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This thesis is about the power of political elites to establish the 
framework of political discourse, and to thereby control political power, in 
Puerto Rico.  The Puerto Rican 'status question' - the debate about the island's 
ultimate juridical and political relationship with the United States and the rest 
of the world – is considered a manifestation of such power.  Formal domestic 
politics in Puerto Rico is structured around three party political desires for an 
uncertain and unknowable postcolonial future, and not around any set of 
distinctive ideological positions for engaging with political issues in the present.  
An unresolved question of nationalism and state building therefore becomes the 
structural filter through which all politics must necessarily pass.  Inspired by 
the concept of hegemony, the thesis is firstly interested in how political elites 
exercise power to establish status as the framework for domestic political 
discourse.  Secondly, and more importantly, it is interested in how this 
framework is reinforced, modified, resisted and even overcome through elite 
exercises of power in concrete political settings. 
The thesis takes a particular focus on the relationship between status 
positions and everyday political practices in three Puerto Rican municipalities: 
Guaynabo, Caguas and Lares.  The author arrived at this focus through an 
ethnographic engagement with the field that was made possible by his research 
positionality as a white British outsider to Puerto Rico.  The thesis tells the story 
of the nuanced ways in which local political elites engage with the status 
question through practices of politics on the ground.  Elite performances of local 
state power do not straightforwardly reproduce the hegemony of status, but 
rather, create a more complicated empirical terrain of contradictory, 
unexpected and subversive effects.   
In certain places, everyday practices of municipal politics appear to 
reflect the intractable entanglement of local priorities and centrally prescribed 
status positions.  In others, politics gets done in ways that leave the status 
question behind, creating effects that include city-state sovereignty, elevated 





possibilities for decolonisation.  Ironically, therefore, a political system that is so 
profoundly shaped by discourses of nationalism and state building is disrupted 
in practice by some of the very actors who help to give the system this shape.  
These findings contribute to critical geographies of the Caribbean and to recent 




 In Puerto Rico, politicians and political parties do not define themselves 
in terms of left and right.  Instead, they organise around positions on the island’s 
unresolved ‘status question’: should it become an independent country, 
integrate with the United States as its 51st state, or continue as an autonomous 
US Commonwealth?  This thesis investigates how status positions influence 
everyday political decision-making in three Puerto Rican cities.  In essence, it 
attempts to compare what Puerto Rican politicians say against what they 
actually do.  It tells the story of the nuanced ways in which politicians engage 
with the status question through political practices on the ground.  The purpose 
of this inquiry is to look for new ideas that could help to break, or overcome, the 
current deadlock between the three main status positions.  Puerto Ricans have 
been voting ambiguously, unable to clearly decide which direction to take.   
 The thesis does not recommend an urgent, formal decolonisation of 
Puerto Rico according to any traditional option.  Instead, it argues that several 
reforms to its existing democracy are more immediately necessary.  Such 
reforms could in turn move Puerto Ricans towards clearer agreement about the 
change they want regarding their relationship with the United States and the 
rest of the world.  These findings are of greatest relevance to the Puerto Rican 
people.  The thesis will therefore be disseminated to the island’s public 
university, the University of Puerto Rico, which generously hosted the author as 
a Visiting Scholar in 2010-11.  This research was funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council in the United Kingdom.  It provides a fresh, 
contemporary perspective on a Caribbean island that is significantly under-
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1 Introduction: the 'failure of the century' 
 
 This thesis is about the relationship between hegemonic political 
discourses and everyday politics in Puerto Rico.  This relationship is 
interrogated through a focus on Puerto Rico's status issue - the ongoing 
question of the Caribbean island's ultimate political relationship with the United 
States and the rest of the world.  Puerto Rico is an island where an unresolved 
question of nationalism and state building has become the structural filter 
through which all domestic politics must necessarily pass.  This is because 
Puerto Rico's three main political parties define and differentiate themselves 
not in terms of socio-economic ideology, but rather, their status preferences for 
the island.  Put another way, formal domestic politics on Puerto Rico is 
structured around three party political desires for an uncertain and 
unknowable postcolonial future, and not around any set of distinctive 
ideological positions for engaging with political issues in the present.  Thus the 
New Progressive Party (PNP) advocates statehood (integration into the United 
States as the fifty-first federated state of the union), the Popular Democratic 
Party (PDP) defends autonomy (as manifested by the island's present 
Commonwealth relationship with the United States, a status they seek to 
perfect), and the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) demands the 
establishment of an independent nation-state republic. 
 However, Puerto Rico is stuck.  In spite of four countrywide plebiscites in 
1967, 1993, 1998, and most recently in 2012, Puerto Ricans have been unable to 
reach a clear consensus at the ballot box about which direction to take.  On each 
occasion the traditional status preferences of statehood, Commonwealth and 
independence, as advocated by the respective political parties, were presented 
to the voting public.  Yet the electorate has repeatedly divided itself almost fifty-
fifty between the Commonwealth and statehood options, with the 
Commonwealth status quo prevailing in 1967, 1993 and 1998, statehood taking 
a heavily disputed win in 2012, and independence never garnering more than 
four percent of the vote.  Meanwhile, decades of persistent lobbying by Puerto 





maintains Puerto Rico in a colonial relationship and thus holds the power to 
change it - have been totally fruitless.  Faced with a lose-lose situation of 
plebiscite deadlock on the island and repeated shows of indifference by the 
powers that be on the mainland (Figure 1.1), Puerto Rican status politics has 
arrived at a tranque - the Puerto Rican slang word for 'dead-end' (Rivera Ortiz, 
2001: 27).  Indeed, the status issue was derided in the millennial issue of Puerto 




Figure 1.1: ¡Yo no comprende español!  Newspaper cartoon depicting a PNP leader's 
insistence that Obama resolve the status issue, but the president claims not to 
understand.  (Source: El Vocero, 2010) 
 
 This thesis searches for the possible ways for Puerto Ricans to move 
beyond the tranque.  It does so by investigating how the structural dominance of 
status translates into everyday practices in Puerto Rico's domestic political 
system.  While status dominates the island's political structure, how - if at all - is 





First, and quite simply, it offers an original line of enquiry into an otherwise 
exhausted debate.  Second, it provides an empirical contribution to new ideas 
advanced by Puerto Rican political authors who are finally reflecting on the 
importance of status.  Third, and most significantly, the results of this enquiry 
have the political potential to transform current understandings of the terms 
and significance of the Puerto Rican status question.  On the one hand, it might 
discover that there are ways to make status more relevant - that is, to disrupt 
the stalemate and move the issue forward.  On the other, it might reveal an 
equally significant but rather more subversive conclusion about the need to 
reimagine Puerto Rican politics beyond status entirely.    
Deploying an ethnographic research strategy in three field sites, this 
thesis uncovers evidence in support of both propositions.   It tells the story of 
the nuanced ways in which political elites engage with the status question 
through practices of politics on the ground.  In certain places, the concrete 
efforts of political elites to move Puerto Rico towards new forms of consensus 
on status reflect the intractable entanglement of local political priorities and 
status positions.  In other places, politics gets done in ways that leave the status 
question behind, despite the external filter of status on politics in Puerto Rico.  
Ironically, therefore, a political system that is so profoundly shaped by 
discourses of nationalism and state building is disrupted in practice by some of 
the very actors who help to give the system this shape.  The practice of politics 
in a non-nationalist framework shows that it is possible to overcome political 
imaginations that are bound up in the discourses of Commonwealth, statehood 
or independence. 
 
1.1 Research questions 
 
 The primary research question of this thesis is the following: 
 
1.  What is the relationship between the structural dominance of the status 





The thesis aims to question how Puerto Rican politicians' declared wishes for 
their people, as manifested in their status preferences, translate into their 
everyday political work.  In this respect it is a relatively simple question of 
comparing what Puerto Rican politicians say against what they actually do.  
However, that this question has gone almost universally ignored in the 
literature reveals the dominant and largely unchallenged position of status in 
most accounts of Puerto Rican politics.  In Puerto Rico, status and politics are 
virtually synonymous.  As a result, status has served to block alternative 
understandings of politics and severely limited the number of studies that take 
them seriously, let alone assess their significance relative to status.  With its 
focus on everyday practices of governance and decision-making, the above 
research question aims to rectify this situation. 
 
 The primary research question is supported by two secondary questions: 
 
2.  Where and how do positions on status influence everyday politics? 
 
In order to answer the main research question the project first identifies 
relevant institutional locations for investigating the relationship between status 
position and political action.  It is about grounding status in a concrete domestic 
political context.  This is achieved firstly by tracing the hegemonic discourses of 
status to their institutional bases: the three main political parties.  The thesis 
then argues that the municipalities - the administrative and territorial divisions 
of the local state - present the ideal scale to investigate the relationship between 
hegemonic party political discourses and the practices of politicians on the 
ground. 
 
3.  How do new perspectives on the relationship between status and everyday 
politics transform the terms and significance of the status debate, and develop our 






This question draws upon the principal findings of the thesis to reconsider the 
political significance of the status question and related positions, and advance 
new ideas about how the tranque might be overcome.  Specifically, the 
municipalities are, to a degree, able to subvert issues of nationalism and state 
building in the pursuit of alternative political agendas that forge more direct 
connections to the material politics of everyday settings.  The thesis therefore 
recommends no status option, nor indeed any immediate status change, but 
rather modest reforms to Puerto Rico’s existing representative democracy to 
encourage these alternative forms of politics.  Structural improvements to 
Puerto Rican democracy in the short and medium-term could ultimately lead to 
new forms of popular consensus on the status issue beyond deadlocked partisan 
positions.  Moreover, they could pluralise the debate beyond mere concerns of 
the central state to more clearly articulate the implications of different ideas 
about reorganising state power for cities, municipalities and communities. 
 
1.2 Thesis structure 
 
To build this argument, the thesis is divided into the following six chapters: 
 
 Chapter Two discusses the literature drawn upon by the thesis.  In 
particular, it demonstrates the importance of understanding the Puerto Rican 
status question in the context of debates on hegemony, discourse, performance 
and power; on the geographies of politics; and on conceptions of the political.  
This chapter contextualises the above research questions and explains their 
pertinence in terms of the shortcomings, challenges and unfilled research gaps 
of the existing scholarship on Puerto Rican politics.  Indeed, the present 
research enters at a crucial moment where a growing number of Puerto Rican 
intellectuals are critiquing the traditional framing of the debate from a variety 
of perspectives, in the process turning "the question of status" into "the status of 
the question" (Negrón-Muntaner, 2007: 1).  Moreover, to the author’s 





perspective - in any discipline - since Peter Jackson's (1980) PhD thesis A Social 
Geography of Puerto Ricans in New York. 
Chapter Three explains how I developed the thesis' research questions 
and arrived at a focus on the municipal scale of Puerto Rican politics to answer 
them.  This involved an ethnographic research strategy of extended overseas 
fieldwork, allowing for immersion into the puzzle of Puerto Rican politics, 
language learning, and a search for an original yet politically productive line of 
enquiry.  It underlines that researching Puerto Rican politics presents 
significant epistemological challenges.  However, I negotiated these challenges 
as a white British ‘outsider’ to Puerto Rico, where I was positioned 
advantageously within a regional Caribbean mindset that facilitated my 
progress in practical and intellectual ways.   
Chapter Four draws upon pilot data from central political leaders in 
order to demonstrate that hegemony is evident in the Puerto Rican status 
question.  It establishes that Puerto Rico's party political structure is built 
around competing ideas about political affiliation - ultimately, nationalism and 
state building.  It explains how the parties attempt to set the status question as 
the framework for political discourse in Puerto Rico.  Moreover, it reveals that 
the efforts of political elites to set this framework obscure their own interests to 
dominate domestic political power.  It also discusses the structure of formal 
municipal politics and explains its potential to empower local political actors to 
reinforce, modify, resist and even overcome centrally prescribed status 
positions. 
Chapter Five notes that positions on status appear to be relevant to the 
political practices of three municipalities: Guaynabo, Caguas and Lares.  Here 
local political elites have implemented material changes to the everyday, lived 
environment of the municipalities in order to bring into being and normalise 
discourses of Puerto Rican identity that are consistent with their status 
positions.  They are seen to exercise local power in ways that have resulted in 
the reinforcement, reinterpretation and resistance of different perspectives on 





predetermined aspect of Puerto Rican reality but rather constitutive of 
hegemonic discourses that are routinely brought into being and negotiated 
through performances in material space.   
Chapter Six examines in greater depth the relationship between status 
positions and the structures and everyday practices of politics in the 
municipalities.  It notes that the mayors of Guaynabo, Caguas and Lares exercise 
their local powers according to a range of ideologies and priorities.  Nonetheless, 
local political agendas become significantly entangled with centrally prescribed 
status positions through routine practices in the municipal executives.  Such 
entanglements create a complicated empirical terrain of effects that do not 
simply reproduce hegemonic status positions but also contradict and subvert 
them in unexpected ways. 
Chapter Seven considers that the everyday politics of Puerto Rican 
municipalities mount conceptual and practical challenges to the salience of 
formal political status.  Conceptually, certain municipalities subvert the 
ontological scales that constitute the status question – the central state and 
nation-state – by harnessing decentralisation and responding to globalisation.  
Practically, the performance of decentralised power in the municipalities has 
created a series of effects that only a status resolution is supposed to make 
possible, according to dominant political discourses in Puerto Rico.  These 
effects include city-state sovereignty, elevated standards of living, and even 
decolonisation. 
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis.  The entanglements of local politics 
and status politics in the Puerto Rican municipalities would appear to suggest 
that the status question matters.  However, to a degree the municipalities are 
able to leave status behind by practicing non-nationalist forms of politics 
principally focused on the material conditions of lived and everyday settings.  
The thesis recommends structural reforms to deepen and expand non-
nationalist politics in Puerto Rico.  Ultimately, this might destabilise currently 
deadlocked partisan positions on status and lead to a new popular consensus 





Puerto Rican political institution, status position or individual politician - which 
is so often the tone of existing writings on Puerto Rican politics - but rather to 
offer an analysis that an outsider is optimally positioned to offer.  Puerto Rican 
politics currently suffers from a particular predisposition that precludes the 
ability of many people to see things in a different way. 
 
1.3 Background to Puerto Rico 
 
 Puerto Rico is located in the centre of the Caribbean Sea, east of the 
Dominican Republic and west of the Lesser Antilles chain (Figure 1.2).  Its land 
area stretches approximately 100 miles from east to west and 35 miles from 
north to south. With a population of 3.72 million, Puerto Rico is one of the most 
densely populated areas of the world, with 1,088 inhabitants per square mile 
(US Census Bureau, 2012a: 32).  Puerto Rico was a colony of Spain for 400 years 
from 1493 until 1898, when the United States invaded the island during the 
Spanish-American War.  Three years later Puerto Rico's status was established 
as a 'non-incorporated territory' of the United States subject to the Territorial 
Clause of the US Constitution.  According to this clause, effective to this day, 
Puerto Rico "belongs to but is not part of the United States" (Duany, 2005: 7).  
As such the US Constitution and Bill of Rights do not apply in their entirety to 
the island (Task Force, 2011: 17).  In 1952, Puerto Rico became a US 
Commonwealth (in Spanish, Estado Libre Asociado, or 'Free Associated State'), 
an ambiguous, semi-autonomous status that granted the island a local 
constitution and powers over most local matters, including culture, language, 








Figure 1.2:  Location of Puerto Rico.  (Source: García, 2011) 
 
 Under the Commonwealth arrangement the US Federal Government 
retains jurisdiction over most state affairs, including foreign relations and trade, 
currency, citizenship, customs and immigration, defence, and courts.  All federal 
laws apply to Puerto Rico.  Moreover, Puerto Rico continues to be subjected to 
the Territorial Clause of the US Constitution despite its semi-autonomous status 
(Smith, 2007: 279).  Puerto Ricans have been US citizens since 1917.  However, 
since Puerto Rico is not a state, its residents cannot vote for the president nor 
send a delegation of representatives or senators to US Congress.   They are 
entitled to a range of federal government programs, but the island's unique 
juridical status as a non-incorporated territory permits Congress to treat Puerto 
Rico unequally in this regard compared with the states of the union (Cabranes, 
1986: 453).  This said, as US citizens Puerto Ricans may freely travel to and 
establish residency in any of the 50 states, and thereby enjoy the full rights of 
living in a state.  Indeed nearly 5 million Puerto Ricans currently live in the 
United States, making the diaspora significantly greater than the island 
population (US Census Bureau, 2012b).  Puerto Rico has one non-voting 





alongside Spanish as an official language, but it is estimated that only 18% of the 
population speaks it fluently (Pousada, 2008: 138). 
 Politics in Puerto Rico is structured by passionate and tireless debate 
about the ambiguities and contradictions of the island's present juridical 
condition.  However, at the same time Puerto Ricans face considerable domestic 
challenges, including metropolitan economic dependency, poverty, crime, 
unemployment, population decrease, and governmental corruption.  While in 
2009 the island's pro-statehood Resident Commissioner saw a positive 
atmosphere in US Congress to push the status issue, calling it "an alignment of 
the stars" (Caribbean Business, 2009: 22), many political commentators have 
considered the "collective obsession" of status (Toro, 2008: 37) a constant 
distraction from more immediate socio-economic and institutional problems.  
Notably, close to 50% of Puerto Ricans depend upon food stamps, housing, 
university scholarships and other federal benefits (Rivera Ortiz, 2009: 51), 
around half of all families on the island fall below the federal poverty level and 
receive federal food stamps (Pantojas-García, 2007: 208), and per capita income 
is one third that of the mainland (Task Force, 2011: 4).  Unemployment on the 
island reached 16.9% in 2010 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013) and a year 
earlier its labour force participation rate was 43.2%, the lowest in the world 
(Hernández Colón, 2009b: 23). 
Puerto Rico has been in economic recession since 2006 (Harvard-MIT 
Puerto Rican Caucus, 2008: 44).  Brain drain to the United States resulted in a 
population decrease of 2.2% between 2010 and 2000 (US Census Bureau, 
2012a: 25).  The per capita murder rate is currently six times that of the United 
States (Greene, 2013).  In 2010 the FBI conducted its largest ever police 
corruption raid, rounding up 90 members of the Puerto Rico Police Department 
with suspected links to drug trafficking (Melia, 2010).  Given the predominance 
of status issues in Puerto Rico, politicians often interpret these serious domestic 
problems through the lens of their status positions.  This thesis is interested to 
consider the ways in which status positions might also inform the solutions that 










 This thesis is about the power to establish the framework of political 
discourse, and to thereby control political power, in Puerto Rico.  Specifically, it 
examines the processes through which the island's status question has come to 
determine this framework, and considers the ways in which it is reinforced, 
modified, resisted and even overcome through exercises of power in everyday 
political settings.  The present chapter provides a summary and analysis of the 
literature that is pertinent to this interrogation.  The first section outlines the 
theoretical approach of the thesis, which is formed of ideas on discourse, 
hegemony, performance, everyday politics and power.  The chapter is then 
structured around broader debates in Caribbean studies, social sciences and 
geography that importantly contextualise the adopted theoretical approach.  
These sections engage with current scholarship on Puerto Rican status from 
multiple disciplines in order to highlight a number of research gaps that the 
thesis is able to usefully fill. 
The first section details the theoretical framework.  The second section 
briefly identifies where this thesis sits in the context of recent Caribbeanist 
literatures and scholarship on geographies of the Caribbean.  The third section 
notes that most scholars of Puerto Rico contribute to the hegemony of status by 
rooting it in a dichotomy of two related discourses that are also hegemonic: 
colonialism and nationalism.  The fourth section reviews traditional and 
progressive approaches to the relationships between politics, scale and the state 
in geography and social science.  It does so to highlight that the hegemony of 
status question has skewed understandings of these relationships in the Puerto 
Rican literature, with most writings prioritising the scalar units of nation, state 
and nation-state as the containers of political power. 
The fifth section reviews traditional and progressive understandings of 





explain that the status question has come to dominate understandings of 
politics and the political in Puerto Rico.  The chapter concludes by noting that 
the dominance of the status question has not, remarkably, been matched by 
academic research into it.  Some scholars have started to challenge the 
framework set by questions of status and, in the process, the power relations 
that its hegemony maintains.  Given that this exciting new work is mostly 
theoretical, the present thesis aims to provide some important empirical 
grounding. 
 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
 
Conceptually, this thesis is interested in how hegemonic discourses are 
reinforced, modified, resisted and even overcome through performed practices 
in lived and everyday contexts.  It takes a focus on the varied, everyday 
performances of power through which hegemony works in Puerto Rico.  The 
island’s status question is understood as a manifestation of hegemony.  This is 
because status clearly reflects the power of Puerto Rican political elites to 
establish the framework for domestic political discourse.  The thesis considers 
status a debate in which three different party political visions of state power – 
as represented by the status positions of statehood, Commonwealth and 
independence – struggle and compete for hegemony.  It asks how these state 
visions are reinforced, modified, resisted and even overcome through everyday 
practices of politics in concrete settings.  Using case studies of the everyday 
practices of local political elites in three municipal sites, the thesis looks to 
demonstrate that elite performances of state power do not straightforwardly 
reproduce the hegemony of status, but rather, create a more complicated 
empirical terrain of contradictory, unexpected and subversive effects.  The 
purpose of this interrogation is to look for new ideas to break, or overcome, the 
current deadlock of formal status politics in Puerto Rico.  Ideas on discourse, 
hegemony, performance, everyday politics and power form the theoretical 





2.2.1 Discourse and hegemony 
 
 The Puerto Rican status question may be usefully conceptualised as a 
discourse.  Discourse is language that creates and shapes the structures of 
meaning through which the world is interpreted.  According to theories of 
discourse, language does not transparently represent a pre-existing reality, but 
rather, actively produces it “via practices of interpretation deploying different 
modes of representation” (Campbell, 2009: 166).  In this way, discourses “shape 
the contours of the taken-for-granted world, naturalising and universalising a 
particular subject formation and view of the world” (2009: 167).  Foucault 
writes about ‘regimes of truth’ as the mechanisms and techniques that produce 
discourses which function as ‘true’ in particular times and places.  As he puts it, 
“each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth; that is, the 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault, in 
Rabinow, 1991: 75).  ‘Truth’ and ‘general politics’ are created and maintained by 
dominant groups who exercise the majority of power in a society through 
institutions.  In this way, “truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of 
power which produce and sustain it” (1991: 74).  As a starting point, the status 
question may therefore be considered a discourse that is created and 
maintained by powerful groups in Puerto Rico to sustain the appearance of 
particular realities and truths. 
 Hegemony is a useful concept for developing an understanding of how 
particular discourses manage to predominate in a society over alternative 
interpretations of reality.  Antonio Gramsci (1973) theorised hegemony as the 
power of a dominant group “to persuade subordinate classes to accept its moral, 
political, and cultural values as the 'natural' order"(Jackson, 1989: 53; emphasis 
added).  Hegemony refers to the power of persuasion, as opposed to the power 
of coercion through physical force, to achieve control: “hegemonic controls 
involve a set of ideas and values that the majority are persuaded to adopt as 
their own” (Kong and Law, 2002: 1505).  In this way particular ideologies are 





successful, the social order endorsed by the elite is the very same that the 
masses desire.  The concept of hegemony deepens an understanding of the 
Puerto Rican status question as a hegemonic discourse – a framing device or 
lens through which elite groups have persuaded the majority to think and look.  
As Peet (2007: 13) neatly puts it: “There is a special class thinking up and 
spreading dominant modes of thought.  We should know who they are”.  In 
Puerto Rico, continued ambiguities at the ballot box indicate that no one status 
position has successfully secured hegemony.  However, the thesis contends that 
the performance of competing status discourses, and their resulting tensions, 
entanglements and interdependencies, serve to cement as hegemonic the status 
question itself. 
The thesis departs from Gramsci and adopts a more nuanced 
understanding of hegemony beyond a simple Marxist binary of elite domination 
and non-elite resistance.  It is inspired by Peet’s (2007) distinction between 
hegemony, sub-hegemony and counter-hegemony.  This provides a useful 
framework for understanding the varied ways in which Puerto Rico’s local 
political elites negotiate status positions as established centrally by the political 
parties.  Hegemony, in Peet’s (2007: 22) words, is the discursive production of 
“power centres formed by institutional complexes”.  The thesis considers the 
three main political parties to be power centres.  Sub-hegemony refers to the 
actions of “peripheral centres of power”, which “translate received discourses, 
modify and add to ideas, and provide evidence of their validity through regional 
practice” (2007: 22).  The thesis understands Puerto Rico’s municipal 
governments as peripheral centres of power.  As the case studies shall 
demonstrate, mayors are able to refashion status discourses received from their 
parties centrally to create alternate effects that may be considered sub-
hegemonic.  Finally, counter-hegemony refers to “centres, institutions and 
movements founded on opposing political beliefs that contend against the 
conventional, and advocate policy alternatives” (2007: 22).  The thesis is 
interested in political elites rather than non-elites in the context of sub-





counter-hegemonic effects by resisting discourses of the centre.  The potential 
for counter-hegemony shall be demonstrated in one case study, where local 
political elites are seen to contest the centrally prescribed status position of 
their own party. 
 
2.2.2 Performance, performativity and everyday politics 
 
This thesis is inspired by theories of performance.  Such approaches 
contend that social phenomena, identities and space are not prefigured and 
determinate but produced or brought into being through everyday practices.  
Ontologically, social life does not pre-exist its performance.  Therefore, as Thrift 
(2003: 2021) puts it, “the world is not a reflection but a continuous 
composition”.  It is in the realm of the everyday – the “ordinary, routine and 
repetitive aspects of social life that are pervasive and yet frequently overlooked 
and taken-for-granted” (Pinder, 2008: 223) – that the world is produced and 
reproduced.  Space is also understood to be constituted through performances.  
As such, “performances do not take place in already existing locations… Specific 
performances bring these places into being” (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 441).  
These ideas deepen an understanding of the status question as not a fixed or 
predetermined aspect of Puerto Rican reality but rather a hegemonic discourse 
that is brought into being through its persistent production and reproduction in 
lived and everyday contexts, and in material space. 
While performance principally focuses on practices (what is actually said, 
done or acted out), ideas of performativity are interested in their potentially 
varied effects.  Performativity considers that hegemonic discourses are never 
perfectly reproduced through performances, but rather, are modified and even 
subverted.  This is because ‘slippage’ always occurs between “actual 
performances… and the norms/ideals that they cite” (Pratt, 2008: 525).  
Performativity conceives of performances as ‘citational’ – that is, historically 
embedded in past utterances and discourses which are repeated.  However, the 





subversion, rupture, agency, and the constitution of new strategies.  
Performativity therefore “pertains to the citational practices which produce and 
subvert discourse and knowledge” (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 433; emphasis 
added).  In sum, the performative refers to the ‘doing’ of discourse and its 
potentially varied effects (Crouch, 2003: 1947).  The thesis looks to 
demonstrate the relevance of these ideas by detailing how the practices of local 
Puerto Rican political elites do not straightforwardly reproduce hegemonic 
status discourses, but rather create, in a performative way, a more complicated 
empirical terrain of contradictory, unexpected and subversive effects. 
The thesis theorises the practices of local political elites in terms of ideas 
on ‘everyday politics’.  Everyday politics refers to “the ways in which official 
politics enters and permeates the local and everyday (and vice versa)” (Rigg, 
2007: 144).  These interactions between official and everyday politics take place 
through “the quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that indirectly 
and for the most part privately endorse, modify or resist prevailing procedures, 
rules, regulations or order” (Kerkvliet, 2005; in Rigg, 2007: 144).  Adapting 
these ideas to Puerto Rico, this thesis searches for possible intersections 
between the ‘official politics’ of centrally prescribed status positions and the 
routine practices of Puerto Rican political actors at the municipal scale of 
government.  This adaptation takes a view of everyday politics that 
encompasses the ordinary decision-making of Puerto Rican politicians within 
the structures of the local state.  Everyday politics conceives of decision-making 
as a performed, mundane practice through which hegemonic discourses, as set 
from the centre, are reinforced, reworked, contested, and even bypassed or 
overcome.  Theoretically, therefore, the thesis contends that local political 
practices in Puerto Rico could have real implications for the salience and 











The concept of power importantly bridges the above concepts of 
discourse, hegemony, performance, performativity and everyday politics.1  
According to theories of discourse, power is not fixed and simply possessed in a 
hierarchy of individuals, groups or institutions from most to least powerful, but 
exercised.  Discourses, and by extension hegemony, flow through the exercise of 
power (Gaventa, 2003).  Dominant groups and institutions exercise power in an 
attempt to secure hegemony for their discourses.  Power may be exercised in 
negative and positive ways – negatively in the sense of coercion or repression, 
and positively in the sense of production or persuasion, as per hegemony (Sharp 
et al, 2000: 2).  Power is exercised through performances; which is to say, 
through everyday practices.  As such, everyday practice is fundamental to the 
workings of power (Thrift, 2000a).  By extrapolation, the reinforcements, 
modifications, resistances and subversions of discourse that take place in the 
realm of the everyday are also defining aspects of power.  For example, Thrift 
(2000b: 384) notes that geopolitical stances, national identities and forms of 
governance are brought into being and reinforced through the “smallest of 
details” and “mundane citations” in everyday life.  Everyday resistances and 
subversions are equally significant:  
 
All powerful systems are constantly being undermined by the 
undertow of everyday practice, not least because they themselves 
consist of everyday practices.  Though they can call on various 
forms of technology to make them more durable, they cannot 
transcend other ontological skills… Almost as a matter of routine 
people slide around these systems. (Thrift, 2000a: 270) 
 
By investigating the relationship between status positions and everyday 
political practice, this thesis explores the complex ways in which power works 
in Puerto Rico.  It is inspired by two particular theories of power that help 
                                                        
1 While it is not the purpose of this chapter to explain the distinction and interactions between 





explain the interactions of status positions and everyday politics: Allen’s (2004) 
relational account of power and Sharp et al’s (2000) entanglements of power. 
Allen’s (2004) relational account of power understands that decision-
makers in institutions ‘beneath’ the central state (according to a hierarchical 
understanding of state power) are in practice able to strategically work around 
or beyond it through their own power exercises.  In his words, power is about 
“the cross-cutting nature of governing relationships as different bodies, 
partners and organisations mediate the decision-making process, mobilising 
resources independently of any central authority” (2004: 24).  This definition 
reflects the current trend of theorising the everyday governing processes of 
political institutions as ‘governance’.  Governance attempts to “broaden 
‘government’ beyond the strictly delineated world of nation-state action” 
(Larner, 2011: 338) - as per state-centric forms of political power - in order to 
consider “the growing involvement of private and third sector actors in a 
diverse range of activities once conventionally associated with the state” (2011: 
338).  The thesis considers the Puerto Rican municipality not merely a ‘site’ of 
held local power but rather a potential “honeycomb for politics” where the 
mayor, legislators, executive directors and non-governmental actors “can 
themselves mobilise to intervene, interrupt or modify the translatable goals of 
government” through power exercises (Allen, 2004: 24).  As will be shown 
empirically, everyday Puerto Rican politics therefore brings into focus the 
structures and practices of power that reinforce, contest, complicate and even 
overcome the aspirations to central state-building that constitute all status 
positions.   
Sharp et al’s (2000) theory of power contends that processes of 
domination and resistance do not exist in a simple binary opposition to one 
another, as per orthodox accounts of power, but are inherently ‘entangled’.  
“Domination and resistance cannot exist independently of each other… the one 
always contain[s] the seeds of the other, the one always bear[s] at least a trace 
of the other that contaminates or subverts it” (2000: 20).  This version of power 





shaping social life – or as Sharp et al (2000: 2) put it, “more grounded 
commentaries alert to the chaotic muddle of empirical situations”.  This thesis is 
particularly interested in the implications of these ideas for theorising the state.  
Within the modern state, power relations are not determined by a static 
hierarchy of institutions or individuals but rather the coming together of “a 
range of different branches, interests and agents, each of which tends to operate 
with different agendas, support networks and constituents” (2000: 7).  
Processes of domination and resistance, and their effects of inscription, 
reinterpretation, contradiction and subversion, are therefore inherent to the 
workings of state power.  Moreover, entanglements of power are fundamentally 
spatial since they are “really, crucially and unavoidably spun out across and 
through the material spaces of the world” (2000: 24). 
Inspired by these ideas, the thesis shall demonstrate that the Puerto 
Rican municipalities – the administrative and political units of the local state – 
are material sites where state power is intractably entangled.  Using empirical 
case studies, it shows how elite performances of power in the municipalities 
connect to local concerns and hegemonic central positions at the same time.  
Centrally prescribed status positions and local political agendas do not exist 
independently of one another in everyday Puerto Rican politics; rather, they are 
seen to interact in ambiguous ways, and create a handful of contradictory, 
unexpected and subversive effects.  The chapter now moves on from the 
theoretical framework to discuss where this thesis sits within current 
literatures on Caribbean studies and Caribbean geographies.  
 
2.3 Caribbean context 
 
This thesis arrives at a moment where the intellectual focus of Caribbean 
studies has shifted well beyond anti-colonial approaches primarily interested in 
issues of nation and state building, as informed by the so-called "wave of 
decolonisation" that swept the region after the Second World War (Oostindie 





of postcolonial approaches in Caribbean societies, which seek to expose and 
challenge the continuation of colonial power relations after formal 
independence and critique grand narratives of progress and history (Walcott, 
1995; Lamming, 2002).  Of interest to the thesis are ideas from the region on 
hegemony (Hall, 1987); the possibilities of counter-hegemonic resistance 
(Meeks, 2000); and new understandings of decolonisation (Girvan, 2010; Meeks, 
2003; Nettleford, 2003). 
 Moreover, this research takes place in a contemporary context in which 
insular Caribbean nation-states face a series of 'existential threats' (Girvan, 
2011) in the form of global economic, social, cultural and environmental 
pressures that undermine their viability and territorial integrity.  This 
corresponds to the predominance of regional and transnational institutions 
over governance in the Caribbean, such that "insular independence has become 
largely shambolic and economic sovereignty an illusion" in a global era (2011: 
21).  What is more, the priorities of the United States - the hegemonic power in 
the region - have shifted from military concerns informed by the Cold War to a 
'post-9/11' scenario focused on security, drug trafficking and illegal 
immigration (Pantojas-García and Klak, 2004).  The power of central states in 
the Caribbean is further brought into question by a growing consensus, in both 
independent and non-independent societies, of the need to “empower local 
communities through the increased devolution of central government 
functions" (Benn and Hall, 2003: xii). 
 The thesis is therefore particularly inspired by new thoughts on 
decolonisation beyond state sovereignty, as informed by postcolonial 
experiences in the English-speaking Caribbean.  The endurance of multiple 
colonial legacies after formal independence has led to a proliferation of non-
state-centric ideas about reversing the region's continued cultural, economic 
and epistemic dependency on the metropolitan world.  For example, Meeks 
(2003: 176) calls for a cultural decolonisation based on a pan-Caribbean 
solidarity - a "Caribbean psychic and geographical space" - to strengthen 





economic projects.  It is now accepted that decolonisation crucially involves 
local scale strategies that develop the economic autonomy of communities in a 
global context (Girvan, 2001), with decentralisation and participatory 
governance advanced as ways of decolonising divisive national political cultures 
(Nettleford, 2003).  More widely, decolonisation has been rethought as an 
intellectual or epistemic project to escape colonial ways of thinking (Lamming, 
2001; Girvan, 2010).  Such work underlines the necessity of using indigenous 
ideas over "flawed conceptualisations based on 'imported' formulations" (2010: 
6) to understand Caribbean politics, economics, society and culture. 
 Importantly, the present research adds to a currently small body of 
literature on governance and the prospects of political change in the non-
independent Caribbean (Clegg and Pantojas-García, 2009; Gamaliel Ramos and 
Rivera Ortiz, 2001).  These works examine how territories of the region are 
facing the challenges of globalisation through an unusual set of governance 
arrangements.  Despite the losses of sovereignty experienced by their formally 
independent neighbours, a consensus has formed in the literature around the 
continued salience of political status issues and state power in non-independent 
societies.  Sovereign free association is commonly mooted as the most realistic 
option, offering a 'best of both worlds' autonomous arrangement of sovereign 
powers for meeting global economic challenges while retaining the economic 
and political advantages of metropolitan protection (Sutton, 2007).  However, 
this literature fails to consider the possible implications of debates on 
globalisation, decentralisation and the erosion of nation-state integrity for the 
relevance of the political status question itself - namely, its ultimate framing 
around tropes of national and territorial sovereignty.  This thesis attempts, in 
part, to contribute to a new discussion along these lines. 
 Further, the present research contributes to the growing literature on 
critical geographies of the Caribbean (Kingsbury and Sletto, 2005).  These take a 
particular interest in how forms of governance and island-state sovereignty are 
being rescaled in response to discourses of neoliberalism and globalisation in 





region's "economic and political marginalisation" and the "reduced sovereignty 
of the state relative to capital" as a result of the neoliberal agendas of 
supranational development institutions including the WTO and IMF.  Newstead 
(2009) observes that power has been rescaled beyond the nation-state in the 
form of CARICOM, a regional institution of political, economic and social 
regulation that overcomes the "persistent statism" of its members (2009: 158).  
The rescaling of governance has led to new forms of local politics beyond the 
state involving multiple interest groups, such as participatory development (see 
below).  Attention has also been paid to the disruptive effect of diasporic 
experience and return migration on fixed understandings of nationalism in the 
Caribbean, as citizens become transnational and broaden their political, social 
and economic affinities beyond one nation-state or territory (Conway et al, 
2008; Howard, 2003).  In sum, geographers of the Caribbean are sensitive to the 
reality that major decision-making processes, and movements of people, exceed 
the national scale and involve regional and transnational actors. 
 In particular, the thesis contributes to a large body of works within 
Caribbean studies and Caribbean geographies interested in participatory forms 
of development (Nettleford, 2003; Meeks, 2000; Pugh and Potter, 2003; Pugh 
and Momsen, 2006).  This is because everyday politics in one of the presented 
case studies takes place within a local political structure based on ideas of 
participatory governance.  As will be shown, the performance of participatory 
discourses in this site is related to elite political positions on the Puerto Rican 
status question.  Participatory approaches to development are currently 
fashionable in the Caribbean and Global South.  Indeed, their rise to prominence 
in the last two decades has marked a so-called 'participatory turn' in 
development practice (Sletto, 2005: 77).  Channelling this discourse, 
Caribbeanist intellectuals see opportunities to devolve the "asphyxiating power 
of the centre" (Meeks, 2000: 170) to community-based organisations, and to 
rethink government as a hub for the coming together of partners from the 
private sector, non-governmental organisations and communities (Nettleford, 





 Geographers of the Caribbean have paid significant attention to 
participatory development.  They consider the ways in which participatory 
planning discourses have been adopted, shaped and appropriated in different 
contexts (Pugh and Potter, 2003).  While such strategies are ostensibly 'bottom-
up', championing community empowerment and democratic consensus-
building amongst multiple interest groups, it is noted they are often ironically 
'top-down' in practice (Momsen, 2006: 1).  According to Pugh and Potter (2003: 
17), this is because planning is usually context-neutral and "'imposed' upon a 
complex set of power relations without much appreciation of how those 
contextual relations work in practice".   
 Geographers therefore argue that participatory development initiatives 
rarely disrupt hierarchical structures and relations of power in Caribbean 
democracies.  In fact, they have been seen to actively maintain them, since 
participatory discourses can be co-opted by local and national political elites to 
build up and recentralise their formal state power (Pelling, 1999; Pugh, 2006).  
Participatory development has been further criticised for maintaining the 
hegemony of Western, neoliberal notions of progress in the region according to 
structural adjustment policies and moves to roll back the state (Pugh, 2003).  In 
sum, participatory development in the Caribbean has often become rhetoric that 
masks the exclusion of marginalised groups from decision-making (Pelling, 
1998: 469).  The present case study in Puerto Rico shall make a small 
contribution to these debates by considering how ideas about participatory 
democracy have been appropriated by local political elites in a likely attempt to 
secure hegemony for discourses related to particular status positions. 
 Unfortunately, geographers have paid very little attention to Puerto Rico, 
nor to the non-independent Caribbean more widely.  The most notable recent 
exception is a special edition of Southeastern Geographer collated by 
researchers from the University of Puerto Rico, which takes a mostly economic 
focus on the spread of US chain stores across the island (Guilbe, 2009), the 
globalisation of retail activities (Tillman, 2009), and the proliferation of gated 





call for more research on the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, an area that is 
significantly underrepresented in the existing literature on Caribbean 
geographies (Torres, 2005: 171).2  More specifically, there is an opportunity for 
geographers to consider the political implications of spatial rescalings in the 
region for status questions in the non-independent Caribbean.  Given that 
formal state sovereignty that has proven a "mirage" (Ramphal, 2009: i) for 
many of their neighbours, have the territories found ways to bypass status 
entirely by finding non-state-centric solutions to decolonisation? 
 
2.4 Hegemonic discourses in Puerto Rico 
 
 This section demonstrates that the status question has become a 
dominant discourse that frames much work on Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans 
from a variety of perspectives.  In order to understand how this happens, it is 
necessary to outline two related discourses – colonialism and nationalism - that 
form the binary within which status is traditionally understood.  This is 
evidenced in the way status is described interchangeably as Puerto Rico’s 
“colonial question” (Laó, 1997: 172) or its “national question” (Manuel Carrión, 
1993: 68).  Beyond status, the colonialism/nationalism binary has been used to 
explain multiple aspects of Puerto Rican experience.  The effect of this condition, 
in Ríos Ávila (2007: 247) words, is that "it is now commonplace to start any 
inquiry into things Puerto Rican by invoking the island's ambiguous political 
status as a Commonwealth: political colonialism versus cultural nationalism". 
Most scholars of Puerto Rico agree that the island is a colony of the 
United States "in the classical sense of being politically and economically 
subordinated to another country" (Duany, 2005: 6).  The principal reason for 
this is well known: political sovereignty over Puerto Rico resides in US Congress.  
This was confirmed by an infamous decision of the US Supreme Court in 1901 
that the island legally “belongs to but is not part of the United States” (2005: 7).  
                                                        
2 An important exception is Howard's (2007; 2001) work on the role of racism and 






In Puerto Rico colonialism has therefore become a "simple and perfectly useful 
word" describing "a relationship between a powerful metropolitan state and a 
poor overseas dependency that does not participate meaningfully in the formal 
lawmaking processes that shape the daily lives of its people" (Cabranes, 2001: 
40-1).  Puerto Rican scholars commonly lament the continuation of colonialism 
on the island.  For example, Malavet (2002: 421) finds it "utterly astonishing 
that this one-hundred-year-old colonial captivity endures".  Trías Monge (1997: 
107) goes further back to the four hundred years of Spanish occupation before 
the US invasion to describe Puerto Rico as "the oldest colony in the world".  In 
sum, the discourse of colonialism has assumed a hegemonic presence in Puerto 
Rico.  As Flores (2000: 35) puts it: "though it carries a seemingly endless array 
of meanings, and the formulas for challenging it span the full range of political 
options, the word colony, or its connotations, resonates virtually unchallenged 
in Puerto Rican public life". 
 Nationalism has been cemented as a second dominant discourse in 
Puerto Rico, in binary opposition to colonialism.  Nationalism is commonly 
framed as the “cure” to the “disease” of colonialism (Quiroga, 1997: 116).  The 
starting point for Puerto Rican nationalism is the overwhelming consensus, 
both popular and academic, that Puerto Rico is a nation.  As Duany (2000: 8) 
notes, Puerto Rico fulfils most of the traditional criteria for nationhood – a 
shared language, territory, culture and history – less political sovereignty.  Two 
different forms of nationalism are posited as the cures for Puerto Rico’s colonial 
condition: political nationalism and cultural nationalism.  Political nationalists 
argue that independence is the logical culmination of Puerto Rican nationhood 
and the way to definitively end colonialism.  The context of "yankee 
imperialism" (Enamorado-Cuesta, 1966: 2) presents the Puerto Rican nation 
with a straightforward dilemma of "liberty or domination" (Sánchez Tarniella, 
1973: 4).  Political nationalists also contend that Puerto Ricans face an 
existential dilemma of "cultural assimilation versus national consciousness" 





safeguard Puerto Rico's national distinctiveness in the face of "North American 
cultural aggression" (Méndez, 1980:1). 
 Puerto Rican cultural nationalists agree with political nationalists on the 
existence and traits of a national collective, but disagree about its necessary 
political destiny.  Cultural nationalists contend that the Puerto Rican nation is 
fully expressed within Commonwealth status, while political nationalists go 
further to "equate the nation with the state" (Duany, 2007: 53).  Cultural 
nationalism was one of the PDP’s landmark policies after founding the 
Commonwealth in 1952.  Dávila (1997: 61) notes that the party created an 
“institutional structuregeared at combating colonialism through the 
enhancement of Puerto Rican culture”.  The PDP therefore attempts to convince 
Puerto Ricans that "the struggle for independence is not a necessary condition 
for the construction of a national identity" (Pantojas-García, 2005: 174).  The 
pro-statehood position, represented by the PNP, usually argues that Puerto Rico 
is not a nation but rather a ‘cultural identity’ within the US nation that would be 
fully protected under a ‘creole statehood’ (Meléndez, 1991: 136). 
The predominance of colonial and national discourses cements the 
hegemony of the status question in Puerto Rico.  First, colonial discourse 
reinforces status by constructing it as the mechanism for ending colonialism.  
The continued existence of the question therefore signifies the continued 
existence of colonialism.  In Meléndez’s (1991: 122) words, "Puerto Rico's 
'status issue' is the euphemism used to name the island's colonial problem".  
Second, discourses on nationalism cement the status question by constructing it 
as a fundamental debate on national identity.  Therefore, consensus has 
emerged that different status options have significant consequences for 
definitions of ‘Puerto Ricanness’ (Morris, 1995).   
As a result, Puerto Rico gets theorised through a perpetual ‘status lens’.  
The current political status of Puerto Rico, and the debate around changing it, 
end up framing discussion on Puerto Rico from a variety of perspectives.  Many 
scholars of Puerto Rico – particularly those not from the island - have remarked 





status issue.  As Anderson (1973: 17) puts it, "it is the status-identity of Puerto 
Rico with regard to the United States which provides the ultimate framework 
for the posing of all other problems.  The so-called 'status problem' provides the 
moral context within which all meaningful issues in Puerto Rico are expressed".  
Fernández (2000: 269) reflexively notes that "the social situation and political 
status are part of our Weltanschauung and are so intertwined as to give the 
appearance of one-ness".  The ‘meaningful issues’ that get interpreted in a status 
framework include debates on politics, economics, culture, society, law, history, 
and psychology.3  Carr (1984: 3), for example, notes that “economic problems 
are never seen, as perhaps they should be, as independent of status choices”, 
and Espada (1999: 143) describes Puerto Rican society as a “daily reality of 
colonised minds and colonised bodies”. 
Remarkably, the dominance of the status question in Puerto Rico has not 
been matched by academic research into it.  Very little empirically rigorous 
work has been completed on the status question itself.  What exists falls into 
three broad categories.  First, there are a handful of quantitative studies based 
on statistical analyses of surveys and voting data from past elections and 
plebiscites.  For example, Barreto (2000a) contends it is likely that Puerto 
Ricans vote in general elections according to their status preferences.  Cámara-
Fuertes and Rosas-Cintrón (2004) forge links between the status positions, 
political views and socio-economic backgrounds of Puerto Ricans, noting that 
statehood supporters tend to be urban, poor, uneducated and reliant on federal 
aid; independence supporters are younger, highly educated and middle class; 
and Commonwealth supporters are “disproportionately rural” (2004: 170).   
The second body of empirical literature on status attempts to reveal the 
perspective of US Congress.  As the arbiter of any status change and the locus of 
political power over Puerto Rico, this institution has received 
significantattention.  For example, an interview and questionnaire-based study 
of members of Congress by Colón Morera et al (1993) notes the repeated 
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indifference shown to Puerto Rican affairs.  The authors conclude that status is 
"too far removed from congressional election or re-election concerns in order 
for it to become a salient issue demanding significant attention” (1993: 364).  
Similarly, Trías Monge (1997: 3) contends that Congress “studiously ignores” 
Puerto Rico and is not clear about the status options it is actually willing to 
accept, nor in what forms.  Further, Rivera Ortiz and Ramos (2001) observe how 
the terrain of the status debate in Congress has shifted from classical issues of 
disenfranchisement and democracy and towards economic questions.  As such, 
Congress increasingly insists that any status solution be 'revenue neutral' - that 
is, require no further expenditure on the part of the United States. 
The third body of empirical work on status is based on “formalist-legalist 
readings of the US-Puerto Rico relationship” (Laó, 1997: 172).  These take data 
in the form of the countless legal precedents (Rivera Ramos, 2001) and US 
Congressional hearings (Lugo-Lugo, 2006) that have made up debates on status.  
This data is typically used to argue for onefavoured status option (Rubinstein, 
2001; Smith, 2007; Malavet, 2002) or for the imperative of formal 
decolonisation more generally (Duffy Burnett, 2007; Trías Monge, 1997).  The 
bias towards legal studies in the literature on status - as indicated by their 
disproportionate number - perhaps reflects the dominant framing of status as a 
principally legal or juridical question.  It is presumed that the most important 
contributions to the debate are made from this perspective, since the juridical 
parameters of the current framework of US-Puerto Rican relations appear to 
define what is possible (Malavet, 2004).  Political analysts therefore note it may 
be no coincidence that Puerto Rican political elites so often have a legal 
education (Cámara-Fuertes, 2010: 5). 
 
2.4.1 Challenges to hegemonic discourses in Puerto Rico 
 
 The existing empirical scholarship on the status question does nothing to 
challenge the framework that it sets, nor the power relations that its hegemony 





progressive scholars have started to problematise discourses of colonialism and 
nationalism in Puerto Rico.  Given that these discourses form the foundation of 
status, some authors have applied their critiques to challenge status by 
extrapolation.  While these are not studies of status directly, they inspire the 
present study nonetheless by problematising its foundational concepts.  
Fortunately, some writers have directly challenged the current framework of 
status by using new theories of power, but this work requires empirical 
grounding. 
 First, progressive scholars have started to rethink the nature of 
colonialism in Puerto Rico.  Puerto Rico's colonial experience does not fit a 
classical account of direct military and political control, metropolitan neglect, 
and violent nationalist reaction, as in many neighbouring Caribbean and Latin 
American republics (Laó-Montes, 2008: 15).  Regardless, most island 
intellectuals frame Puerto Rican struggles in this way, "within a nineteenth-
century model of colonialism in which the colonised live in daily confrontation 
with the invader on their own soil" (Grosfoguel et al, 1997: 10).  It is now 
accepted that Puerto Ricans have democratically consented to colonialism by 
supporting the status quo in plebiscites (Cabranes, 1986: 462).  Today Puerto 
Ricans experience colonialism in their everyday lives not in the form of state-
centred metropolitan domination, but rather, through consumer practices 
(Flores, 2000).  This condition has been named the 'lite colonial': "as colonial 
subordination becomes transnationalised it also tends to shift from a primarily 
political, state-, and institution-driven force to a commercial one impelled by 
markets and oriented toward consumers” (2000: 38). 
Recent theories of colonialism in Puerto Rico are based upon alternative 
understandings of power.  Colonial power is no longer understood to operate 
along a state-centric axis between the metropolitan state and the peripheral 
colonial state, as assumed by political nationalists.  Rather, colonial power is 
enacted along multiple axes that transcend the hierarchy of state power, such as 
class, gender, race, and transnational economic flows.  Grosfoguel et al (1997) 





both a state-centric coloniality vis-a-vis the United States and a classist and 
racist "internal colonialism" hegemonically enacted by local elites, "sometimes 
under the banner of a nationalist ideology" (1997: 23).  The experience of Latin 
America demonstrates that formal state decolonisation via political 
independence does nothing to dismantle “the old colonial racial and class 
hierarchies” (1997: 23).  These ideas inspire the thesis by highlighting that the 
status question is not the only way to understand colonialism in Puerto Rico.  
Colonialism is manifested in the form of power relations that are not limited to, 
nor set by, the current political relationship between the metropolitan state and 
peripheral colonial state.  This highlights the possibilities for non-state-centric 
resistances to colonialism. 
 Despite these fresh critiques, colonialism remains a dominant discourse 
in Puerto Rico.  One sign of this is the hostility with which ideas of the 
‘postcolonial’ have been received by Puerto Rican scholars.  They have 
"singularly fallen on deaf ears" (Flores, 2000: 35).  Duany (2002: 123) 
paradoxically calls Puerto Rico a ‘postcolonial colony’ in that its population has 
a strong sense of national identity but little desire to become a nation-state.  
However, the dominant connotation of postcolonialism as a temporal condition 
coming 'after-colonialism' or 'after-independence' means it is largely deemed 
incompatible with the still-colonial Puerto Rico.  In its apparent proposal to 
leave colonial questions behind, most Puerto Rican scholars struggle to see 
postcolonial work as anything but a ratification of the colonial status quo.  For 
example, Lugo-Lugo (2006) believes the dominance of discourses of global 
postcolonialism and a ‘new world order’ in US academic and political 
institutions has allowed the US to stall the status issue and keep Puerto Rico as a 
territory.  "With the increasing pervasiveness of postcolonial theory in the US 
academy”, she argues, “it has become quite difficult to discuss coloniality 
without prefixes" (2006: 127).   
Puerto Rican nationalism has also been heavily critiqued by progressive 
scholars of the island.  In particular, postmodern authors challenge the 





essentialist, exclusionary construct of an intellectual class with a political 
project to fulfil (Grosfoguel et al, 1997).  They severely criticise the elite 
“guardians of the nation” - those who “cannot but insist on the image of a Puerto 
Rican culture on the verge of disintegration under the blows of imperialism” 
(Ayala and Bernabe, 2007: 326).  For example, Gil (1994) argues that the nation 
is not an extant entity but a myth that has been created by independentistas to 
advance their own ideological agendas.  As he puts it, “the 'national project' 
cannot be completed without national liberation (the founding of a national 
state)… Either this politics liberates the nation-subject, or it is alienated, 
refracted, imperialist, and Yankee”(1994: 98).  In other words, independentistas 
are so invested in their national myth that they are unable to fathom any sort of 
justice without or beyond it.  These works inspire the thesis by drawing 
attention to the elite interests served by status positions. 
More widely, the cultural nationalist discourse promoted by all political 
parties has been critiqued as a conservative account of the nation that denies 
racial and sexual difference and excludes the Puerto Rican diaspora.  Negrón-
Muntaner (2007: 10) notes that marginalised sexual and racial groups in Puerto 
Rico are “unable to comply with the classical narratives of self and nation 
implied by all traditional status choices”.  Duany (2002) considers Puerto Ricans 
a “nation on the move” in light of constant revolving-door migration between 
the island and the United States.  The Puerto Rican diaspora therefore 
undermines traditional party political discourses of nation as a unity of territory, 
birthplace, citizenship, language, and culture.  Disrupting the coherence of a 
national category that all parties assume in their discussions, the diaspora is 
mostly ignored in status debates and has always been excluded from 
participating in plebiscites. 
 A handful of progressive scholars have directly critiqued the hegemony 
of the status question.  These writers attempt to untangle the status question 
from the many problems that have traditionally been subsumed beneath it.  For 
example, Fernández (2000: 270) looks to contextualise the status question 





economic and social conditions" on the island.  Within this, "the political status 
issue would be a part but no more than just that: a part which may not even be 
the most important one" (2000: 264).  In a similar vein, Duchesne Winter (2007: 
94) comments that "status change is not a sufficient condition for a profound 
social transformation, and it is not even clear that it might be a necessary 
condition".  However, Fernández (2000: 263) laments that the "fresh and 
imaginative thinking" required to reframe Puerto Rican problems beyond status 
- "an object of unquestioned worship" - is "currently nowhere to be found in the 
political establishment". 
Grosfoguel (1997) attempts to 'de-essentialise' the status question 
beyond colonialism and nationalism by framing it instead in terms of individual 
rights and quality of life.  This involves leaving behind the idea that any of the 
options is able to genuinely end colonialism, accepting US hegemony over the 
region as inevitable, and favouring the option that deepens the existing 
metropolitan rights of Puerto Ricans: statehood.  In this view, independence is a 
hopeless position founded upon essentialist principles of national dignity and 
self-determination, which can do nothing to "significantly improve the standard 
of living and the democratic and civil rights that Puerto Ricans already enjoy" 
(1997: 70).  Rather, Grosfoguel advocates a “radical democratic” form of 
statehood, in which a contingent of US Congressional representatives and 
senators from a Latin American nation could challenge the empire from within 
(Grosfoguel, 2008: 7).  Another non-essentialist interpretation of the status 
debate is Duchesne Winter's 'independencia light', which rejects a heavy, 
confrontational, state-centric nationalism in favour of a project that looks to 
seize advantage "within the social, economic and political balances of power, 
without attempting to seize it centrally" (Duchesne Winter, 1991: 6). 
 To summarise the section, thisthesis enters at a moment where Puerto 
Rican scholars are beginning to critique the hegemony of the status question.  
Empirical work is required that can speak to these new debates on colonialism, 
nationalism and status.  At the same time, however, Puerto Rico’s academic old 





under the old terms of political nationalism (for example, Berríos Martínez, 
2010).  Evidently, the dichotomy of colonialism and nationalism continues to 
influence the majority of academic production on the status question.  Indeed, 
Pantojas-García’s (2005: 164) quip that “the end of the Puerto Rican status 
question would also mean the end of many academic careers” serves to 
highlight the largely uncontested dominance of status in the island’s academic 
institutions. 
 
2.5 (Challenging) scale: where politics happens 
 
2.5.1 Discourses of politics, state and scale 
 
 This section reviews traditional and progressive approaches to the 
interactions between politics and space.  Specifically, the ‘political’ is encased in 
assumptions about the state and about scale.  It is important to outline different 
approaches to the interactions between politics, state and scale in order to 
understand how the hegemony of the status question has skewed assumptions 
about these interactions in Puerto Rico.  Notably, the dominance of status has 
influenced scholars of island politics to prioritise the units of nation, state and 
nation-state. 
 Traditional discourses of politics conceive of the state and its institutions 
as the locus of political power.  They see it as a legitimate site of authority that is 
neutral and responsive to the needs of a plurality of groups (Sharp et al, 2000: 
3).  State power is centralised, rooted in particular institutions, and exercised by 
the elites that control them.  Flint (2003: 618) refers to this as “Politics with a 
large ‘P’”: “the institutional arrangements regarding the control of the state and 
its foreign relations, with a genealogy of statesmanship and high politics”.  It is 
based on what Allen (2004: 7) refers to as a “centred view of power”: “[t]he 
state as the central actor guarantees social order through the distribution of its 
powers to select elites and bureaucratic authorities and thus effectively 
‘contains’ society within its territorial boundaries”.  Power is understood to 





state is deemed the most powerful entity in a “descending order of spatial scales, 
where those further up the scalar ladder are more powerful than those further 
down” (2004: 9). 
 In the postwar period, social scientists assumed that states were aligned 
as nation-states.  The nation-state is based on the Westphalian principle of 
territorial sovereignty.  This designates the power that a nation has over its 
territory – in other words, “to make final decisions and impose the law on a 
territorially bounded national community” (Pabón, 2007: 66).  In this view, 
national economies and societies are fixed categories over which the state holds 
central authority.  The nation-state therefore corresponds to an understanding 
of politics as government: “the administrative capacities and aspirations of the 
state in its national, regional, and local manifestations” (Legg, 2011: 347).  As 
such, traditional political discourse sees the nation-state as the “container of 
politics” (Sparke, 2009: 489).  The tendency to presume the nation-state as the 
natural unit of political and social organisation is called ‘methodological 
nationalism’ (Larner, 2011: 341). 
Given that the state is traditionally deemed the locus of political power, 
and the sovereign nation-state the naturalised unit for social and political 
organisation, political debate in non-independent societies tends to be framed 
by the concepts that correspond to the realisation of the nation-state: namely, 
decolonisation and self-determination (Rivera Ortiz and Ramos, 2001; Sutton, 
2008).  Decolonisation is broadly understood as the achievement of self-
determination, either through political independence and the formation of a 
nation-state, full integration with an existing nation-state (the colonial 
metropolis), or an autonomous arrangement of shared powers with the 
metropolitan nation-state.  Self-determination is the perceived right of a people, 
who typically identify as a nation and with a particular territory, to determine 
their own political future (Flint, 2009: 676).  This is premised on an assumption 
that its territory is controlled unjustly by an external state power, from whom 





plebiscites and referenda, is one means of realising decolonisation; other means 
include resistance and revolution (Laó-Montes, 2008: 15). 
However, the nation-state is no longer seen as a self-evident and fixed 
container of political power.  Rather, it is now commonplace to consider that its 
power to “monopolise loyalties” (Pabón, 2007: 67) is being eroded by 
globalisation, through which state power is lost to transnational and 
supranational organisations.  The nation-state is being undermined as “the 
primary focus of economic, political and cultural identification for its citizens” 
(Anderson and O’Dowd 1999: 598), and as such, is “in a serious crisis” 
(Appadurai, 2003: 337).  The erosion of nation-state sovereignty corresponds to 
more recent understandings of politics as ‘governance’ as opposed to 
government.  Governance “captures an apparent shift away from state-centric, 
top-down, monolithic forms of political power” (Larner, 2011: 337) in order to 
consider the increasing importance of supranational and subnational political 
authorities in governing processes. 
 Geographers have attempted to rethink the concept of scale, with 
implications for the spatiality of politics.  For example, Amin (2002: 386) notes 
that scales are brought into being (and resisted) through discursive practices: 
“spatial scales – from home and locality to city, region, nation and continent – 
have no pre-given or fixed ontological status, but are socially produced”.  
Realising that scales are not given entities but rather constructed and 
performed opens up possibilities for alternative spaces of political agency 
beyond the hierarchy of descending state powers.  In this regard, the thesis is 
inspired by Allen’s (2004) relational account of power outlined in section 2.2.3. 
 
2.5.2 Dominant discourses of politics, state and scale in Puerto Rico 
 
 The present section notes that the traditional, centred views of power 
outlined above are clearly manifested in the dominant discourses of politics, 
state and scale in Puerto Rico.  This is largely to do with the overwhelming focus 





The dominance of status has inevitably led scholars to frame Puerto 
Rican politics at the national scale.  This is because status is ostensibly about 
decolonisation, and the traditional means of realising decolonisation is self-
determination – a concept that takes the nation as its ontological unit.  As legal 
scholar Rubinstein (2001: 423) notes, “nothing in life is as certain as the annual 
introduction in the United Nations Committee on Decolonisation of a resolution 
urging self-determination and independence for Puerto Rico”.  Given that the 
principle of self-determination is rooted in modern international law and 
binding on the United Nations, and that Puerto Rico's status debate ultimately 
revolves around this principle, it is perhaps unsurprising that scholarship from 
the discipline of law has come to occupy a powerful position in the writing on 
Puerto Rican politics.  As Álvarez-Curbelo (2007: 101) puts it, “many island 
commentators tend to frame Puerto Rican politics in terms of the metanarrative 
of decolonisation, which is in turn located within “serious” legal discourse.”  The 
substantial body of legal studies on the status question4 therefore reinforces an 
understanding that the national is the most important scale for Puerto Rican 
politics.  
The focus of Puerto Rican politics on decolonisation also corresponds to 
a focus on the state.  This is because the status question conceives of 
decolonisation as a state-centric process, to be realised through a 
reconfiguration of relations between the metropolitan state and insular colonial 
state (Trías Monge, 1997).  However, contemporary realities of economic 
globalisation and regional trade agreements have led to a rethinking of 
decolonisation and sovereignty beyond the traditional nation-state to consider 
other possible state formations based on more flexible notions of power.  For 
example, Rivera Ortiz (2001: 175) notes there is now a gradation of possible 
relations between small island economies, their former metropoles and the rest 
of the world, including ‘sovereign free association’, ‘interdependent 
interdependence’ and even ‘autonomous integration’ - all with the potential to 
                                                        





expand the definition of Puerto Rican decolonisation beyond three mutually 
exclusive formulas. 
 The nation- and state-centric bias of Puerto Rican political scholarship is 
made evident by the serious lack of work about the local scale.  Notably, only a 
handful of studies examine politics in the municipalities.  Portillo and Rabell 
(1995) and López Pumarejo (1998) provide largely descriptive accounts of 
municipal reform and decentralisation.  Heine (1993) analyses the leadership 
and governing style of the long-standing mayor of Mayagüez, a city in western 
Puerto Rico.  Rabell et al (2007) document an innovative model of ‘democratic 
governance’ in the municipality of Caguas based on participatory democracy.  
However, the dominance of status and associated discourses has caused local 
politics to be mostly ignored and subordinated to larger debates about nation 
and state building.  The present thesis addresses this situation by considering 
the relationship between the large-P politics of status and the smaller, more 
routine practices of politics on the ground in municipal settings. 
 
2.5.3 Challenges to dominant discourses of politics, state and scale in 
Puerto Rico  
 
 Challenges to dominant discourses of politics, state and scale in Puerto 
Rico dispute state-centric accounts of political power.  They note that the Puerto 
Rican state is weak, the nation-state is in decline, local politics is an important 
and under-researched site for political agency, and that Puerto Rican 
decolonisation must be rethought beyond the state.  These points directly 
inspire the present thesis. 
Picó (2007) critiques the status issue by questioning the nature of the 
political apparatus it proposes to modify: the state.  He argues that the state is 
an authoritarian yet inefficient structure that Puerto Ricans have historically 
distrusted and resisted through their everyday lives and practices.  The 
frequency and scale of these resistances – for example, the island’s huge 





testament to the weakness of Puerto Rican state power.  Further, the receipt of 
federal benefits has not fostered in Puerto Ricans a concomitant loyalty to the 
apparatuses of the Puerto Rican or US state, as “many resist every effort to exact 
accountability for these benefits…  Most people lack the necessary documents 
and licenses to validate the legality of their daily routines” (2007: 26).  Puerto 
Ricans therefore experience the state as an 'absent' entity, removed from the 
"everyday life of the communities and individuals of most portions of the island" 
(2007: 21). 
Regarding the status question, the weakness of the state leads Picó to the 
following conclusion:  
 
One may truly question whether the reluctance to endorse 
decisively any political status option for Puerto Rico comes from 
indecision… or from people's lack of inclination to enhance the 
powers of the state with a well-defined resolution of status that 
may bring about a greater presence in people's daily lives.  Most 
commentators wonder whether Puerto Ricans want 
independence, statehood, or an enhanced Commonwealth.  
Perhaps they should ask whether they want more government or 
less, more state powers, and more accountability to the state.  
(Picó, 2007: 26-27) 
 
As a critique of the very foundations of the status debate, Picó inspires the 
thesis.  He argues that the status question is ultimately about the strengthening 
(or at least modification) of the Puerto Rican state - an institution that Puerto 
Ricans constantly evade through their everyday lives and practices.  Picó’s state 
analysis is supported by Pabón’s (2007: 68) provocation that the “status 
paradigm… ignores that national sovereignty is always the sovereignty of the 
state, that is, of the political and economic sectors that control the state, and it is 
not the sovereignty of the 'people'”.  In this view status is a discursive device 
that attempts to secure the hegemony of island elites.  However, he contends 
that “the 'people' invoked by these elites does not exist.  It is an empty signifier 
that is used by anyone, for any purpose" (Pabón, 2007: 68). 
A further line of critique in the literature related to status is that its 





out that the nation-state is the ontological political unit that all status options 
assume and aspire to realise, Pabón (2007: 65) argues that the three main 
parties are therefore structurally identical: “despite their apparent differences”, 
their political discourse “has as a central trope national sovereignty, be it as a 
claim for an independent or autonomous national state or as a demand to 
complete the island’s annexation to the United States”.  He then contends that 
the nation-state focus of status means it is powerless to solve mundane local 
and global issues that do not occur on, nor are limited to, this scale.  That the 
formally independent countries in the region continue to face similar issues to 
the non-independent Puerto Rico should make clear that the nation-state is an 
unappealing model for Puerto Rico's own development.  Pabón (2007: 65) 
therefore considers status a "debate that is much ado about nothing, a nonsense 
dilemma based on an obsolete political paradigm that stifles political 
imagination and blocks alternative political imaginaries" (2007: 65). 
 This thesis attempts to respond empirically to three theoretical insights 
from Picó (2007) and Pabón (2007) above.  First, it clearly demonstrates that 
status is a debate about state power.  Second, it looks to expose the interests of 
the elites who aspire to control that state.  Third, it enables a discussion of 
ontological challenges to the status question itself, given its framing around a 
unit of social and political organisation in crisis. 
Puerto Rican postmodern scholars have set about rethinking the 
possibilities for political intervention beyond the units of nation, state and 
nation-state prioritised by the status question.  This has involved a spatial turn 
away from the grand narratives of nationalism, colonialism and revolution, and 
towards smaller, more concrete scales such as community and local struggle.  
Gil’s (1994) theoretical work is pioneering in this regard.  He points out that 
independentista discourse assumes that “no regional productive practice is 
possible short of Liberation” (1994: 99).  Its focus on the national has created a 
“discursive plug” that is “incompatible with the development of 
microfoundational and discrete strategies at a regional level (which must have 





happiness in microcosmic settings)" (1994: 100).  In agreement with other 
progressive scholars, he understands that Puerto Rican politics should pay 
greater attention to quality of life issues.  He therefore proposes a 
decentralisation of power from the central state to local administration:  
"imagine, then, an administrative conception of power in terms of certain 
“places” that have to be covered, because the place of True Power, the national 
state, has been vacated” (1994: 100). 
 Having deconstructed the nation as revolutionary collective, he goes on 
to challenge nationalists’ account of the Puerto Rican self.  Gil (1994) still 
defines the Puerto Rican as a political subject, but not an independentista or 
‘national subject’ struggling for an imagined national liberation.  Rather, [s]he is 
an “individual” whose “capacity for response [is]… limited to a reduced number 
of enunciations that denote recognizable interests in their more or less 
immediate perimeter” (1994: 102).  “In other words”, he explains, “mayors who 
are occupied with the sanitary condition of the community might gain more 
votes than those that promise Liberty and National Sovereignty.  Terms like 
independence, truth, sovereignty, statehood… have very probably lost their 
signifying capacity for our context of messages” (1994: 102).  Gil (1994) 
therefore makes a pioneering call for academics to abandon their obsession 
with status, a debate that is defined by empty signifiers that do not connect to 
the material politics of everyday issues.  Academics must take local politics 
much more seriously: 
 
I believe that, more than the Struggle for Independence, we 
intellectuals are confronted by micro-organizational work.  This 
work’s “agenda” lies in sectoral organisation and delimited action 
within well-defined and contained parameters […] Our work more 
properly rests on a more difficult encounter with the small 
problems, the daily, micro-foundational conflicts of life. (1994: 
102) 
 
  Similarly, Negrón-Muntaner (2007: 15) theorises a 'politics of small 
problems' beyond the scales of nation, state and nation-state.  Her approach 





dominant discourses in the pursuit of concrete political goals and 
improvements to daily life.  This is about producing "more enabling narratives 
of self and community by seeing through the core assumption that political 
identities are based on national specificity or legal precedent" (2007: 13).  She 
explains how the nonpartisan movement to close the US Navy's bombing range 
on the island municipality of Vieques in 2003 was successful because activists 
were able to articulate a "politics of small problems" (2007: 14) framed around 
local demands rather than nationalism or anticolonialism.  "By invoking 
smallness", she explains, "I am ultimately parodying the still-dominant idea that 
only when the 'big' problems of nation-building, state founding, and/or 
capitalist 'development' are solved, will 'the people' be liberated... A politics of 
small problems is the opposite of a traumatised politics based on national 
identity" (2007: 15).   
 This thesis is inspired to speak to the theories of Gil (1994) and Negrón-
Muntaner (2007), both of whom identify the potential of political practices at 
the local scale to disrupt and subvert the hegemonic discourses of the status 
question.  Given the dearth of research into Puerto Rican politics in the 
municipalities, it seems appropriate to consider the way in which the 
negotiation of ‘small problems’ at this scale could challenge the theoretical and 
practical salience of the status question.  The thesis therefore responds to 
Negrón-Muntaner’s (2007: 15) call for Puerto Ricans and scholars of the island 
to see politics anew with “fresh eyes”. 
 Moreover, the thesis is inspired by progressive island scholars who are 
rethinking the very meaning of decolonisation.  Decolonisation has been 
theorised without privileging the state as the locus of political power and scalar 
framework for realising it.  As Grosfoguel (2008: 6) argues, state-centric 
decolonisation merely validates the aspirations of existing colonial elites to 
dominate the new state apparatus: “to become a “national bourgeoisie, to be 
presidents and senators of the Republic or ambassadors or consuls in foreign 
countries”.  Laó-Montes (2008: 15) concurs, remarking that decolonisation 





than merely kicking out an imperial power from the administration of a colonial 
state, much more than achieving 'independence' in the sense of building a 
'sovereign' nation-state” (2008: 15).   
New approaches to decolonisation are based on alternative theories of 
power beyond the state.  As Flores (2000: 38) puts it, "the move for 
decolonisation needs... to be flexible, dynamic, and democratic in the sense of 
scepticism toward the postulation of a singular vanguard force or an obligatory 
teleology of state power” (2000: 38).  In this vein Laó-Montes (2008: 15) 
proposes a "new politics of decolonisation" in which power is fluid and able to 
"link local, national and global processes" (2008: 15).  Many scholars concur 
that the localised power struggles of the citizen-led 'Peace for Vieques' 
movement to evict the US Navy represents an example of decolonisation beyond 
the status question (McCaffrey, 2002; Laó-Montes, 2008).  While the conflict 
was “fundamentally rooted in Puerto Rico’s status as a US colony” (McCaffrey, 
2002: 9), the people “found a way to express their rejection of colonialism 
without having to choose between the options for political status" (García 
Passalacqua, in McCaffrey, 2002: 174). 
To summarise the section, this research arrives at a moment when 
scholars are rethinking Puerto Rican politics in terms that challenge the 
established ontological focus on the scalar units of nation, state and nation-state.  
The hegemony of status has successfully cemented these units as the most 
important locations for politics.  Progressive scholars now consider the 
significance of power beyond the central state to take seriously alternative 
locations of the political.  In particular, the local scale has the potential to 
challenge the hegemony of the status question, and could give rise to alternative 
understandings of decolonisation based on local power struggles.  The present 
thesis seeks to provide much-needed empirical grounding to these theoretical 








2.6 What constitutes politics? 
 
2.6.1 Dominant and alternative discourses 
 
 Traditional discourses on politics in social science correspond to 
traditional assumptions about political power, as discussed in section 2.5.1 
above.  Namely, politics is understood as government: the processes that 
maintain the apparatus of state power through durable political institutions.  
Politics is therefore traditionally conceptualised by identifying key institutions 
and analysing what they do.  As such, politics is assumed to be about political 
parties and party systems (Graham, 1993); legislating and decision-making 
(Jones, 1994); elections, voting and representation (Farrell, 2001); executive 
administration (Goodnow, 2003); and justice (Griffith, 1997).  These areas are 
typically analysed within frameworks of systems and models. 
Just as alternative conceptions of power have challenged traditional 
understandings of political scale, so they also challenge traditional 
understandings of politics.  For example, politics has been rethought to take 
seriously resistance to the state in the form of non-elite activism.  Ordinary 
citizens are able to exercise political power to contest state structures and 
policies.  In this vein Beck (1994; in Flint and Taylor, 2007: 296) notes that the 
“political vacuity” of state institutions is causing a growth of politics in non-
institutional settings.  Citizen groups and grassroots organisations constitute a 
‘sub-politics’ or ‘small-p politics’ that is not tied to classes or parties and 
mobilises issues related to the environment, gender, sexuality and identity 
(2007: 296).  Moreover, as outlined in section 2.2.2, politics is no longer 
understood as a merely static phenomenon but rather a performed act through 
which hegemonic discourses are circulated, appropriated and resisted.  In this 








2.6.2 Dominant discourses of politics in Puerto Rico 
 
 The status question dominates Puerto Rican politics.  As González-Díaz 
(in Pabón, 2007: 69) puts it, “the political has been almost exclusively identified 
around the status question”.  Similarly, Meléndez (1991: 127) notes that in 
Puerto Rico “politics has always been ‘status politics’.”  The reason for this, he 
notes, is simple: “Puerto Rico has always been a colony, first under Spain, and 
after 1898 under the United States…  As a result, the parties’ programs and 
politics have evolved around the issue of the island’s political status” (1991: 
127).  The status question therefore becomes the prism through which all 
politics is filtered.  Thus, “even though a specific political event may not be 
directly related to the status problem, it is probable that both leaders and 
masses (especially the latter) will interpret it through their preconceived status 
prejudices and preferences” (Cámara-Fuertes, 2004: 84). 
Puerto Rico’s three main political parties define themselves principally in 
terms of their status positions.  As such they are not organised along a 
traditional left-right or liberal-conservative ideological spectrum.  Rather, they 
adhere to a centre-periphery model of political organisation, from integration 
(statehood) through autonomy (Commonwealth) to separation (independence) 
(Anderson, 1988: 13).  Each party contains both liberal and conservative 
legislators who span the ideological spectrum, but all are united under a status 
preference (Cámara-Fuertes, 2009: 114).  As such, Cámara-Fuertes (2010: 152) 
contends that “there is not an overarching ideological structure in the 
legislators beyond status”.  He reaches this conclusion by statistically analysing 
the views of central legislators on a wide range of economic, social and political 
issues, and showing that the average positions of each party “are basically the 
same” (2010: 213).  This, he argues, has far-reaching and negative consequences 
for decision-making.  Lacking in clear ideological principles, Puerto Rican 
parties go about addressing serious problems such as crime, drugs or education 





 Politics in Puerto Rico is also monopolised by the political parties.  They 
have come to dominate most structural functions and institutions of the political 
system.  In Puerto Rico the line between parties and government is blurred such 
that the two have become conflated, causing “party-government confusion” 
(Rivera Ortiz et al, 1991: 187).  Puerto Rico therefore has a developed system of 
political patronage in government jobs.  As Cámara-Fuertes (2004: 58) puts it, 
“the ‘correct’ party in power can mean promotions, raises, and work for other 
members of the family, and the ‘wrong’ party in power can spell demotions, 
harassment, or outright job loss”.  Negrón Portillo's (1993) study of government 
workers indicates that "political advantage" has replaced the values of 
professionalism and efficiency as the criteria for advancement in public service.  
“Governmental gigantism” in the form of large, inefficient central agencies 
(González Taboada, 2006: 89), and the “centralist mentality” of the parties 
(Hernández Colón, 2006c: 25), are also deemed to impede democracy.  Given 
that the parties are increasingly seen to take decisions to serve their own 
interests before those of citizens, it is now understood that Puerto Rico faces a 
“crisis of governance” (Ortiz-García and Pérez-Lugo, 2009: 141). 
The parties are the key intermediaries between citizens and the 
mainland federal government (Anderson, 1988).  As such they are responsible 
for the management and distribution of all federal resources to institutions and 
individuals on the island.  This makes the political parties very powerful in a 
domestic context, and at the same time, administrators of the present colonial 
regime (Anderson, 1988).  Ironically, therefore, the parties actively reproduce a 
system they publicly claim to want to change.  Rivera Ortiz et al (1991: 178) 
note that the Puerto Rican political system is composed of a durable framework 
of semi-autonomous central and federal institutions.  Thus, despite the parties’ 
organisation around the unsettled question of political status, the system itself 
is able to operate in a more or less settled way.  Status would therefore appear 
to be a relatively arbitrary and partisan superimposition onto this framework.  





arrangement of dependency, while at the same time permitting the expression 
of degrees of satisfaction with that arrangement”.   
Dominant understandings of politics in Puerto Rico have paid extremely 
little attention to decision-making.  In Soto-Crespo's (2006: 734) view, this 
reflects the implicit belief of most Puerto Rican scholars that Puerto Rico’s state 
“is a colonial administrative formation that lacks agency and… is but a puppet of 
US imperialism".  Only two discussions of decision-making are to be found in the 
literature.  The first is Cámara-Fuertes’ (2009: 121) observation on the crucial 
role of party discipline and the caucus rule in the central legislature.  Legislators 
must obey a fixed blanket voting position or face "some kind of punishment, 
such as office budget reduction or removal from committees” (2009: 122).  The 
second is Anderson’s (1973: 3) reflection that Puerto Rican politicians are 
“obliged to concentrate their energies on concrete issues” rather than the status 
question in order to secure re-election.  Therefore, despite politicians’ stated 
desires to change the island’s status, the “exigencies of electoral party politics in 
Puerto Rico reinforces the functional acceptance of the autonomist status quo” 
(1973: 8). 
The only other mentions of decision-making in the literature consist of 
Gándara-Sánchez’s (2013: 2) observation on the lack of a tradition of bipartisan 
cooperation between parties, and Negrón-Muntaner’s (2007: 4) suggestion that 
politics is not seen as a serious deliberative process because “actual decision-
making processes are not accessible to the vast majority of Puerto Ricans”.  
There is therefore a large gap for research on formal political decision-making 
in Puerto Rico.  Meléndez (1998: 54) notes that a study comparing 
“programmatic politics (what the parties offer) and public politics (what they 
do)” is particularly necessary.  The present thesis fills this gap by comparing 
what is said about status (in party political discourse) and what is done about it 
(in everyday political practice). 
 Finally, Puerto Rican politics is commonly understood to refer to 
elections and voting.  The island’s very high rate of electoral participation 





literature also reflects that the parties have convinced citizens that voting is the 
only viable form of political intervention, severely limiting their “political 
repertoire” (Rivera Ortiz et al, 1991: 214).  The construction of citizens as 
passive electors reinforces the hegemonic understanding that Puerto Rican 
politics is principally about the political parties, and by extension, status.  
Further, the hegemony of the parties and status combine during general 
elections to give the impression that every four years “the whole political future 
of the island… is being decided” (Cámara-Fuertes, 2004: 65).  The status 
question cements understandings of politics as voting most obviously through 
plebiscites.  Puerto Rico’s plebiscites in 1967, 1993 and 1998 have received 
significant attention, especially from the perspective of statistical analysis (for 
example, Bayron Toro, 2008; Barreto, 2000a).   
 
2.6.3 Challenges to dominant discourses of politics in Puerto Rico 
 
 The scholars who critique the state-centric geographies of Puerto Rican 
politics and status also attack the hegemony of status over understandings of 
politics.  Notably, Pabón (2007:69) contends that “its discursive operation has 
tended to render invisible any other definition of what one could understand by 
politics”.  He explains: 
 
It is practically impossible to refer to any issue that could be 
considered political outside the framing of the status question.  If 
it does not have to do with status – independence, autonomy or 
statehood – it is not political... If the issues are not linked to status, 
they are not political until they are tied to this discourse… Status 
is like a black hole that swallows every political space in Puerto 
Rico.  (2007: 69) 
 
Further, he provokes that the parties are not only structurally identical - 
organising themselves around the principle of national sovereignty - but also 
structurally dependent upon the status question.  As such, “those who declare 
that their fundamental political goal is to resolve the island's status are the ones 





would cease to have the issue that justifies their political existence” (2007: 71).  
Similarly, Flores and López (1994) observe that the parties are, to a degree, 
dependent upon one another’s discourse to cement their own positions: 
Commonwealth supporters rely on independentistas for their anti-
assimilationist, anti-statehood stance, but statehood supporters also draw upon 
the independentistas’ “rejection of the whole Commonwealth setup as an 
outlived ‘colonial’ arrangement” (1994: 93).  The present research contributes 
to these ground-breaking theoretical lines of thinking by looking to provide 
them with empirical support.  It critiques the status question as a hegemonic 
discourse that is constructed and maintained by elites who look to control the 
domestic political system well before considering any changes to it. 
The dominance of status is also highlighted by traditional scholars as a 
way of arguing for its urgent formal resolution.  Accepting that the parties “do 
not align themselves along a spectrum having anything to do with ordinary 
issues of public concern, such as health, education, jobs, crime or the 
environment”, Duffy Burnett (2007: 79) laments that “high-stakes issues that 
should be settled as a precondition to the effective conduct of daily political life 
have come to dominate – and distort – public discourse”.  In this view the 
distorting effect of status further justifies closing the question according to a 
traditional and permanent formula, allowing for the overdue reorganisation of 
domestic politics according to other ideas.  Burnett (2007) understands that the 
question’s lack of resolution, perpetuated by progressive scholars who look to 
disrupt it, prevents Puerto Rican politics from moving on to a better framework 
for decision-making.  “The failure to resolve basic matters of political 
organisation, relegating them instead to perpetual limbo, may make good 
material for scholarly conversation”, she concludes, “but it is a terrible way to 
conduct political life” (2007: 81).   
 Progressive scholars have theorised Puerto Rican politics as a 
performance, with a particular focus on the status question.  Villamil (1984: 3) 
calls the status debate an “interminable soap opera, with different actors 





Ríos Ávila (2008: 248) notes that "the political parties in the island have co-
opted (sometimes demagogically so) the juridical issue and turned it into a 
theatre of national identity".  Duchesne Winter (2008: 13) argues that the 
constant political performance of the status question has cemented it as the 
“salient defining aspect” of Puerto Rican national identity:  
 
[A]s such it has become a self-perpetuating political conundrum.  
Ironically, Puerto Ricans would lose an essential source of their 
national passion if the status issue were to be resolved.  They 
would depart from a collective debate that has emotionally bound 
this Caribbean imagined community, by being uttered, staged, 
reproduced, allegorized, or encrypted 24 hours a day in the 
airwaves, the literature, the press, cyberspace, or daily 
conversation spanning the island for most of its modern history. 
(2008: 13) 
 
In another publication, Duchesne Winter (2007) derides the superficiality of 
each party’s status performances.  The independentistas, he notes, "live up to 
their anti-imperialist self-image by incessantly pointing to trivial differences 
between the Puerto Rican state and the imperialist regime of the United States" 
(2007: 93).  This rhetoric ignores the way in which neoliberal globalisation has 
undermined the powers of the sovereign nation-state to protect communities 
and individuals in order to enable "spectacular visions regarding the liberation 
and rebirth of the Puerto Rican nation” (2007: 93).  He attacks the “dismally 
ingenuous” pro-statehood discourse in terms of its “apocalyptic warnings” 
against separation from the United States (2007: 93).  Finally, he attacks the 
pro-Commonwealth discourse as a shallow identity politics “playing on banal 
nationalism” and stripping “anticolonialism to a bare anti-statehood stance with 
hardly any social content” (2007: 92).  Given that these scathing observations 
are not grounded in empirical research, this thesis fills the available gap for a 
rigorous comparative study of party political status discourses. 
Scholars of Puerto Rico now consider politics as a process in which 
dominant discourses may be contested through non-state activism.   For 
example, Grosfoguel et al (1997) contend that Puerto Ricans have adopted a 





and styles in order to resist the most oppressive elements of colonial rule.  
Mobilising their US citizenship to claim constitutional rights, Puerto Ricans 
resist “master narratives of independence and nationalism” by struggling for a 
“quality of life in the present rather than in a distant future ‘paradise’” (1997: 
71).  However, Rivera Ortiz (2007) notes that civic forms of political 
mobilisation have never extended to the status issue, which is monopolised by 
the political parties.  There has never been a large-scale demonstration about 
status issues without their direct involvement and supervision (2007: 10).  This 
usefully confirms that the main institutions performing and circulating status 
discourses in Puerto Rico are the political parties. 
Theories of everyday practice have been applied to Puerto Rico in order 
to question the relevance of status and related discourses as ways of framing 
Puerto Rican experiences.  They disrupt the traditional assumption that 
colonialism is a “prime mover determining and shaping all social life” (Lao, 
1997: 172).  Ortiz-Negrón (2007), for example, explores the political effects of 
Puerto Rican consumer culture.  For her, "the centrality of shopping in public 
discourse and as an everyday practice can serve as a heuristic device to 
question the limitations of certain structures, social categories, and discourses 
that attempt to explain contemporary Puerto Rican society" (2007: 40).  
Invoking the dead-end of the status issue and consumer culture even as a kind 
of escapism from this, she says the latter "offers the subject the gratification of 
the present in an indeterminate world that no longer believes in utopias” (2007: 
43).  Negrón-Muntaner (2007: 6) agrees, arguing that status will only become a 
crucial question once it is seen less in terms of jurisprudence or national 
sovereignty and more as “a mechanism to ward off a dangerous threat to a way 
of life”.  Similarly, the thesis is interested to see if everyday Puerto Rican politics 
takes place in ways that cannot be fully captured by hegemonic ways of thinking 










 This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework adopted in the 
thesis.  Specifically, it is interested in how the hegemony of the status question 
is reinforced, modified, resisted and even overcome through elite performances 
of power in the everyday politics of three municipalities.  This interrogation has 
been situated within recent works in Caribbean studies and Caribbean 
geographies, broader literatures in geography and social science, and existing 
scholarship in Puerto Rico from a variety of perspectives.  It was noted that the 
status question is hegemonic in Puerto Rico.  Moreover, the dominance of status 
has not, remarkably, been matched by empirical research into it.  Most 
empirically rigorous work on status tends to validate the question and its 
ontological framework of scales. 
Fortunately, the framework of the status question has recently been 
challenged by new theories based on alternative conceptions of political power 
beyond the central state.  While there is at present very little empirical work 
that speaks to these theories, the thesis looks to address this.  New literature 
questions the dominance of status, its spatialities of nation, state and nation-
state, and the motives of the political elites that control its discourse.  These 
critiques also highlight new spaces for studying Puerto Rican politics – namely, 
the local and the everyday.  It therefore seems apt to respond to these calls with 
a study that considers the relationship between the structural dominance of the 
status question and everyday politics in Puerto Rico.  In this way, the thesis 
demonstrates the importance of a nuanced understanding of hegemony, and 





































 The previous chapter argued that a study about the relationship between 
the structural dominance of the Puerto Rican status question and everyday 
political practice would importantly fill a number of research gaps in the 
existing literature.  This chapter explains how I arrived at a focus on this 
relationship, and how I selected the municipal scale of Puerto Rican politics as 
the most suitable context for investigating it.  In particular, it narrates how a 
focus on status and everyday politics was developed through an ethnographic 
engagement with the field.  With reference to postcolonial Caribbean writers, it 
explains that this engagement was made possible by my research positionality 
as an outsider to Puerto Rico.  As a white British researcher I was positioned 
advantageously within a regional Caribbean mindset that facilitated my 
progress both practically and intellectually. 
The first section establishes the epistemological challenges of doing 
social research in Puerto Rico.  Namely, the Puerto Rican and North American 
perspectives that comprise most existing research reinforce the status question 
and related discourses as the definitive ways of organising the experiences and 
politics of the Puerto Rican people.  The second section outlines my attempt to 
approach Puerto Rican politics from a different mindset that interrogates, 
rather than uncritically foregrounds, the dominance of status.  Three elements 
define this mindset: my positionality as an outsider, extended fieldwork 
experience, and the possibilities of a geographical approach informed by 
postcolonialism.  The third section outlines how I applied the mindset to a 
concrete research agenda, narrating the evolution of the project from an 
exploration of general geographical questions around status into a particular 
focus on its relationship to everyday politics in three municipalities.   
The fourth section reflects that the development of the research was 
likely assisted by my colonial subjectivity.  The fifth section explains why I came 





outlines the logic that informed the selection of three particular municipal case 
study sites.  The sixth section justifies the ethnographic research strategy that 
informed the research and presentation of findings.  The seventh and final 
section details the methods and analytical techniques deployed in the research. 
 
3.2 The epistemological challenges of doing social research in 
 Puerto Rico 
 
Social researchers of Puerto Rico face the epistemological issue that 
existing research is so often framed, directly or indirectly, by Puerto Rico’s 
status and the debate around it.  As Jackson (1987: 320) puts it, "every aspect of 
political and academic discourse about Puerto Rico bears the imprint of this 
fundamentally unequal relationship".  This situation is manifested in much 
twentieth century work on Puerto Rico, written from both North American and 
Puerto Rican perspectives.  The former perspective reflected and justified the 
interests of the United States to maintain Puerto Rico in a colonial relationship 
(Nieves-Falcón, 1971: 9; Lewis, 1963: 250).  For example, Mintz’s (1966) 
contribution to an academic volume prepared for a US Congressional status 
commission recommended no revisions to the status quo based on the 
“extremely dependent” nature of Puerto Ricans (1966: 396).  Further, social 
scientific studies such as Oscar Lewis’ (1964) hugely influential La Vida 
constructed Puerto Rican migrant communities in the United States as the 
“Puerto Rican problem” – a group “with inherent moral deficiencies that lacked 
the necessary… work ethic to improve their social, political and economic 
condition” (López, 2007: 65). 
 The latter perspective – writings on Puerto Rico by Puerto Ricans – also 
demonstrate a form of colonial bias in their obsession with the hegemonic 
issues of colonialism, nationalism and the status question.  The traditional, 
colonial framing of the status debate sees decolonisation within the limited 
framework of options and solutions that are supposed to be feasible and 





Ultimately, however, this framework has not only failed to disrupt the dead-end 
in which Puerto Rico currently finds itself, but has actively created and 
reinforced it.  Another approach to Puerto Rican status is clearly required if the 
deadlock is to be disrupted - one that is neither limited to the prescriptive 
framework of traditional status alternatives nor confined to the vocabulary that 
is traditionally mobilised to understand the issue.  
Specifically, this new approach is about questioning the Western binary 
constructions - colonialism/nationalism, domination/resistance, 
coloniser/colonised, and self/other – that dominate explanations of the island’s 
current political status and form the boundaries of most discussion about the 
alternatives (Ríos Ávila, 2008: 247).  Moreover, it is about challenging the 
methodological nationalism – “the naturalisation of the global regime of nation-
states”(Wimmer and Schiller, 2003: 576) - that underpins these binaries.  
Methodological nationalism is the Western conceptual tendency to privilege the 
nation-state as the optimal political unit for the organisation of societies and the 
production of knowledge.  As explained in the previous chapter, the nation-state 
is indeed the political unit that frames much discussion of Puerto Rico’s status, 
in ignorance of more recent discussions about the crisis of the nation-state.  A 
new methodological approach to status therefore requires that researchers 
critique, rather than foreground, the vocabulary of dichotomies and nation-
states as the definitive ways of organising the experiences and politics of the 
Puerto Rican people.  
My own position as a Western geographical researcher also has 
epistemological implications in Puerto Rico.  As Bermán-Santana (1996) 
highlights, the discipline of geography was also implicated in the process of 
maintaining Puerto Rico in a colonial relationship.  Geographers were involved 
in the discursive construction of what she calls the 'doctrine of nonviability': 
that Puerto Rico "was not viable as an independent state and had no alternative 
but political and economic dependence upon the United States because it was 
too small, geographically too strategic, too poor in natural resources, and too 





as a project with inseparable links to past colonial endeavours (Sidaway, 2000: 
606).  Therefore, as a Western geographical researcher of Puerto Rico, I must 
avoid creating an unequal power relationship with my field analogous to the 
unequal relationship of political power that has existed between Puerto Rico 
and the United States for over 100 years.  In other words, I need to avoid the 
practice of academic neo-colonialism and "incorporate the voices of 'others' 
without colonising them in a manner that reinforces patterns of domination" 
(England, 1994: 81). 
 
3.3 Approaching Puerto Rican politics from a different mindset  
 
Reflecting on the epistemological challenges above, I argue in this section 
that it was productive to enter my field from a different mindset.  This would 
permit alternatives to colonially biased perspectives on the Puerto Rican status 
issue and consider its significance relative to other political processes taking 
place at different scales.  Three elements define this mindset: my research 
position as an outsider, extended fieldwork, and the unique possibilities of a 
geographical approach informed by postcolonialism. 
Given my aim to understand Puerto Rican status in a different way, my 
position as an unfamiliar outsider - neither Puerto Rican nor from the United 
States – represented an intellectual advantage.  Doing research in another 
culture, Robson and Willis (1997: 4) note, has the potential to "counter 
tendencies towards ethnocentric or universalist views".  Such views 
characterise much of the existing scholarship on Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans.  
On the one hand, US-authored social research has often been ethnocentric, 
colonially motivated, unsympathetic and underpinned by prejudice.  On the 
other, as outlined in the previous chapter, a great deal of work on the Puerto 
Rican status issue by Puerto Rican scholars is characterised by universalist 
views and the unchallenged hegemony of discourses on colonialism and 
nationalism.  Given that the vast majority of social research on Puerto Rico has 





literature therefore tends to position authors within a coloniser/colonised 
dichotomy.   
My status as a British researcher enables me, in part, to avoid this 
identity trap.  While I am obviously unable to examine the Puerto Rican status 
issue in a way that is value-free, neutral or 'objective', I am, on an individual 
level, able to sidestep the polarisation that has often characterised the debate 
and even reduced it to caricature (Pérez, 2004).  As I am not from the United 
States, I escape easy identification as an agent of, or apologist for, the 
institutions of US empire.  Moreover, as I am not Puerto Rican (or more 
specifically, not a Puerto Rican intellectual or politician), I do not attempt to 
claim epistemological high ground as an optimally positioned insider with an in-
depth understanding of the Puerto Rican “reality” or “truth” (for example, see 
Romero-Barceló, 1978: 70).  Puerto Ricans who write about island politics – 
journalists and self-styled media analysts as well as politicians and intellectuals 
– are known to overstate their knowledge and insights in order to argue for the 
imperative of their favoured status option.  The fundamental problem in this 
situation, however, is that these authors are products of the very political 
culture they write about – one in which the status question is hegemonic.  As a 
result status gets privileged in accounts that are insufficiently empirical and too 
often rhetorical (Cámara-Fuertes, 2010: 5). 
 By comparison, I was able to approach status with an advantageous 
sense of detachment from it.  Herod (1999: 325) notes that the “outsider” is 
“constantly questioning and taking things less for granted, often precisely 
because one does not understand certain things in the way that an "insider" 
does".  In this sense, my outsider mindset influenced the development of my 
particular line of enquiry.  My epistemological starting point was to not take the 
discursive dominance of the status question for granted.  I did not believe 
uncritically in the imperative of its immediate resolution, favoured no one 
status option, and approached with caution the default elite view that status 
was the most important political issue on the island.  This critical approach was 





of providing fresh perspectives on Puerto Rican affairs.  For example, the British 
scholar Raymond Carr was commissioned to write Puerto Rico: A Colonial 
Experiment (1984) "precisely because he was new to the subject" (Cabranes, 
1986: 452).  Indeed, his selection, Rossant (1984; in Carr, 1984: x) notes, was 
influenced by the “difficulty of finding a scholar, whether Puerto Rican or 
American, who had not already made up his mind about what the relationship 
ought to be”. 
In an attempt to counter the colonial mindset that has characterised the 
discipline of geography and its past engagements with Puerto Rico, I decided to 
undergo a period of extensive pilot fieldwork and cultural immersion.  Pilot 
work helps to circumvent the common practice of academic neocolonialism 
where the Western ‘expert’ has fixed their research parameters in a top-down 
manner before even entering the field.  Indeed, in Orientalism Said (1978) 
ruminated on "the methodological question" of project origins, highlighting the 
importance of field experience in the formulation of a topic: 
 
A major thing I learned and tried to present was that there is no 
such thing as a merely given, or simply available, starting point: 
beginnings have to be made for each project in such a way as to 
enable what follows from them. (1978: 15-16) 
 
As its starting point, a new project on Puerto Rican status should attempt to 
broadly understand the present situation in order to then identify and pose the 
pertinent questions (Said's "beginnings") that could ultimately help to end or 
overcome the island’s political deadlock. 
 This thesis approaches the Puerto Rican status question from the 
perspective of postcolonial geography.  Postcolonial geographies are sensitive 
to the ways in which colonialism has had different economic, political, social and 
cultural effects in different locations.  They consider colonial spaces as unique 
sites where "place, politics and identity" interact (McEwan and Blunt, 2002:1).  
It is acknowledged, in the words of Ashcroft et al (1998:10), that “every colonial 
encounter or ‘contact zone’ is different, and [that] each ‘postcolonial’ occasion 





Postcolonial geographies thus pay close attention to the spatial and temporal 
context of colonial experience, and as such move beyond the ‘global’ 
postcolonial approaches that homogenise the impact of colonialism across the 
world (Dirlik, 1994). 
The sensitivity of postcolonial geographies to context corresponds to a 
theoretical interest in the materiality and performativity of space.  Materially, 
they pay attention to the "physical, spatial, architectural, urban and landscape 
realities" in which colonial discourses are developed and manifested (King, 
2003: 389).  Performatively, they consider the ways in which these discourses 
are reinforced, modified and resisted through the lived, everyday experiences 
and actions of people who inhabit these spaces.  These approaches take a 
particular interest in cities as sites of "built forms and physical spaces [that]... 
help to produce and reproduce social relations, identities, memories and 
subjectivities" (King, 2003: 389).  Thus, postcolonial geographies move beyond 
mere analyses of colonial discourse and representation - which critics of 
postcolonial theory attack as politically inconsequential - to connect these ideas 
with "material practices, actual spaces and real politics" (Yeoh, 2001: 457). 
A postcolonial and geographical approach to the status question can 
respond to the calls of the literature for empirical research that investigates, 
and challenges, its hegemony.  First, it considers the material representation of 
status discourses in concrete forms such as landscape - including the ways in 
which they are reinforced, modified or resisted.  Second, it also considers how 
these discourses are reified, reappropriated or contested through performed 
practices in lived and everyday contexts.  This latter aspect opens up a serious 
intellectual consideration of the power of politics in practice to disrupt, or even 
overcome, the dominance of the status question.  In sum, the focus of geography 
on issues of space and place enables a study about the spatial context of the 
political discourses that comprise the status question.  Through a local focus on 
the concrete political spaces in which status is manifested but also potentially 
modified and resisted, a question that is hegemonically constructed at the scales 





geographies.  This focus would contribute to the presently small body of 
research on local Puerto Rican politics by forging a connection between the 
discursive registers of the status question, its material representation, and 
everyday practices embedded in Puerto Rican place.   
Postcolonial geographies are interested in the potential of "local scale 
analysis" (Nash, 2002: 222) to reveal the larger workings of colonialism.  The 
present study explores this very dynamic in the Puerto Rican context by 
investigating the relationship between everyday, local political practices and the 
discourses of the status question.  Nash (2002: 228) states that postcolonial 
geographies "work through the tension between understanding colonialism as 
general and global, and particular and local, between the critical engagement 
with a grand narrative of colonialism, and the political implications of complex, 
untidy, differentiated and ambiguous local stories".  These are the very tensions 
that may be fruitfully investigated in Puerto Rico - tensions between grand 
narratives of colonialism, nationalism and the status question, and the local 
stories of Puerto Rican politics in practice. 
Finally, as a partial response to the broader historical relationship 
between geography and colonialism, my research answers recent calls within 
postcolonial geographyfor more ‘cosmopolitan’ approaches to scholarship.  
Robinson (2003: 280) suggests that researchers should select an unfamiliar 
overseas region for study in order to undergo "attentive learning and a serious 
self-questioning: a 'provincialising' of Western knowledge and a learning of the 
limitations of Western insights, not their recentralisation."  She advocates the 
"longer-term commitments" (2003:280) of language learning, self-insertion into 
unfamiliar fields, and dialogue with regional scholars as tactics for rejecting "the 
hegemonic and dominating position" and "theoretical tactics of 
universalisation" often adopted in geography (2003: 285).  In line with this 
approach, I have selected an unfamiliar field (I am not from Puerto Rico and had 
no prior ties to it), have opted to work in a language that is not my first (I am 
not a native speaker of Spanish) and, during a stay in the island's public 





my topic.  These practices, which I describe more fully in the next section, 
represent my attempt to displace the colonialist and universalist undercurrents 
within past scholarship on Puerto Rico and the discipline of geography. 
 
3.4 Applying a new mindset to a concrete research agenda 
 
This section narrates the evolution of the project from an open-ended 
exploration of the spatialities of the status question into a particular focus on 
the relationship between status and everyday political practice in Puerto Rico.  
It demonstrates how I applied the above mindset to my research.  This process 
was guided by an ongoing ethnographic dialogue with my field, which at first 
was broadly understood as Puerto Rican political culture.  Crucially, I arrived at 
my research questions while coming to understand this culture – in which the 
status question is dominant - over time.  Simultaneously, my understanding of 
Puerto Rican politics was constantly being refreshed as I consulted the existing 
literature and looked for ways to respond to its calls.  Below I tell the story of 
how my project arrived at its "beginnings" (Said, 1978: 16).  Rather than an 
arbitrary researcher’s imposition, these beginnings emerged from the field.  I 
outline the way in which the project took shape over three separate field trips 
between 2009 and 2011, each with different objectives and outcomes.  I also 
briefly discuss the impact of logistical issues in shaping the research agenda 
during fieldwork. 
 
3.4.1 The first trip 
 
 My first trip to Puerto Rico took place over a two-month period between 
June and August 2009.  The purpose of this trip was threefold: first, to start to 
get to know Puerto Rico and commence my immersion in Puerto Rican society 
(this was the first time I had set foot on the island); second, to begin to try out 
the research ideas that I had developed during my first year on the project; and 





learn that year.  I addressed each of these aims by attending a four-week 
intensive 'Spanish and Puerto Rican Culture' language and cultural immersion 
course in the University of Puerto Rico (UPR), remaining in San Juan for a 
further month to continue with my objectives.  Along with language training and 
excursions around the island, this course provided a temporary base in the 
university and put me in contact with academics - most notably Dr Humberto 
García Muñiz and Dr Carlos Guilbe - who became influential in helping me to 
refine my research plans.   
 The research departed from a very broad interest in the geographies of 
the status debate, as informed by first-year study.  Working on the assumption 
that geographers had written nothing about the status question, I was 
interested to ask: what is status, and where is it?  Following the 
recommendations of my confirmation panel one month earlier, I brought to 
Puerto Rico a working hypothesis for investigation: that the status debate was a 
discourse, produced and performed through a network of sites and events, 
including political institutions (such as the parties, US Congress and the United 
Nations), cultural institutions (museums), education policy, the media, and 
public rallies.   
 The trip had a number of outcomes.  First, the course in UPR influenced 
my methodological decisions around language.  Language acquisition made me 
think about the distortion, losses, and changes of meaning that would occur if I 
were to conduct an English-language interview with a native Spanish speaker 
with less-than-perfect English.  Thus, in advance of my second trip, I intensified 
my language acquisition in order to prepare myself for conducting research 
interviews in Puerto Rico's primary language.  Second, while a pilot interview 
with the incumbent Secretary of State from the pro-statehood party revealed to 
me first-hand the vehemence with which the political elites debate the status 
issue, my field observations and multiple conversations with ordinary people all 
pointed towards the absence of status from the everyday concerns of Puerto 
Ricans.  Third, local academics corroborated this view, objecting to my working 





discourse between a network of sites during a moment in Puerto Rican political 
life when there were no plebiscite events on the agenda.  This was, as one 
professor put it, "politics as normal".  Fourth, there was a general sense amongst 
academics that new work on status was not forthcoming because all existing 
lines of inquiry had been exhausted: Puerto Rico was stuck in the tranque, so 
there was little, if anything, left to study. 
 
3.4.2 The second trip 
 
 My second trip took place over four months between January and May 
2010.  Importantly, this gave me a semester back in Edinburgh to reflect on 
what I had learned and to reformulate my research goals.  The main objective of 
the second trip was to return to my open research question: where in Puerto 
Rico is the status question?  My secondary objectives were to continue 
improving my Spanish and commence reviewing the local literature, as many 
relevant books were only available in Puerto Rico, and often in Spanish.  I had 
reflected on the comments of UPR staff about the exhaustion of status.  I 
wondered if the real issue was not that there was nothing left to study, but 
rather, that there was nothing left to study according to the dominant 
framework in which status has traditionally been understood.  In other words, 
had an established paradigm in the Puerto Rican academy limited opportunities 
for new ways of looking at the issue?  Sensing that I could be able to move 
beyond this, I continued my search for status.  However, this led to the 
realisation that status was indeed notable by its absence in Puerto Rico.   
 Two of the most significant institutions in which I could locate the debate 
were not even on the island: US Congress and the UN Decolonisation Committee.  
Not a single museum touched upon it, and a pilot interview with the Director of 
History and Social Studies in the Department of Education - who sets the 
political syllabus in public schools - led me to conclude that its treatment was so 
trivial and brief as to merit no further exploration.  No political rallies to do with 





rod for the discourse in the public sphere.  Minor press and radio chatter 
occurred around the ultimately doomed attempts of Pedro Pierluisi, the pro-
statehood Resident Commissioner, to get a plebiscite bill (HR2499) through US 
Congress, but it quickly disappeared once he had failed.  The only institutions in 
which I could locate status in Puerto Rico were those that depended upon it for 
their existence: the three main political parties.  With this revelation the parties 
became the focus of my study. 
 I collected data, both primary and secondary, from the Central 
Committees of the three main parties - a process that was facilitated by rapid 
improvements in my Spanish fluency.  In total, I conducted thirteen interviews 
with central political figures, including those from two new political parties that 
identified themselves as non-status movements.  I considered these political 
elites the key producers of the status discourse.  Adapting the work of Sarah 
Radcliffe (1996), this material allowed me to formulate an argument that the 
status debate, as traditionally framed, was about three competing 'national 
imaginaries' (1996: 24).  I considered that underlying each status preference 
was a spatial logic - a distinctive imagination of the national space - based upon 
a particular understanding of the relationship between nation and state.  I 
intended to argue that each party privileged a particular blend of national 
discourses and symbols to construct a version of the Puerto Rican nation that 
was compatible with their status choice - be it independence, Commonwealth, 
or statehood.  At this juncture I believed I had identified a research gap that lent 
itself to the study of Puerto Rico's imagined geographies, as constructed and 
represented through the status question.  However, during my literature 
reviewing towards the end of trip I learned of Nancy Morris' (1995) Puerto Rico: 
Politics, Culture and Identity, and had to confront the disappointing prospect 
that my intended research had effectively been completed some fifteen years 
earlier! 
 The second trip had two main outcomes, both of which were crucial 
turning points for the development of the eventual project.  First, the discovery 





Edinburgh.  This inspired the search for a more original focus.5  Second, the pilot 
interviews contributed to my growing sense of how unreflexive the political 
elites were about the status question.  In particular, they had found my 
questions that weighed up their status positions against actual political practice 
(for example, how status issues actually affected the work they performed as 
legislators) difficult to answer.  After six months of fieldwork, therefore, I was 
building a picture of Puerto Rico as a place where the one issue that dictates the 
domestic political structure is virtually invisible in practice.  This revelation, 
reinforced by the theory of progressive literature about alternative 
understandings of Puerto Rican politics (Gil, 1994; Negrón-Muntaner, 2007), 
opened up a new and pertinent research question: What is the relationship 
between the structural dominance of the status question and everyday politics in 
Puerto Rico? 
 
3.4.3 The third trip 
 
 The third and final trip took place over ten months between August 2010 
and May 2011.  Having established my main research question, the immediate 
objective was to identify relevant institutional sites for investigating it.  I needed 
a concrete political context in which to ground the Puerto Rican status debate.  
In this way the main research question above produced a secondary question, 
reflecting my interest in location as a geographer: Where and how do positions 
on status influence everyday politics?  The longer-term, ultimate objective of this 
trip was to complete all fieldwork around these two research questions. 
  An August meeting with Luis Cámara-Fuertes, a quantitative political 
scientist in UPR, became a pivotal discussion in my search for research sites.  He 
presented me with a copy of his new book, La ideología de los legisladores 
puertorriqueños (2010), which touched upon the tension between what gets 
                                                        
5 Though I reached the conclusion that my research up to this point was indeed different from 
Morris', which is about national identity through the lens of status rather than status per se, the 
similarities were sufficient to render it not so much a genuinely original contribution as a 





said about status (in political discourse) and what gets done about it (in political 
practice).  In it he contends that status positions should have nothing to do with 
the vast majority of decisions taken in the central legislature, which pertain to 
other political issues.  He shows through multiple regression analysis that if 
status position is literally removed from the ideological equation, legislators 
from the same party are exposed as having little else in common.  Given that he 
had collected data from central political elites in his book, he suggested that I 
consider a municipal study of politicians and their ideological positions.  He 
offered the example of ‘Guaynabo City’, a metropolitan municipality covered 
with English-language signage owing to the vehemently pro-statehood views of 
the mayor.  On his advice, and through my continued cultural immersion, I 
selected two further municipalities for investigating the relationship between 
structural status politics and political practice.  These case studies were selected 
on the grounds that they could represent the other two traditional status 
options – independence and autonomy – and their channelling through 
municipal identity.  With the support of my supervisors, seven months were 
then spent collecting data within these municipalities. 
 Interviews took place with the political and bureaucratic elites in each 
site.  However, before presenting myself to the municipalities, I dedicated the 
months of September and October to the acquisition of full functional fluency in 
Spanish.  This was a conscious methodological decision.  As Howard (1997: 28) 
puts it, "there is a lot to be said for waiting until you have gained a full grasp of 
the local language and the issues at stake before approaching key informants... 
You will then be in a position to pose more pertinent and penetrating questions 
and maximise the information gained from the interview".  A lot of time was 
also invested in arranging these interviews, by way of email correspondence, 
numerous telephone conversations with municipal departments, and screening 
meetings with the gatekeeper assistants of important people.  As Goldstein 
(2002: 671) notes, "for inside-the-beltway interviewing... a sustained time 
period 'in country' is key to making connections".  "Being there" (2002: 671) 





elites.  I could therefore adapt to last-minute interview cancellations and 
rearrangements, and be patient with participants who were initially 
unresponsive.  
 
3.4.4 Logistical issues 
 
 I was a Visiting Scholar at UPR's Institute of Caribbean Studies (IEC) for 
semesters one and two of the 2010/2011 academic year, coinciding with the 
duration of my third trip.  The IEC is an interdisciplinary research group in the 
Faculty of Social Sciences and publisher of the journal Caribbean Studies.  Not 
only was this institutional affiliation an honour, it also brought a handful of 
practical advantages.  First, it gave my presence and purpose in Puerto Rico a 
formality and legitimacy which was definitely helpful in securing interviews 
with certain political elites.  Second, I was provided with excellent resources: 
not only a desk and internet access but my own office, telephone, printing 
facilities, and air conditioning (a precious commodity on a humid island).  The 
office was useful in a professional as well as practical sense, becoming the 
meeting point for a handful of interviews.  Third, my institutional affiliation 
cemented my presence within the university itself, which was central to further 
contact building and meetings with members of staff who were interested in my 
research and able to offer their insights.  Fourth, my position as a Visiting 
Scholar was marked by a public lecture I gave about my research in May 2011 
as part of the Institute’s Conferencias Caribeñas series.  This recorded event was 
an invaluable experience, with the subsequent discussion about status between 
UPR academics, students and members of the public providing hugely revealing, 
rich information about the status question.   
 Although English exists alongside Spanish as an official language of 
Puerto Rico, Spanish is undoubtedly the first language of its people, taking 
precedence in everyday life, politics, government and business.  Further, despite 
its coeval official status, English is poorly spoken on Puerto Rico, with census 





2008: 138).  While some of the island’s political and bureaucratic elites are 
bilingual – usually the result of a mainland university education or diasporic 
experience – many are not.  Further, one of the ironies of Puerto Rican status 
politics is that supporters of the independence and Commonwealth parties tend 
to speak better English than those of the pro-statehood party, many of whom 
are monolingual and tend to have the lowest levels of education (Cámara-
Fuertes and Rosas-Cintrón, 2004: 170).  Therefore, while the pro-statehood PNP 
has been known to (misleadingly) claim that Puerto Ricans are bilingual and 
hence linguistically compatible with the fifty states, I could never assume 
bilingualism of any of my interviewees.  This logistical reality informed my 
decision to learn Puerto Rican Spanish.6 
Puerto Rico falls under the jurisdiction of US Customs and Border 
Protection, one of the many federal institutions in place on the island.  This 
means that international travel to Puerto Rico is treated as arrival into the 
United States, even though Puerto Rico is not part of the United States.  I 
therefore conducted fieldwork under a B1 US business visa.  Transport was an 
issue that required daily negotiation in Puerto Rico.  As a society Puerto Rico is 
extremely dependent upon the private car and has a very limited public 
transportation infrastructure.  Indeed, Ortiz-Negrón (2007: 44) describes the 
island’s urban geography – “where suburbs and highways have at the centre a 
mall and are linked by cars” – as “the spatial surface of Puerto Rico”.  I therefore 
chose to live in parts of San Juan with the best connections to available public 
transport and the university: Río Piedras and Old San Juan.  However, in a true 
display of national hospitality, Puerto Ricans offered me lifts almost everywhere.  
Whenever a bus or train could not get me to an interview, a friend would always 
be available to help. 
 
                                                        
6 Standard Puerto Rican Spanish is unique in dialect, pronunciation and vocabulary when 
compared with the dominant forms of Spanish found in Latin America, Europe and other parts 
of the Caribbean (Carroll, 2008: 99).  Non-standard varieties of Spanish are also widely spoken 
on the island, such as Spanglish (the use of English vocabulary in everyday talk as a substitute 
for Spanish words) and code-switching (the bilingual practice of jumping between Spanish and 





3.5 The white British outsider 
 
 This section builds on the last by accounting for the multiple ways in 
which I believe my identity as a white British researcher significantly influenced 
the development and progress of my research in Puerto Rico.  I expand the 
following discussion of my field experiences in dialogue with ideas about the 
Caribbean mindset drawn from important writers of the region, including 
George Lamming, Derek Walcott and Wilson Harris.  With reference to the 
concept of positionality, I explore how my status as an ‘outsider’ to Puerto Rico 
had intellectual as well as practical effects.  Specifically, it is likely that my 
Britishness influenced the research in multiple, advantageous ways.  These brief 
reflections attempt to contribute to the presently small body of methodological 
discussion about positionality in Caribbean geographical research (Kingsbury 
and Klak, 2005).  This is particularly necessary given the noted tendency of 
Anglo-American geographers of Latin America to pursue 'objective' or 'value-
free' knowledge (Sundberg, 2005: 17). 
 Positionality focuses the researcher on their individual relationship to 
the field in terms of personal characteristics such as nationality, ethnicity, social 
status, language, political stance, gender and sexuality (England, 1994).  The 
purpose of discussing it is not to overcome these characteristics in a search for 
objectivity or detachment – what Haraway (1989: 584) calls an impossible ‘God 
trick’ - but to account for and write them into the research in order to reduce 
research bias.  As Griffiths (1998: 133) explains: "bias comes not from having 
ethical and political positions – this is inevitable – but from not acknowledging 
them”.  Positionality becomes particularly important in the context of research 
about the Caribbean, a region that has been shaped by centuries of colonial 
power relationships.  Lamming (1985) notes that 
 
[a] concept of people or place does not arrive out of the blue.  
How you come to think of where you are, and of your relation to 
where you are, is dependent on the character and the nature of 
the power of where you are.  You yourself do not decide who you 





certain prevailing power does that.  (Lamming, 1985; in 
Birbalsingh, 1996: 2) 
 
 Puerto Rico’s relationships to colonial power are principally defined by 
four hundred years of Spanish colonialism and a further one hundred years of 
US territorial occupation, beginning with the 1898 invasion and stretching to 
the present day.  While the United Kingdom never colonised Puerto Rico (in 
spite of four attempted invasions in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries), its 
historical and contemporary relationship to the Caribbean as a whole – not to 
mention the United States – mean it likely that my Britishness still had colonial 
effects in Puerto Rico.  I had entered the Caribbean with a research identity that 
was linked to “centuries of intellectual and psychological (not to mention 
physical) impositions” in the region (Nisco, 2005: 1).  As Walcott (1995: 301) 
notes, referring to the colonising influence of past UK scholarship, “the Antillean 
archipelago was there to be written about, not to write itself”. 
 A number of research participants – the central political elites in 
particular – were white descendants of powerful European families that had 
settled in Puerto Rico during the Spanish colonial era.  More generally, most 
Puerto Ricans understand themselves as the product of a historical mixture of 
European, indigenous and African ethnicities and influences – often in that 
order of importance (Jiménez Román, 1996: 8).  I noticed that many people who 
were instrumental to my research had felt some connection to the ‘Old World’.  
As Walcott (1987) writes, these connections are a significant element of the 
Caribbean mindset and illustrate the consequences of colonialism for the 
forging of contemporary Caribbean identities.  His poetry explores the idea of 
'in-betweenness' to account for the way in which colonial subjects construct 
their personal and national identities with reference to a blend of competing 
cultural models, influences and loyalties (1987: 18). As such, he argues, 
Caribbean peoples are intimately aware of the relationships between their 
selves and larger social realities and historical processes.  I believe this mindset 
made me interesting to participants – the top elites in particular – as it was easy 





common ground.  One participant, for example, proudly mentioned that his 
great grandfather was British. 
My British identity may also have been advantageous in that it connected 
with Puerto Rican understandings of prestige, fostering feelings of respect and 
admiration that could be rooted in a colonial imagination.  Lamming (2002) 
notes that a colonial ‘consciousness’ has resulted from the systematic attempts 
of metropolitan rulers to inculcate metropolitan values, images and histories in 
the Caribbean region - particularly through education.  “England”, he writes, 
“was the name of a responsibility whose origin may have coincided with the 
beginning of time” (2002: 1).  Similarly, during the first half of the 20th Century 
Puerto Rico was subjected to the “civilizing mission” of Americanisation, which 
established English as the language of school instruction and strongly 
encouraged the population to look towards the United States (Rodríguez 
Domínguez, 2005: 93).  While these policies ultimately failed, to this day 
prestige is conferred to Puerto Ricans who are fluent in English (Lazú and 
Negrón, 2000).   
These realities may have enhanced my own prestige and eased my 
integration into the field.  First, it is possible that I was seen as an ‘Old World’ 
native speaker of English, and therefore something of a novelty on the island.  In 
this respect, the people of Puerto Rico were very interested in me and extremely 
helpful.  They appeared to be flattered that I had travelled so far to study their 
island without having any prior connection to it, and respected my efforts to 
learn Spanish, even though English is one of Puerto Rico’s official languages.  
Second, a number of research participants were educated in prestigious 
metropolitan universities in the United States, and in one case, the United 
Kingdom.  This increased their affinity with me and boosted my imagined 
importance.  In a revealing slip of the tongue at a book release, one senator 
introduced me to his fellow party members as an Oxford scholar.  
 It is also possible that my Britishness was beneficial to my reception in 
the University of Puerto Rico.  During my first trip I introduced myself to its 





first locally based academic institutions concerned with studying the region 
from an “inter-Caribbean orientation” (Brathwaite, 1975: 2).  Its foundational 
interest in forging links between multiple Caribbean perspectives resonates 
with Harris’ (2006; in Jaggi, 2006) call for a ‘cross-cultural vision’ in the region.  
According to this vision, “one faction of humanity discovers itself in another; 
both sides benefit from opening themselves to a new universe” (2006: 1).  He 
contends that an attentiveness to other worldviews can challenge “the ritual 
habit, ritual normality that seals our eyes and ears”, meaning that “you can 
advance, see things you never saw before, move out of boundaries that have 
been a prison” (2006: 1).  I was able to benefit from this very mindset in the IEC, 
which offered an intellectual environment of openness, interdisciplinarity and 
collaboration.  The institute welcomed my interest in Puerto Rico’s status issues 
as a British scholar.  Indeed, I believe its members saw the opportunity for a 
fresh perspective on Puerto Rico’s oldest, and currently deadlocked, political 
question. 
Finally, my outsider status offered practical advantages that were crucial 
to the development and progress of this study.  Politically, it positioned me 
beyond the island’s partisan affiliations and divisions, which have deep roots in 
Puerto Rican culture and society (Cámara-Fuertes, 2004).  Therefore, my 
outsider status likely aided my access to all political parties.  Howard (1997: 24) 
notes that "the actual or perceived political affiliation of the researcher... has an 
important bearing on the outcome of research".In order to access the most 
powerful political figures, I emphasised both my interest in their opinions on 
the status question and my outsider position as a British researcher.  I predicted 
that some respondents would see the interview as a straightforward 
opportunity to advance their own positions on status to an interested (and 
possibly unknowing) young scholar.  As Morris (2009: 211) puts it, "elite 
respondents [often] agree to be interviewed as they have something to say, and 
will use an interview to present themselves in a good light, not be indiscreet, to 





across, to deride or displace other interpretations and points of view".  The 
response rate to my requests for interview was high. 
However, it is possible that my institutional affiliation with the 
University of Puerto Rico negatively affected my reception by those participants 
who were less forthcoming.  UPR has a popular reputation as a hotbed of 
independentista scholarship and activism (Gil, 1994).  Further, during fieldwork 
in 2011 the university became the site of a massive student-led strike resisting 
the education policies of the incumbent pro-statehood PNP.  The movement also 
received the support of a number of teaching and faculty staff.  In this context, 
one of the most important interviewees to my study – a PNP leader – was also 
proving to be the most elusive.  Therefore, during the eventual screening 
meeting with his personal assistant I was careful to present myself as a British 
outsider, related to the university only as a visitor. 
 
3.6 The municipal focus 
 
 This section justifies the project's empirical focus on the everyday 
politics of three particular Puerto Rican municipalities, as selected during the 
third trip.  First, I explain why the municipal (local) is the ideal scale for my 
investigation of the relationship between the structural dominance of status and 
everyday politics.  My selection of this scale was informed by theoretical as well 
as practical issues.  Second, I elaborate on the logic that informed the choice of 
three municipalities in particular which, as mentioned in the last section, were 
taken as case study sites for investigating Puerto Rican politics in practice as set 
against the status question. 
 
3.6.1 Justifying the local 
 
 Theoretically, the justification for a local study of the Puerto Rican status 
question rests on a move away from the debate’s ontological foundation upon 





demonstrate that the status question shall remain self-reinforcing so long as 
research on Puerto Rican politics continues to privilege these scales.  This 
restrictive framing of politics is called methodological nationalism (Wimmer 
and Schiller, 2003).  In contrast, my study focuses on the local in order to 
examine the relationship between central party positions and everyday political 
practice.  This enables an analysis of the way in which the hegemony of the 
status question is reinforced, modified and resisted through performances of 
local political power.  The literature also highlights that the local political scale, 
and political decision-making, are understudied areas in scholarship on Puerto 
Rican politics. 
 Practically, the local scale is represented by Puerto Rico's municipalities, 
the 78 administrative and territorial divisions of the local state.  Given that the 
local legislative process of each municipality is overseen by local members of 
the central political parties, the municipalities offer an opportunity to consider 
the impact of status - that which defines politicians centrally and structurally - 
upon everyday political work performed locally.  There are also sampling 
advantages to a particular focus on the local political elites of the municipalities.  
The fact that minority party representation is guaranteed in all municipal 
legislatures (OMB, 2012: 25) offers the potential for an assessment of the 
impact of structural politics on everyday politics in a cross-partisan way.  As 
Anderson (1988: 12) points out, there has been "in effect an evenly-balanced 
two-party system" in place in Puerto Rico since the foundation of the PNP in 
1968.  So, unlike the central legislature, where the PIP have never made 
significant electoral inroads, the municipalities guarantee the local legislative 
involvement of all three main political factions on Puerto Rico: the statehood 
party, the Commonwealth party, and the independence party. 
 
3.6.2 Selection of case studies 
 
 The selection of three municipalities followed principles of case study 





investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident".  
This definition is particularly apt since the literature on status has never 
clarified what its ‘real-life context’ actually is.  I therefore used case studies to 
establish the extent and significance of the status phenomenon. 
In order to investigate the relationship between the structural politics of 
status and the everyday politics of the municipalities, my logic was to identify 
three municipalities – each dominated by a different political party – where the 
structural politics of status were clearly manifested.  I attempted to go about 
this in two ways.  First, local electoral figures from the State Electoral 
Commission of Puerto Rico, accessed via an online database (Álvarez-Rivera, 
2010), were used to determine local party political strongholds.  A link was 
assumed between local party strength and consensus around the status 
question in the local ruling political class, simply because in Puerto Rico status 
is the only ideological cleavage that clearly defines the parties (Cámara-Fuertes, 
2004; 2010).  Further, an extremely strong correlation has been noted in the 
municipalities between support for a particular status option in a plebiscite and 
a vote for the corresponding party in local elections (Barreto, 2000a: 218).  
Therefore, my thinking was that within the municipal strongholds of the parties, 
a greater consensus around the status question amongst legislators and 
administrators, backed up with greater support from the voting public, could 
potentially reveal more work being done at the local level to promote that status 
position in everyday political practice. 
 Second, beyond electoral figures past and present, I also paid attention to 
the political histories and contemporary identities of the municipalities.  This 
was because the three traditional status options could not all be represented by 
electoral figures alone.  Specifically, no political party advocating independence 
for Puerto Rico has ever been a significant electoral force, at either the local or 
central level.  As such, it was not possible to use electoral data to identify an 
independentista municipality or region.  However, a broader consideration of 





municipality with deep roots in the independence movement, commemorated 
to this day in its town slogan.  Indeed, as outlined in section 3.4.3, municipal 
identity and landscape had already been considered significant sites for the 
expression of status positions. 
 The considerations of historic electoral strength and contemporary 
municipal identity, as well as the recommendations of UPR academics, led me to 
select the following three case study sites for fieldwork (Figure 3.1).  The first is 
Guaynabo, a metropolitan municipality to the west of San Juan, and a stronghold 
of the pro-statehood PNP.  It has a distinctive English-language municipal slogan, 
Guaynabo City, and placed English-language street signage throughout its 
territory.  The second is Caguas, a stronghold of the autonomist, pro-
Commonwealth PDP in the central-eastern region south of San Juan.  Like 
Guaynabo, it has a distinctive municipal slogan declaring itself a ‘New Country’.  
The third is Lares, a rural municipality in the central-western region.  Its slogan 
‘City of the Shout’ remembers the island’s only declaration of independence, 






















3.7 Research strategies: ethnography and triangulation 
 
My work adopts an ethnographic research strategy.  Ethnography entails 
the study of social phenomena by “entering into close and relatively prolonged 
interaction with people in their everyday lives” (Tedlock, 2000: 456).  Several 
aspects of this approach are suited to my research and its aims.  First, it places a 
strong emphasis on exploring the nature and complexity of the social 
phenomena in question.  In other words, the ethnographer sets out to fully 
understand the issue in context, refusing to make a priori assumptions about it 
as per other strategies such as hypothesis testing (Atkinson and Hammersley, 
1998: 110).  Put this way, an ethnography of the status question is well overdue.  
Status, and the discursive logics that underpin it, have been privileged to such 
an extent in Puerto Rico that the phenomenon itself has largely escaped 
empirical scrutiny.  An ethnography of status therefore looks to ground the 
issue in a domestic empirical context, refusing to assume that its dominance and 
importance are self-evident realities of Puerto Rican politics. 
 Second, ethnography makes the ontological assumption that social 
phenomena are brought into being through the everyday lives and practices of 
people.  It therefore involves “participating in people’s daily lives…, watching 
what happens, listening to what is said, [and] asking questions” (Atkinson and 
Hamersley, 1998: 1).  Studying the everyday working lives of political decision 
makers in Puerto Rico will shed light on their practices, motivations and 
behaviours and, importantly, reveal the ways in which these could be related to 
their status positions.  Third, ethnography is an intensive approach that 
requires researchers to immerse themselves in the culture of interest for an 
extended period of time while maintaining a flexible attitude towards it.  Section 
3.4 above, which explained the evolution of my research over three extended 
fieldwork trips, represents a summary of my ethnographic engagement with the 
field. 
 A fourth important aspect of ethnography is that it subordinates 





field (Flick, 2009: 234).  It emphasises “practicing a general research attitude” 
(2009: 233) involving the deployment of various methods to achieve an in-
depth understanding of the studied phenomenon.  My ‘general research attitude’ 
is represented by my attempt to engage with Puerto Rican politics from a 
different mindset, as outlined in sections 3.3 and 3.4.  The research questions 
were formulated through this practice, and methods then selected according to 
their value in yielding information about the phenomena of status and everyday 
politics in the case study sites. 
Ethnography uses several methods in ‘triangulation’ in order to reveal 
multiple aspects of the single phenomenon under study (Silverman 1997:85).  
Triangulation is a multi-method research strategy designed to increase 
confidence in conclusions about the phenomenon by studying it from different 
viewpoints (Cohen et al, 2007: 141).  It is a way of "cross-checking data" from 
multiple sources (O'Donoghue and Punch, 2003: 78) with the aim of searching 
for regularities.  Other benefits include "creating innovative ways of 
understanding a phenomenon, revealing unique findings, challenging and 
integrating theories, and providing a clearer understanding of the problem" 
(Thurmond, 2001: 254).  This research triangulates semi-structured interviews, 
documents, images and field notes in the following results chapters in order to 
build a picture of the relationship between the status question and everyday 




3.8.1 Semi-structured elite interviews 
 
 Interviewing is the central component of the thesis’ data collection 
strategy.  47 people were interviewed throughout the research.  Interviewing is 
the optimal method for investigating the relationship between political 
discourse and political practice in Puerto Rico.  The principal source of 





Politicians perform decision-making processes as actors but at the same time 
they have structural allegiances as members of a political party.  This makes 
them optimally positioned research participants for a comparison of political 
structure and political practice.  They are able to offer insights into the nature of 
the relationship under investigation through the dialogue of a research 
interview.  As Lilleker (2003) notes, interviewing is a particularly advantageous 
data collection strategy in the context of political research: 
 
Interviews... provide insights into events about which we know 
little: the activities that take place out of the public or media gaze, 
behind closed doors.  We can learn more about the inner 
workings of the political process, the machinations between 
influential actors and how a sequence of events was viewed and 
responded to within the political machine... Suffice it to say that 
interviews can provide immense amounts of information that 
could not be gleaned from official published documents or 
contemporary media accounts.  (2003: 208) 
 
It is this process of politics in action, as it occurs "out of the public or media 
gaze", that the research intends to shed light upon.  Though the status issue is 
structurally dominant and constantly reinforced through media channels in the 
Puerto Rican public sphere, very little is known about the relationship between 
what is publicly said about status and the everyday practice of Puerto Rican 
politics "off-stage" (Lilleker, 2003: 213).  Puerto Rican politicians - who must 
align themselves with a status option and its discourses in order to practice 
politics - are the guardians of this information.  As Lilleker (2003: 213) puts it, 
"no-one is able to offer the level of knowledge of an issue or aspect of 
government as one deeply involved within that area… Of course, politicians are 
also the only source for information on their own activities and motivations." 
 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with Puerto Rican political 
and bureaucratic elites.  At their most general interviews are "conversations 
with a purpose" in which participants “can explain the complexities and 
contradictions of their experiences and… describe the mundane details of their 
everyday lives” (Bryman, 1998; in Valentine, 2005: 111).  This method is 





structured form of interviewing was adopted, based around a list of pre-
determined, open-ended questions that were addressed in the course of the 
conversation but not necessarily in a rigid order.  This was to avoid disruption 
to the conversational flow and ensure "flexibility in the way issues are 
addressed by the informant" (Dunn, 2000: 52).  Above all, a semi-structured 
format ensured a base level of structure to the dialogue according to my 
research interrogations and enabled the comparison of information provided by 
different participants around the same specified issues.  It also ensured the 
coverage of all key issues in light of my non-native (and therefore imperfect) 
Spanish language skills. 
 I borrow Smith's (2006: 646) understanding of elites as "individuals who 
appear to routinely exercise power, without significant challenge to the 
legitimacy of their authority".  This definition is helpful as it is consistent with 
my aim to investigate the processes through which the status question is 
legitimised as the organising principle of Puerto Rican politics and politicians.  It 
also serves as a useful reminder of the need to avoid conducting uncritical 
research that serves these elites.  Indeed, my purpose in critiquing the status 
question is not to side with any one elite position, but rather, to attempt to 
expose the power relations that its hegemony maintains.  Following Aberbach 
and Rockman (2002) I split the elite as a broad group into two categories for 
investigation: the political elite (party political appointees in an important 
decision-making body of the state) and the bureaucratic elite ("high-level civil 
servants" also with the potential to influence policy making in the state 
apparatus (2002: 673)).  Elite interviews took place with three different groups 
between the pilot and main study: Puerto Rican politicians at the central scale, 
politicians at the municipal scale, and civil service directors at the municipal 
scale.  Pilot work focused on the first group, which as explained earlier in the 
chapter, led to an interest in the second and third groups for the main study. 
 Participants were selected according to the principle of 'purposeful 
sampling', where "people are chosen on the basis of their experience related to 





sampling' (Valentine, 2005: 112).  For pilot work central-level politicians were 
selected based upon their identified importance to the status debate and 
political party leadership during immersion in the field.  These included 
legislators (representatives and senators) as well as other senior members, 
from the three main political parties.  At the municipal level, the political elites 
selected included the mayor and three members of the municipal legislature, 
one from each of the main political parties.  Municipal civil service directors 
(bureaucratic elites) were selected from key executive departments, including 
culture, economic development, budget, planning, federal affairs, public works, 
and education.  This selection was repeated in each of the three municipalities: 
Guaynabo, Caguas, and Lares. 
  Subtly different interview designs were used with each group in 
recognition of their different positions, but they were broadly similar in their 
coverage of questions in three key areas (see Appendix 10.3 for full versions of 
the interview schedules).  The first set of questions was designed to establish 
information about formal political structures in Puerto Rico.  As a result they 
interrogate the status positions of politicians, which the literature suggests is 
the sole principle that organises and separates the parties.   To gather 
information about any other principles of political structure, interviewees were 
asked what all members of their party had in common ideologically beyond a 
status preference.  The second set of questions was about Puerto Rican political 
practice.  This line of enquiry aimed to understand the forms in which everyday 
politics takes place in Puerto Rico, gathering descriptive information about the 
deliberations, disagreements, negotiations, compromises and conflicts that 
define the everyday political process.   
 The third set of questions - which form the crux of the project - combine 
elements of the first and second sets to investigate the relationship between 
formal political structure and political practice in Puerto Rico.  The aim here 
was to investigate the relevance of the status question as a structural political 
principle to the conduct of everyday Puerto Rican politics.  These questions 





about municipal identity which, as the previous section explained, was 
considered an example of the way in which status preferences (and therefore 
formal political structures) had some relation to local decision-making and local 
political power.  The second part consisted of more general, open questions 
inviting the interviewee to think of any examples where they perceived that 
status issues had affected local decisions or events in the municipality.  
Clarifying questions were provided throughout the interview (in parentheses on 
the interview schedules) whenever required.  The conversations began with an 
introduction and the presentation of a plain-language statement to the 
participant, and the three main parts of the interview were discussed between 
warm-up and warm-down questions. 
 With a handful of exceptions, interviews were conducted in the offices of 
participants.  Valentine (2005: 118) notes that "talking to people on their own 
'territory'... offers you the possibility to learn more about the person from 
seeing them in their own environment".  As the following chapters shall display, 
some of my political interviewees had office workspaces that were quite 
revealing of their political views.  Target participants were easily identified 
through public information.  Most interviews were organised through email and 
telephone correspondence either with the participants themselves or 
gatekeeper employees such as aides and administrators.   
 
3.8.2 Documents, images and field notes 
 
 Section 3.6.2 explained my use of case studies in the research.  Another 
feature of a case study approach is its relatively unstructured and flexible 
nature.  However, as Hall (2008: 116) argues, "this is a strength... rather than a 
weakness, as it gives the researcher scope to address the complexity of the 
social phenomena under investigation".  Case study research therefore lends 
itself to the use of multiple methods in addressing complexity.  Though 
interviewing is the principal data collection strategy for this research, the 





question and everyday political practice - may also be illustrated using other 
sources, including documents, images, and my own fieldwork journal.  The 
research incorporates this data into the ethnography according to the principle 
of triangulation outlined above. 
My focus on elite groups in political institutions means there is potential 
for triangulation using documental evidence.  As Herod (1999: 315) notes, elites 
"can often readily provide copious quantities of documents that their own 
institutions have produced which may be used... to verify what is said in an 
interview".  Documents were collected in three ways.  First, in the search for 
information about structural politics, election manifestos, pamphlets, and books 
were collected from the Central Committees of the political parties in San Juan.  
Second, information on political practice was collected in the form of public 
documents provided to me by the municipal governments that I had chosen to 
research.  This included official promotional material, economic reports, 
summaries of legislative sessions, and newsletters about local issues and events.  
The third source of documents (for information on both structural politics and 
political practice) was the Puerto Rican press.  Throughout fieldwork I kept a 
close eye on newspaper reporting about the status question, collecting much 
information about party political positions and practices from various articles, 
columns and contributions.  Many of these were written by the central 
politicians themselves.  I also collected articles about municipal affairs and 
events, including accounts of the city slogans.   
 I include in the analysis a selection of images from secondary sources as 
well as photos taken while in the field.  Images sourced from secondary data are 
incorporated into analysis according to the principles of triangulation above.  I 
use my own photographs in a more illustrative way, taking them as "visual 
supplement[s] to the written text" (Rose, 2007: 239).  This is about capturing 
the 'texture' of place using visual information that would be difficult to capture 
in writing.  Rose (2007: 247) notes that geographers are increasingly turning to 
photography as a method to convey "the elusive qualities that define sense of 





images that convey the materiality of status positions in the municipalities.  
Visuality is an important component of my municipal interviews, as I have 
understood the concrete presence of the city slogans Guaynabo City, Caguas, 
Nuestro Nuevo País, and Lares, Ciudad del Grito as possible manifestations of 
structural status politics. 
 I kept a research diary throughout fieldwork.  This filled up with 
ethnographic notes from every stage, and about the many aspects, of my 
research experience.  It is a useful supplementary data source as it contains a 
wide range of evidence-based reflections on my immersion in Puerto Rican 
political culture.  For example, notes were taken about public conferences with 
party leaders in UPR, political radio programmes, meetings with informants and 
academics, impromptu interviews in informal public settings (where a voice 
recorder was deemed inappropriate), my participation in two party-organised 
political rallies (which had undertones of the status question), and about my 
own public conference paper in UPR, in which I presented my research.  The 
journal also contained ethnographic notes made while exploring my municipal 
field sites - observations about the town centres and the hallways and offices of 
government.  
 
3.8.3 Analysis techniques: translation and coding 
 
 The majority of research interviews were conducted in Spanish and 
recorded on a portable mp3 device.  Interviews were transcribed first in 
Spanish.  Useful passages from the transcriptions based around key questions 
were then translated into English, according to the principle of equivalence, in 
preparation for coding analysis.  The challenge of equivalence "consists in 
adequately grasping the complexity of meaning in the source language and 
trying to transfer it to the target language" with accuracy (Müller, 2007: 208).  
However, I acknowledge that translation can only ever be a partial and not total 
transference of meaning, as different languages structure the world in different 





cultural meanings (2007: 207).  As such, when I transcribe words or phrases 
that are culturally specific to (Puerto Rican) Spanish, and which therefore defy 
easy translation, I preserve the Spanish-language wording in the translated 
excerpt and explain its meaning. 
 Coding is a form of analysis that is suited to ethnography and the 
comparison of cases (Flick, 2009: 402).  It has therefore been applied in the 
present research to enable the comparison of data provided between my 
interviewees (at an individual level) as well as my case studies (at a municipal 
level).  Coding is "the assigning of interpretive tags to text (or other material) 
based on categories or themes that are relevant to the research" (Cope, 2010: 
440).  The purpose of coding is to identify trends in the data in order to build 
empirical findings that may then speak back to the research literature.  This 
technique was applied to all data from interviews, documents and field notes.  
Data was coded according to recurring emergent themes rather than a closed 
set of predetermined analytic categories. 
Two specific coding techniques were applied.  First, in order to gain a 
feel for the data, I noted down initial ideas in an unstructured way as they 
emerged from the texts.  This is known as 'open coding' (Crang and Cook, 2007: 
139).  Second, following Cope (2010: 448), a dual coding process of first-level 
descriptive codes and second-level analytical codes was implemented.  
Descriptive codes use the respondent's own words as codes, as they appear in 
vivo in the text.  Analytic codes then emerged from this process in order to 
attempt, after reflecting on the descriptive codes, to group them into theoretical 
categories that could be used to return to the literature and overall theoretical 
framework of the thesis.  All coded data was then compared to determine areas 
of agreement and divergence under the three main themes of the research: 










3.8.4 Fieldwork ethics 
 
 Plain language statements were distributed to interviewees in order to 
obtain their consent to participate in my work (see Appendix 10.1). This 
document introduced my research, stated my wish to conduct a recorded 
interview, and outlined the measures I would take to protect participants, such 
as their rights to anonymity, confidentiality and withdrawal.  Anonymity was to 
be guaranteed on the interviewee's request; however, they were informed that 
it would be difficult in practice to totally conceal their identity owing to their 
status as public figures.7  This is in accordance with the guidelines on anonymity 
in the British Sociological Association's Statement of Ethical Practice (BSA, 
2002).  Confidentiality was offered to each participant through the provision of 
the mp3 recording via email, allowing him or her to then request the omission 
of any part of the conversation.  Further, given the highly politicised nature of 
my research topic, it was of great importance to emphasise my position as an 
independent, neutral, foreign researcher with no affiliation to any political party 
or law enforcement agency.  Consent was sought by verbal rather than signed 
agreement because this was most consistent with the openness and informality 
of Latin American culture.  Pilot interviews acquainted me with the very Puerto 
Rican notion of respeto (respect) (Lauria, 1964), an unspoken social contract 
between individuals in which trust and fairness are assumed. 
 Finally, publicly funded researchers have an ethical duty to make their 
findings publicly available.  Howard (1997: 21) notes that researchers owe a 
particular debt to the country that has hosted them, and that their affiliation 
with its institutions "can improve the prospects of the work serving a useful 
purpose for the people being studied".  The findings of the present research will 
certainly be of interest to Puerto Ricans, who shall continue to passionately 
debate their island's formal political status.  As mentioned, I delivered a 
conference paper about my research as part of my affiliation with UPR’s 
                                                        
7 Most politicians and senior civil servants in Puerto Rico are easily identifiable just by virtue of 
their public position.  For example, to refer to the Mayor of Guaynabo without name does not 





Institute of Caribbean Studies in May 2011, and shall also provide the university 
with a copy of the completed thesis. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
   
 This chapter has outlined the methodological approach that was adopted 
in the thesis.  It explained how I applied an outsider’s mindset to Puerto Rican 
political culture in order to develop a project that could make a new 
contribution to understandings of Puerto Rican politics and the status question.  
Specifically, this contribution would seek to interrogate, rather than uncritically 
foreground, the hegemonic discourses of status, colonialism and nationalism in 
Puerto Rico.  Following an ethnographic research strategy, involving extensive 
overseas fieldwork and cultural immersion, I arrived at a project to investigate 
the relationship between the structural dominance of status and everyday 
politics, with a particular focus on the decision-making practices of political 
elites in three municipalities.  My use of the municipal scale to investigate this 
relationship, the selection of three case study sites, and the focus on local 
political elites, were justified.  The methods of data collection and analysis were 
outlined, and issues of positionality – as raised by the overseas context of this 
research - were discussed.  This involved reflecting upon the likely influence of 
my own colonial subjectivity within a regional Caribbean mindset.  The thesis is 
now in a position to present its findings.  This begins in the following chapter, 





































This thesis is about how control over the political framework, and by 
extension, political discourses, influences practices of politicsand power beyond 
the central state in Puerto Rico.  The thesis examines this with reference to the 
status question and its relationship to everyday political practice in the 
municipalities.  The purpose of this chapter is threefold.  First, it explains the 
ways in which Puerto Rico’s central political elites attempt to determine the 
framework for political discourse as the status question.  Second, it unveils how 
the efforts of the political elites to set this framework obscure their own 
interests to control, or at least dominate, political power in Puerto Rico.  Third, 
it discusses the structure of formal municipal politics and explains its potential 
to empower local political actors to appropriate, modify, resist or even subvert 
centrally prescribed political positions – in this case, status positions. 
The chapter is framed theoretically by the concept of hegemony, as 
outlined in section 2.2.1.  The first section briefly explores the current 
parameters of the status discourse by noting that its hegemony is produced 
between three main institutional sites: the Puerto Rican political parties, the 
United Nations, and US Congress.  The chapter then focuses specifically on the 
parties.  The second section examines the discursive tactics through which 
Puerto Rican political elites of all stripes attempt to persuade the majority to 
accept their cultural and political values as the natural ‘order’ (Jackson, 1989: 
53).  The third section looks to expose the ideological interests that hide behind 
these discourses (Jackson, 1989: 59).  The fourth section considers the potential 
for hegemonic central positions - namely, status positions - to be complicated on 
the ground through performances of decentralised power.  This chapter lays 
important ground for the following chapters, which explore in detail the 
relationship between the dominance of status and everyday political practices 





4.2 What is the status question? 
 
 The status question is a discourse about the political future of Puerto 
Rico.  It is important to understand that the status question originates, and is 
produced, in three main institutional sites.  The first site is the Puerto Rican 
political parties.  Each party establishes its status position through an internal 
status committee, which is composed of members of the central leadership.  The 
agreed position is ratified by the party’s central committee and reproduced in 
manuals, election manifestoes and plebiscite ballots as official policy.  
Membership of a party is confirmed by, and contingent upon, an agreement to 
defend the principles and positions contained within these documents (for 
example, PNP, 2009: 3; PDP, 2004: 1).  Positions on status in this chapter are 
therefore garnered from central party political documents and interviews with 
a small sample of central political figures from the three main parties. 
The second and third key institutions that produce the status discourse – 
the United Nations and the US Congress - are beyond Puerto Rico.  While this 
chapter focuses on the Puerto Rican parties, it is important to first briefly 
acknowledge these two external institutions.  Puerto Rico’s status question is, in 
part, a construct of the foundational principles of the United Nations.  
Specifically, it manifests the principle of self-determination as outlined in 
Resolution 1514 (XV): “the inalienable right” of “all peoples” to “freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development" (UN, 1960a).8  This Resolution is the basis for the 
recognition of self-determination as a concept of international law.  The 
Resolution further establishes the "sovereign rights of all peoples" to "complete 
independence" and a "national territory", and "solemnly proclaims the necessity 
of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and 
manifestations" (UN, 1960a).   
                                                        
8 Resolution 1514 (XV) is fully entitled the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples", and commonly termed the “Magna Carta of decolonisation” by 





The aim of self-determination, therefore, is decolonisation.  The UN 
recognises three legitimate decolonisation options in General Assembly 
Resolution 1541 (XV): "emergence as a sovereign independent State", 
"integration with an independent State", and "free association with an 
independent State" (UN, 1960b).  A fourth option was later recognised in 
Resolution 2625 (XXV), described as “the emergence into any other political 
status freely determined by a people” (UN, 1970).  The Puerto Rican status 
debate has formed around these options, with the PIP claiming the first, the PNP 
the second, a minority faction of the PDP the third, and the mainstream of the 
PDP contending that Puerto Rico has already formally decolonised according to 
the fourth.  These UN resolutions deepen the parties' structure around the 
status question, as they are referenced in the manifestos and manuals of each 
party as evidence to support its status position.9 
While the UN plays a significant role in producing the Puerto Rican status 
discourse, the most important external institution in this regard is US Congress.  
This is because Congress currently holds political sovereignty over the island, 
and as such, is deemed the legal arbiter of any status change (Negrón-Muntaner, 
2007: 2).  The status discourse of the Puerto Rican parties is strongly influenced 
by readings of US jurisprudence and what Congress has declared it is willing to 
accept.  Its current position is indicated across three recent reports by the 
President's Task Force on Puerto Rico's Status (Task Force, 2005; 2007; 2011).  
While the UN identifies status options that are open to Puerto Rico by 
international law, the Task Force more prescriptively "develops" options that 
are "compatible with the Constitution and basic laws and policies of the United 
States" (Task Force, 2007: 1).  These are current Commonwealth, statehood, 
independence, and free association. 
The Task Force adopts the following positions on these options.  First, it 
defines Commonwealth as a local governmental arrangement and not a legally 
separate political status, which exists beneath the Territorial Clause of the US 
                                                        
9 See, for example, the 2013 election manifestos of the PNP (2012: 390) and PIP (2012: 4), and 





Constitution.10  Thus, Puerto Rico's current legal political status is that of a US 
territory.  As will be explained, this assessment conflicts with the official 
position of the PDP, which interprets Commonwealth as a formally decolonial, 
not territorial, status.  The Task Force underlines that Congress holds 
sovereignty over Puerto Rico under the Territory Clause.  Congress may, 
therefore, "continue the current system indefinitely, but it also may revise or 
revoke it at any time" (Task Force, 2005: 5), and even "ced[e] the territory to 
another nation" (2005: 5).  Second, statehood would simply grant Puerto Rico 
“equal footing with the original States in all respects” (2005: 6).  However, while 
discussing statehood the Task Force underlines Puerto Rico's present status as 
an "unincorporated" territory, "which means that it is not intended to become a 
State" (2005: 6).   
Third, independence would involve the United States relinquishing 
sovereignty over Puerto Rico to a "separate, independent sovereign nation" 
(Task Force, 2007: 10).  However, as the current sovereign power over Puerto 
Rico, the United States "may determine whether and upon what conditions [it] 
may receive independence" (Task Force, 2005: 6).  Notably, Puerto Rico "would 
not automatically be entitled to receive monetary support or military protection 
from the US" (Task Force, 2007: 7).  Fourth, free association is suggested as an 
alternative to full independence, along the lines of the compacts between the 
United States and Micronesia, Palau and the Marshall Islands (2007: 14).  
Although Congress does not officially express a preference for any status option, 
the Task Force's most recent report (Task Force, 2011) would appear to 
implicitly favour the status quo.  While another plebiscite is recommended, the 
report's principal focus is to "bridge gaps in order to ensure a more effective 
partnership" between the US Federal and Puerto Rican governments (2011: 
foreword).  In other words, pending a status decision, the Task Force suggests a 
strengthening of ties between Puerto Rico and the United States in the pursuit 
                                                        
10 Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the US Constitution outlines the plenary authority of Congress 
"to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 





of more immediate questions such as economic development, job creation, 
education and healthcare (2011: 6). 
In sum, US Congress is the key battleground for Puerto Rican status 
politics beyond the island.  Representatives of the three main parties routinely 
travel to Washington to attend Congressional hearings on status, where they 
debate and contest these definitions and lobby for federally-sanctioned 
plebiscites, using all available juridical tools to search for binding decisions.  
The outcomes of such hearings influence the parties to revise and rearticulate 
their status positions to voters back in Puerto Rico.  Having briefly 
acknowledged the importance of the United Nations and US Congress as 
external producers of status, the rest of the chapter focuses on the construction 
of status discourses through the key domestic institutions: the parties. 
 
4.3 Status: the publicly stated agendas 
 
This section establishes that hegemony is evident in the dominance of 
the status question in Puerto Rico.  Peet (2007: 19) notes that "in order to 
explore the workings of hegemony, it is necessary to focus on the exact agencies 
that produce definite ideologies as specific discourses".  The previous chapter 
explained that during fieldwork the three main political parties were identified 
as the key agencies in Puerto Rico.  This section therefore focuses on the parties 
as the main institutions on the island that produce and mobilise discourses of 
the status question.  Collectively the parties may be understood as Foucault's 
'community of experts' (2007: 20) in the sense that they form an "elite group 
controlling an area of knowledge and expertise, and forming the base for a 
policy regime, similarly understood as a discursive formation" (2007: 20).  
Hegemony is a process that is led by elites to advance certain ideological 
agendas.  However, the agendas that the elites state publicly might act as a cover 
for those they attempt to conceal.  This section focuses on the discourses that 





The political parties claim to either want to change Puerto Rico’s status 
(the PNP and PIP position) or to modify and perfect the autonomous status quo 
(the PDP position).   This discussion demonstrates the powers of persuasion 
that underlie their messages.  It is about the ways in which the powerful 
political elites attempt to convince that their status option is in the best 
interests of ‘the people’, such that they become complicit in advancing these 
ideas and practices.  The key arguments and counterarguments are grouped 
under the following themes: state power, colonialism and decolonisation, the 
nation, and fear.  While the discourses of statehood, Commonwealth and 
independence compete for hegemony in Puerto Rico, this chapter contends that 
the tensions, entanglements and interdependencies that arise from their 
performance ultimately serve to cement as hegemonic the status question itself. 
 
4.3.1 State power 
  
 While the status discourse is ostensibly about the self-determination and 
decolonisation of the Puerto Rican people, it is fundamentally about different 
party political proposals for shifting the balance of powers between the 
metropolitan and colonial state.  Each party attempts to convince the masses 
that their proposed changes to the central state amount to a decolonisation of 
the Puerto Rican people.  However, at its core status is a question about the 
blend of state powers to be designated to Puerto Rico's political class.  
Progressive Puerto Rican scholars are therefore correct to note that Puerto 
Rican status is essentially a question about competing versions of a modified 
state form (Picó, 2007: 27).  It is about the sovereignty of the state - that is, of 
the political and economic groups that control it - and not necessarily a 
sovereignty of the people (Pabón, 2007: 69).   
Independence, as advocated by the PIP, is about the formation of a 
separate nation-state for Puerto Rico.  Full political and economic powers would 
be awarded to the new state in a transfer of sovereignty from the US Congress 





international political and economic forums and be able to negotiate trade 
agreements with other sovereign nations.  Moreover, citizens would swear 
loyalty to the apparatus of the new state.  In the words of the PIP’s entry on the 
1998 plebiscite ballot, independence entails 
 
[t]he recognition that Puerto Rico is a sovereign republic with full 
authority over its territory and international relations, with a 
Constitution that shall be the Supreme Law... The residents of 
Puerto Rico shall owe allegiance to, and shall have the citizenship 
and nationality of, the Republic of Puerto Rico. (CEE, 1998) 
 
The PIP also contends that independence offers Puerto Rico the necessary tools 
to secure economic prosperity: “only independence provides us with the 
sovereign powers we need to protect our industry, commerce and agriculture, 
and enter into treaties” (2007: 7).  This represents a traditional, state-centred 
view of power that assumes nation-states are able to effectively exercise control 
over territorially-defined, parcelled economies and societies (Allen, 2004). 
Statehood entails the full integration of Puerto Rico into an existing 
nation-state, the United States, as a federated state of the Union.  Fundamentally 
the PNP presents its statehood discourse as the claiming of civil (individual) 
rights on the metropolitan state based on the US citizenship of Puerto Ricans.  
According to the 2012 ballot, statehood guarantees that  
 
all United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico may have rights, 
benefits, and responsibilities equal to those enjoyed by all other 
citizens of the states of the Union, and be entitled to full 
representation in Congress and to participate in the Presidential 
elections (CEE, 2012) 
 
Puerto Ricans would have the right to elect and send to US Congress a 
delegation of two senators and, according to the island’s current population, five 
representatives.  Economically, they would receive equal treatment with other 
states in all federal programs – notably, benefits.  At present the welfare 
entitlements of Puerto Ricans are capped well beneath the figures enjoyed by 
US citizens in the states, because under the Territorial Clause Puerto Rico is 
“subject only to the most fundamental provisions of the US Constitution” (Task 





applied to Puerto Rico; under the current Commonwealth state form Puerto 
Ricans are exempt. 
 The statehood position contends that Puerto Rico already possesses 
many attributes of a state of the union.  Indeed, most key federal government 
institutions are in place on the island, including those responsible for 
citizenship, currency, customs and immigration, defense, and courts.  Federal 
law already applies to Puerto Rico.  Since 1992 all federal departments and 
agencies have been ordered to “treat Puerto Rico administratively as if it were a 
state” (Task Force, 2007: Appendix A).  The PNP draws attention to this 
situation to emphasise the closeness between Puerto Rico and the United States.  
Institutionally, they argue, all that distinguishes Puerto Rico from the 50 states 
is its lack of representation in the federal government’s political institution: 
Congress.  This is where the most far-reaching modifications to state structure 
would take place if Puerto Rico were granted statehood.  Five new 
representatives would need to be accommodated in the House, either by 
increasing the total number of seats, or maintaining the current statutory limit 
of 435 and removing five seats from existing states (Crocker, 2011: 10). 
 The statehood argument is founded on an assumption that the people of 
Puerto Rico have demonstrated their loyalty to the institutions of the US state.  
This loyalty should be rewarded with the concession of a federated state form.  
In the words of former governor Carlos Romero-Barceló: 
 
Throughout this century, in war and peace alike, we Puerto Ricans 
have demonstrated our loyalty to the principles of American 
democracy and to the private enterprise system, and... it is now 
high time we were granted the equality that our loyalty has 
earned, and to which our citizenship entitles us. (Romero-Barceló, 
1980: 77) 
 
However, this discourse incorrectly assumes that Puerto Ricans are naturally 
'entitled' to the full benefits of statehood by virtue of their US citizenship.  In 
fact, the right to these benefits corresponds to the federated states of the union 
as institutions, and not to US citizens as individuals.  For example, any Puerto 





automatically gains the right to vote for Congressmen, or claim greater social 
assistance, in their state of residence.  Likewise, a US citizen from any of the fifty 
federated states forfeits their right to vote if they move to Puerto Rico, "even if 
they are Anglo-Saxon, blonde and blue-eyed" (Rivera Ortiz, 2007: 12). 
The PDP argues for modifications to the existing state form to create an 
‘enhanced’ or ‘new’ Commonwealth.  It contends that the current 
Commonwealth, as established in 1952, is an autonomous, internationally 
recognised relationship with the United States that is non-colonial and non-
territorial.  In this view Puerto Rico is not a territory of the United States subject 
to its Territorial Clause, nor a state of the Union, nor an independent nation-
state.  Rather, it is "a state whose foundation depends on thwarting the nation-
state model" (Soto-Crespo, 2006: 733).  In other words, it undercuts the 
nationalist logic that all peoples who self-identify as cultural nations should 
organise politically as independent states.   
According to the PDP, Commonwealth is a unique state form in the 
nature of a compact agreed between two sovereign nations.  Sovereignty over 
Puerto Rico does not lie in US Congress but rather in the “People of Puerto Rico”, 
who are the “ultimate source of political power” (PDP, 2010: 81).  The 
Commonwealth compact constitutes a “permanent union” that “cannot be 
broken nor altered” (2010: 95) without the mutual consent of both nations.  As 
such it guarantees Puerto Ricans a number of mainland federal institutions, 
including the so-called “four pillars of Commonwealth”: “common citizenship, 
currency, defense and market” (PDP, 2010: 96). 
 However, such a compact was never signed and has never legally existed.  
Rather, the PDP contends that the above state form is evoked in the 
combination of the 1952 Constitution of Puerto Rico and the 1950 Puerto Rican 
Federal Relations Act of US Congress.  The current official position of the PDP 
therefore proposes a “Pact of the Future”: a “document signed by both peoples 
that clearly and precisely defines the jurisdictional ambit of both the 





Puerto Rico” (2010: 99).  This pact would form the basis for the PDP’s demand 
for a so-called ‘enhanced’ or ‘new’ Commonwealth. 
The PDP argues that under enhanced Commonwealth, the United States 
would recognise the sovereignty of the People of Puerto Rico to delegate to the 
United States all state powers it does not wish to retain.  From this position 
Puerto Ricans could enjoy all the freedoms of independence, such as 
membership in international political and economic institutions.  At the same 
time they could retain an advantageous economic position within the US system 
by delegating citizenship functions back to the US and keeping their 
entitlements to federal welfare.  Ultimately the PDP argues that political 
sovereignty is a characteristic that is inherent to 'peoples' and not to states.  The 
US Congress does not agree, however, and has ruled the enhanced 
Commonwealth proposal to be impossible under the US Constitution (Raben, 
2001: 4; in Task Force, 2007: Appendix E). 
 
4.3.2 Colonialism and decolonisation 
 
 This section demonstrates that party political arguments for (and 
against) the state powers above are based on different understandings of 
colonialism and decolonisation.  Consistent with the literature outlined in 
sections 2.4 and 2.5.2, these discourses are central to the status debate and are 
publicly circulated and performed by the parties.  
The starting point for the pro-independence argument is that Puerto 
Rico is a colony.  As one PIP party leaflet puts it: “Colonialism is the root of many 
of our gravest economic and social problems because we lack the powers we 
need to fully develop ourselves… In the 21st Century, when the whole world has 
been liberated from colonialism, Puerto Rico is still a colony” (PIP, 2012: 1).  
The PIP attacks the Commonwealth status quo as “colonialism with a long 
chain”, "pure makeup”, and “a cynical public relations exercise” (Martín García, 





government, is described as a moral imperative.  In the words of one party 
leader: 
 
We think that sovereignty is a moral necessity, a question of 
honour.  That’s because without freedom there is no 




It is clear that the status issue, colonialism and decolonisation have 
monopolized the PIP’s understanding of what constitutes politics.  The following 
statement by party president Rubén Berríos Martínez about the 2012 plebiscite 
directly reflects Pabón’s (2007: 69) critique that “status is like a black hole that 
swallows every political space in Puerto Rico”: 
 
The status consultation to take place on 6 November [2012] will 
initiate a process that shall open the doors to our decolonisation.  
Following the plebiscite one shall speak of a before and an after in 
Puerto Rican politics. (PIP, 2012: 111) 
 
 
The PIP attempts to persuade that self-government is the responsibility 
and destiny of all peoples.  A party pamphlet uses the metaphor of a house to 
explain this: “Independence means for countries what being in charge of one’s 
own house means for adults.  It is the form that practically all the peoples of the 
world have selected to govern themselves and be the owners of their own 
destiny” (PIP, 2007: 5).  The PIP promotes decolonisation as a collective rather 
than individual process.  Berríos Martínez makes this clear in his pamphlet Un 
Mapa Para La Ruta: “Puerto Rico’s problem is not a problem of the denial of the 
right to vote, or of civil rights, it is a problem of national rights: of the 
inalienable right of a nation to govern itself.”  (Berríos Martínez, 2004: 7).  
However, this view - that Puerto Rico is a colony because it lacks collective 
freedom scaled at the nation - cannot consider the positive impact that US 
citizenship has had for Puerto Ricans as individuals claiming metropolitan 
rights to raise their living standards (Ortiz Rivera, 2007: 8).   
                                                        





The pro-statehood PNP, like the PIP, is adamant that Puerto Rico is a 
colony.  Romero-Barceló suggests, for example, that “instead of celebrating the 
adoption of our local constitution [in 1952] as a giant step toward full local self-
government, we should declare July 25 a day of shame and mourning for being 
the day when our people voted to become a colony by consent” (Romero-
Barceló, 2009: 25).  While independentistas assume the only important freedom 
is that of the national collective, statehooders understand decolonisation as a 
process of claiming full individual rights as citizens of the metropolis.  As former 
governor Luis Fortuño puts it, “What is good for the Americans in all the States, 
must be equally good for the Americans in Puerto Rico too” (Fortuño, in PNP, 
2012: 378). 
While the statehood discourse does mention the individual political 
rights that Puerto Ricans would be entitled to enjoy, such as the right to vote for 
the US president and congressmen, greater emphasis appears to be placed upon 
the economic benefits that statehood would represent for individuals.  This is 
well illustrated in the PNP’s ‘Statehood Academy’ educational document, which 
but mentions the presidential vote, and rather dedicates several pages to the 
current disparities between Puerto Rico and the mainland states in terms of 
average salary figures and welfare entitlements: 
 
 …as First Class citizens, they have 100% access, 100% of the 
time and in 100% equality of conditions, of all the federal 
programs of education, health, economic assistance, assistance to 
establish businesses, housing and employment, amongst 
hundreds of other programs for which they qualify for being from 
a State (Academia Estadista, 2010: 7; bold in original) 
 
The PDP position rejects the colonialism argument that is common to the 
PIP and PNP.  It contends that Puerto Rico has already been decolonised in four 
ways.  First, party founder, ex-governor and Commonwealth architect Luis 
Muñoz Marín claims that the establishment of this status in 1952 represented 
an "internal decolonisation" granting Puerto Ricans self-government over most 
insular affairs (Muñoz Marín, 1982; in Soto-Crespo, 2006: 714).  Second, the 





upon its removal from the United Nations' list of Non-Self-Governing Territories 
in 1953.  Given that the United Nations does not formally recognise Puerto Rico 
as a colony, Commonwealth supposedly enjoys “international validity” as a 
noncolonial status (PDP, 2010: 45).   
Third, the PDP argues that the Puerto Rican people have continually 
endorsed Commonwealth status through the exercise of self-determination in 
three plebiscites since 1952, when the Commonwealth constitution was ratified 
by popular referendum.  Moreover, the mainstream of the party contends that 
the sovereignty of the Puerto Rican people is already respected by the 
Commonwealth compact.  They would appear to believe that this people-based 
sovereignty transcends the subordinate territorial relationship of the Puerto 
Rican state apparatus to the United States (Hernández Montañez, 2010: 25).  
However, a minority soberanista ('sovereignist') faction of the party counters 
the hegemonic mainstream position by insisting that the Territorial Clause 
continues to dominate and determine relations between Puerto Rico and the 
United States, making the island a colonial state.  It is the tension between these 
two understandings of national sovereignty - of the people or the state - that is 
central to the divisions (Rivera Ortiz, 2010: 4).  The thesis considers the 
soberanista position to be counter-hegemonic and will discuss it further in later 
chapters. 
Fourth, the PDP claims Puerto Rico has been decolonised according to an 
alternative understanding of freedom that goes beyond state sovereignty.  
Muñoz Marín explained this in a 1959 Harvard lecture entitled 'Breakthrough 
from Nationalism': 
 
I learned much from the wisdom of simple men and women, and 
that to them freedom is something deep in the heart, in the 
conscience, in everyday life, in personal dignity, in the furrow, the 
plow and the tools.  I learned that among them, the nationalistic 
concept is as absent as the love of their native land is present; in 
its place there is a deep understanding of freedom.  I learned that 
in their wisdom they preferred... to be governed respectfully from 
a distance rather than to be governed despotically from nearby.  






Purportedly, Puerto Ricans have transcended the emotions of political 
nationalism and created a new, imaginative form of political association well 
fitted to their needs and aspirations.  This is a postnationalist perspective that 
understands decolonisation not as the establishment of or annexation to a 
sovereign state, but rather an everyday, lived freedom to pursue individual and 
collective goals.  Ex-governor Rafael Hernández Colón champions the modern 
version of this discourse.  Regarding colonialism, he suggests to “look at this 
issue another way”: 
 
How many Puerto Ricans feel the alleged burden or oppression of 
colonialism from the US in their daily lives?  How many really feel 
the alleged plenary powers of the US Congress are weighing down 
upon their aspiration to a better education, to live where they 
choose within their means, to get a better job or to speak their 
mind?...  Life is infinitely larger than status, but a politicised 
political and media elite can’t perceive the wide expanse of reality.  
In Puerto Rico, politics mostly means status… Colonialism is an 
ideological issue far removed from the daily lives of our people.  
(Hernández Colón, 2009a: 23) 
 
Hernández Colón's views directly reflect the critiques of progressive scholars of 
the status question discussed in section 2.4.3 of the thesis.   These critiques 
attempt to challenge status as the dominant discourse for understanding Puerto 
Rican politics and framing solutions to social problems.  For example, he agrees 
with Laó (1997: 172) that colonialism is not the "prime mover determining and 
shaping all social life” in Puerto Rico.  Likewise, the ex-governor's contention 
that "politics mostly means status" in Puerto Rico resonates with Pabón's 
(2007: 69) observation that the "discursive operation" of status "has tended to 
render invisible any other definition of what one could understand by politics". 
 
4.3.3 The nation 
 
This subsection examines important differences in party arguments 
about Puerto Rico’s relation to the national concept.  By mobilising different 





people that they possess certain political characteristics which make them 
naturally compatible with a particular status option.  While all parties 
generically construct Puerto Ricans as a people or collective group in order to 
enable the self-determination question, they do not uniformly agree that the 
Puerto Rican people constitute a nation.  Rather, they relate the Puerto Rican 
people to the concepts of nation, citizenship and state in different ways. 
 The PIP maintains that Puerto Rico is, culturally, a nation.  The specific 
political destiny of nationhood is independence; without its own state the 
nation is somehow incomplete.  As Berríos Martínez (1997: 110) puts it, 
“independence provides the framework for… the full flowering and 
perpetuation of a nationality”.  Another party leader agreed in interview:  
 
I think the independence of a nation – and I say that my nation is 
Puerto Rico – is equivalent to personal freedom...  Just as a person 
without their freedom is not a true person, so there is no true 




The PIP position makes clear that a vote for statehood is a vote for another 
nationality.  On the eve of the 2012 plebiscite Berríos Martínez (2012: 1) argued 
that voters once more face “the supreme definition” on the ballot: are they 
“Yankees or Puerto Ricans”?  The PIP believes that citizenship should 
"naturally" follow nationality:  
 
We have never been permitted to possess the citizenship that 
naturally corresponds to the Puerto Rican nationality of which we 
are part.  Juridically, we have been denied the Puerto Rican 
citizenship that emanates from the sovereignty that we have been 
unable to exercise; however, what does have juridical recognition 
is a fictitious citizenship that does not correspond to our 
nationality.  (PIP, n.d.: 38) 
 
 
While the independence position contends that citizenship should follow 
nationality, the statehood position contends that nationality should follow 
citizenship.  Given that Puerto Ricans are US citizens, they are therefore, 
nationally speaking, North Americans.  As such, for most statehooders ‘Puerto 





that is legally determined by citizenship.  The PNP very carefully never refers to 
Puerto Rico as a nation; rather, its nation is the United States.  In this way 
Puerto Rican identity is constructed as compatible with statehood.  There are 
many examples of this in party political material.  An undated pamphlet 
collected from the Guaynabo municipal legislature, entitled Celebrating 
American Citizenship, reads:  
 
We celebrate its arrival, comforted in the thought that even when 
we lack the total protection that being an American citizen 
provides, we are and have been part of the great American Nation, 
and we walk together with our fellow citizens in the historic march 
towards the full enjoyment of life, freedom and democracy. 
(Municipio Autónomo de Guaynabo, n.d: 3; emphasis in original) 
 
To take another example, former governor Luis Fortuño attacks both the PDP 
and PIP for believing in a Puerto Rican nationality separate from US citizenship: 
 
It is undignified to be citizens of a nation without having the same 
rights as other fellow citizens… just as it is undignified to 
proclaim a national project being, collectively, citizens of another 
nation. (Fortuño, 2009: 18) 
 
The PNP does not deny the existence of Puerto Rican identity.  Indeed, it argues 
that its most potent symbols, such as the Spanish language, would be fully 
preserved under a ‘creole statehood’ (Meléndez, 1991: 136).  Rather, the PNP 
attempts to account for Puerto Rican identity using alternative language to 
nation.  Quoting party founder Luís Ferré, it speaks of 'homeland', interpreted as 
"an adherence to the heart of the place in which one is born" (Fortuño, 2009: 
18).  This frees up an understanding of nation as "a concept of political, social 
and human identification" separate from Puerto Rican culture (2009: 18).  As 
such the PNP attempts to persuade that identifying with the US nation does not 
mean cultural assimilation (see section 4.3.4 below).  From this point the party 
borrows an essentially nationalist logic - that nations should correspond to 
states - to argue for statehood.  Puerto Ricans, as citizens of the US nation, 
should aspire to become its 51st state.  
 However, at the same time as insisting on the inassimilable 





by drawing attention to ways in which it believes the United States has 
profoundly influenced Puerto Rican identity.  For example, in the same source 
as above, Fortuño continues: 
 
American citizenship is not in conflict with our Puerto Ricanness 
because our loyalty to the United States and love for Puerto Rico 
belong to two distinct but equally important aspects of our 
identity as a people.  (2009: 18) 
 
Here Fortuño controversially and explicitly states that loyalty to the United 
States is not only an important part of Puerto Rican identity, but that it is as 
important as a love for the island.  This account of identity follows a (US) 
nationalist logic since it assumes that Puerto Ricans are loyal to the institutions 
of the national state to which they presently belong.  A minority of statehooders 
go further to argue that Puerto Ricans are Americans culturally as well as 
nationally.  According to this position Puerto Ricans are essentially Americans 
by their everyday practices, demonstrating loyalty to both US state institutions 
and a generic US national culture.  As ex-senator Garriga-Picó argues in a 2005 
newspaper column, Puerto Ricans have already assimilated culturally: 
 
It doesn’t matter how violently the nationalists react to this 
affirmation and how much Americanism they deny, the reality is 
that the construction of our social life takes place within a matrix 
of institutions, values and behaviours essentially taken from the 
American national community.  (Garriga-Picó, 2005: 2) 
 
He considers, for example, Puerto Rico’s political system, market economy, car 
culture, fashion tastes, use of the dollar, and belief in the values of individual 
liberty and democracy to argue that Puerto Ricans have already culturally 
assimilated to the point that there is little identity distinction to even be made 
between ‘Puerto Rican’ and ‘American’: 
 
Statehood is nothing other than the political arrangement that 
would give juridical and constitutional form to the reality that we 
Puerto Ricans are as much Americans as Puerto Ricans… The 
fundamental point is that I am a statehooder because, like you, I 






 Like independentistas, Commonwealth supporters maintain that Puerto 
Rico is a cultural nation, with a shared heritage, language, ethnicity and 
territory.  However, they understand that the condition of being a nation is 
neither related to citizenship nor the state.  In this way Commonwealth defies 
the concept of the nation-state, which is recognised by the independence and 
statehood positions.  Commonwealth is postnational in that it promotes "an 
understanding of belonging where cultural affiliation functions outside of the 
nation-state construct" (Soto-Crespo, 2006: 734).  For example, the current PDP 
party manual states that “Puerto Rico is a Nation… and we are so, because the 
nationality of a people is not subject to or conditioned by its political or juridical 
state” (PDP, 2010: 19).  Further, Muñoz Marín critiqued the nation-state as early 
as 1959: 
 
...Some of us confused love of the homeland with a narrow and 
petty concept of the national state.  We felt that love of Puerto 
Rico had as a necessary corollary the desire for separate 
independence.  We had not yet comprehended that no law, divine 
or human, demands that countries must be suspicious, vain and 
hostile, that they must live separate from other countries... 
(Muñoz Marín, 1959: 6) 
 
Historically, from this position the PDP has attempted to persuade the people 
that Commonwealth status represents “the best of both worlds” (PDP, 2010: 
133) – the ideal combination of a fully developed Puerto Rican nationhood and a 
whole series of political, economic and social benefits derived from the 
metropolis, such as citizenship.  As the party manual puts it, “[t]he People of 
Puerto Rico have, in the PDP, the only instrument that guarantees the 
permanence of Puerto Rican nationality and cultural identity and, at the same 
time, a relation of political association with the United States... and all this, 
without the need to pay US taxes” (PDP, 2010: 133).  This postnationalist 
strategy attempts to maintain “association without assimilation and cultural 









 The above three sections have demonstrated that status is presented to 
the people fundamentally as a debate about nationalism, state-building and 
decolonisation.  This section underlines that fear also forms an important part 
of each party's attempt to persuade the people to select its status preference.  
The PNP plays heavily on most Puerto Rican’s fear of political separation from 
the United States and of losing their US citizenship.  It argues that “only 
statehood guarantees permanent, indissoluble, irrevocable citizenship” 
(Academia Estadista, 2010: 4).  At the same time the party looks to convince 
Puerto Ricans that only US citizenship has saved the island from economic and 
political disaster.  In the words of a common party phrase circulated in 
newspaper advertising:  
 
American citizenship: where would we be without it?  (In Berman 
Santana, 1997: 1) 
 
In this regard, the PIP blames its lack of electoral success on the “systematic 
indoctrination” of Puerto Ricans by the United States and the PNP, which have 
“foment[ed] a fear of our own freedom and a collective feeling of inferiority and 
impotence” (PIP, 2007: 21).  Due to their colonial inferiority complex “the 
majority of our people have been incorrectly made to believe that Puerto Rico 
could not cope as an independent nation” (2007: 21).   
 In response to the PNP, the PDP and PIP both play upon Puerto Ricans’ 
strong feelings of collective identity in an attempt to persuade them that under 
statehood they would “pay the heaviest of prices” of cultural and linguistic 
assimilation (Berríos Martínez, 1997: 109).  However, given the PIP’s weakness 
as a party the PDP claims to be the “only electoral force” capable of “arresting 
the assimilation of our people” that would take place under statehood (PDP, 
2010: 76).  The PDP often points out that under statehood Puerto Rico could not 
possibly retain the two forms of international cultural representation that it 
currently celebrates with pride – an Olympic team and participation in beauty 





United States, Puerto Ricans would be forced to compete under the US flag as 
representatives of that nation if the island became its 51st state (PDP, 2010: 52).  
The PNP usually responds to these accusations by noting there is nothing 
written into the US Constitution that would legally mandate the erosion of 
Puerto Rican culture.  I received a well-rehearsed version of this argument 
while interviewing the Secretary of State: 
 
CE:  Some people would say the Spanish language, the language 
  of Puerto Rico, would be in jeopardy under statehood.  
 
PNP: Under what legal basis?  [Immediately takes a copy of the 
US Constitution out of pocket and slams it down on the 
table] 
  
 I always carry the Constitution, and let’s see what the 
 Constitution says about that.  You look throughout the 
 Constitution, you will never find… any part of the 
 Constitution that says that the Federal Government or 
 Congress establishes the official language of the nation.  It’s
 nowhere to be found. 
 
This response demonstrates the importance that the PNP leadership 
assigns to the institutions of the United States in considerations of Puerto 
Rican identity.  Specifically, the US Constitution forms the lens through 
which it is understood.  The Secretary of State also clearly attempts to 
reduce statehood - a status that would raise intractable cultural issues - 
to a merely legal question (Pabón, 2007: 68). 
 
4.4 ‘Breaking into’ status 
 
 This section attempts to deconstruct, or in Peet’s (2007: 25) words 
“break into”, the status discourse as it is framed by the political elites.  
Deconstruction involves taking a discourse “more seriously than its exponents” 
in order to “trac[e] its leading themes to their interest base” (2007: 25-6).  This 
is attempted by discussing the responses of central politicians to some of my 
more pressing questions about the status question and their relationship to it.  





to the essence behind the various appearances or disguises assumed by 
policies”.  Hegemony is about the “concealment of interests” (Urry, 1981; in 
Jackson, 1989: 51) - advancing ideological agendas and trying to hide them at 
the same time.  The public positions on status, as outlined by the elites above, to 
a certain extent attempt to conceal particular agendas that are not related to the 
stated goal of decolonising the ‘people’ (Pabón, 2007: 68).   
 
4.4.1 What else defines the parties?  
 
 The status question is so dominant in Puerto Rican politics that the 
parties do not appear to have coherent or consistent policies beyond a status 
position.  This was established by asking interviewees to explain what political 
beliefs all members of their party had in common beyond supporting statehood, 
independence or Commonwealth.  The vagueness with which most elites 
responded, the confusion of others, and the generic repetitions of status 
positions, would suggest that the political elites have naturalised their own 
framework for political discourse.  As such the status question would appear to 
have blocked the formulation and consideration of other clear policies and 
positions: 
 
CE:   Aside from your position on status, what political views 
 define and unify your party? 
 
PIP:  We are the party of social justice. 
 
PNP:   We believe in social justice. 
 
PNP:  We believe in the US system and US democratic values, and 
 in making full use of federal funds. 
 
PDP:  What unites us right now is that we want to rescue the 
 country, to take it off the worst route. 
 
PDP: We believe in our culture, that we are Puerto Ricans, but 
 we also want US citizenship. 
 
Some of the elites were reflexively aware that the parties are 





who span the left-right ideological spectrum (Cámara-Fuertes, 2009: 14).  As a 
member of the PDP put it:  
 
In Puerto Rico, You do not associate politically based on your 
socio-economic ideology.  You vote, you associate politically, 
based on your political status preference.  So if you’re a 
statehooder, you’re… in the statehood party, if you’re a 
Commonwealther, you’re in the Commonwealth party, and if 
you’re an independentista you’re in the independence party.  And 
within those parties you will have a full panoply of people who go 
everywhere from the left to the right.  (PDP interviewee) 
 
Given this situation, the incumbent Resident Commissioner candidly admitted 
that the policies of the PNP and PDP are on paper essentially the same as they 
gravitate towards moderate positions:  
 
We’re split along status.  If you look at the platforms of the two 
main political parties in Puerto Rico, you see that 80% of those 
platforms is the same.  So the parties are pretty moderate.  You’ll 
find some distinctions, but not major distinctions.  Except in the 
status area.  It sounds like it shouldn’t happen, but it happens 
because of status!  (Resident Commissioner, PNP) 
 
For example, the ideological ambiguity of the PNP is exposed by the reality that 
its leadership is divided between supporting the United States' Democratic 
Party and Republican Party.  Some are members of the former, while others 
belong to the latter.  In the context of pro-statehood discourse, those leaders 
who are Republicans would appear to occupy a contradictory ideological 
position.  While the PNP discourse holds that statehood would result in a 
bonanza of federal funds, the mainland Republican discourse seeks to cut, not 
extend, public spending.  As a PDP leader put it to me: 
 
Right now we have a problem with the PNP.  The governor [Luis 
Fortuño] is on the right-right.  To the point that he has one 
discourse here and another over there.  I’ll give you an example.  
Obama’s healthcare reform.  It assigns us millions of dollars.  So 
the governor came and launched the program Mi Salud, using 
funds from over there.  But he belongs to the Republican Party 





they succeed, our program goes.  How is it possible to support 
what you want to eliminate?  Tremendous.  (PDP interviewee) 
 
 Rather than considering the status question to be a problematic model of 
political organisation for decision-making, the elites point to the existence of 
this self-evident structure as proof that the status question is indeed the 
fundamental political question that Puerto Ricans should be asking.  This has 
the consequence of precluding Puerto Rico’s political elites from seeing (and 
organising) politics in a different way.  These points are evident in another 
exchange with the Secretary of State below.  When I asked him about the 
immediate problems faced by ordinary citizens, his responses quickly drifted 
into the status question: 
 
CE:  What do you think people perceive are the most pressing 
 problems in Puerto Rico? 
 
PNP:  Well, they perceive that the political status issue, that we 
 would draw Puerto Rico closer to the United States, and 
 that we would finally resolve the political status question.  
 And that will not be resolved until you achieve a 
 permanent political status that is constitutional… 
 [continues] 
 
CE: Yes.  But to return to…. the everyday problems of Puerto 
 Ricans, well, what sorts of things are people concerned 
 about on the streets today? 
 
PNP:  Well, they are concerned about immediate problems of the
 economy, jobs, crime, the health system, education.  But 
 most Puerto Ricans recognise that the root problem we 
 have in Puerto Rico is political status.  The fact that you 
 define your political affiliation based on political status 
 suggests that that truly is the base political problem that 
 Puerto Rico has. 
 
The responses discussed in this subsection demonstrate that the political 
elites are convinced that a political system structured around the status 
question is self-evidently necessary, despite its ideological contradictions.  
Therefore, not only do they attempt to persuade the masses that they should 
desire this framework, they have also naturalised it themselves.  The Secretary 





framework.  Peet (2007) points out that the elites who seek to establish 
hegemony are often persuaded of the power of their own discourses.  As he puts 
it: “A community of experts takes the same things for granted – indeed, that is 
the meaning of ‘consensus’...  There are basic ideas and methods that do not 
have to be discussed, so debate focuses ‘productively’ on slight differences 
within a meaning structure that is assumed, within a set of institutions, as with 
government, governance and elite academic institutions” (2007: 20).  This is the 
state of affairs in Puerto Rican politics, where the predominant 'meaning 
structure' is status, and the elites play a pivotal role in its reproduction.  The 
relationship of this meaning structure to everyday political practice is the focus 
of the following chapters of the thesis.   
 
4.4.2 Change the system or dominate the system? 
 
This subsection considers the possibility that Puerto Rico’s political 
elites are more interested to dominate the existing political system than they 
are to change it, as per their status preferences.  Here it is important to reiterate 
that the main institutions performing, disseminating and controlling the 
discourses of the status question in Puerto Rico are the political parties.  In the 
first instance, therefore, the parties are driven by a short-term imperative to 
win elections and establish political control over the current system (Anderson, 
1973: 7).  This raises the possibility that the parties are not, in practical terms, 
as serious about changing or modifying Puerto Rico’s status as they claim to be 
in their discourse.  Realistically, a party is only ever in a position to pursue the 
status question through practices such as organising plebiscites or lobbying US 
Congress once it has dominated political power in the domestic system by 
winning elections.  Moreover, given that general election results are commonly 
taken as indicators of current levels of public support for the status options 
championed by each party (Barreto, 2000a), the parties only tend to act on 
status if an election has been won by a landslide majority.  It is very likely that 





party's decision to hold a plebiscite in 2012 at the end of his term, as they 
looked to capitalise on a perceived statehood advantage.  Had the PNP’s 2008 
victory been marginal, it is unlikely that the plebiscite would have taken place. 
 The evidence presented below would suggest that the parties are not, in 
practice, as serious about the status question as their discourses would claim.  
Specifically, none of the parties appear to have thought carefully about what 
would actually happen upon the resolution of the status question according to 
their favoured option.  The parties have not made specific or realistic plans to 
prepare the Puerto Rican political system (and much less their own 
organisations) for the arrival of a new or modified status: 
 
CE:  What preparations has the party made for the achievement 
 of its status preference? 
 
PNP: Well, the truth of the matter is that statehood will not 
 happen overnight.  You know, likely there will be a 
 transition period, a couple of years to prepare for the 
 upcoming presidential elections. 
 
PIP: There will be an economic transition period during which 
 the US will compensate us for colonialism. 
 
PDP: Actually, many people in our party are more or less 
 satisfied with the Commonwealth as it is.  We might want 
 to improve it,  but we’re also constantly obliged to defend 
 what we already have against the statehooders. 
 
These responses would indicate that the PIP is the only party with a concrete 
policy for realising its option.  However, on further inspection this policy is not 
serious.  The PIP proposes in its 2008 manifesto that the transition to 
independence would be assisted by a “Fund of the Republic”, financed by the 
United States “in compensation for 110 years of colonialism” (PIP, 2008: 9).  
Such a fund would be awarded during a “reasonable transition period” of at 
least ten years and be equal to current Federal expenditures on the island (PIP, 
2007: 28).  This is completely at odds with the US Congress’ insistence that all 
options be “revenue neutral” (Rivera Ortiz and Ramos, 2001: 8), and the Task 





“would not automatically be entitled to receive monetary support” from the 
United States.  It would therefore appear that the PIP does not even consider its 
own status preference a realistic prospect. 
The political elites essentially admit, through these statements above, 
that they do not expect the status question to be resolved soon.  In a practical 
sense, therefore, their status discourses might serve primarily as devices for 
persuading the people to vote for them in general elections.  If this is the case, 
the main purpose of the status question is to secure positions of power for the 
political elites within the existing system.  Internalising their own discourses, 
the parties may truly believe in the virtue of status positions and the status 
question.  However, in reality they are unable to specify at what moment in the 
future their preferences could ever be realised.  This situation supports an 
interpretation that their immediate ideological interests are to dominate, and 
thereby reproduce, the existing system - and not necessarily to change or 
modify it as per their stated goals.  As Anderson (1973: 8) writes, “the 
exigencies of electoral party politics in Puerto Rico reinforce the functional 
acceptance of the autonomist status quo”. 
Pabón (2007: 71) provokes that “those who declare that their 
fundamental political goal is to resolve the island's status are the ones who most 
dread its resolution, because without the issue of the status they would cease to 
have the issue that justifies their political existence”.  The fact that the parties 
have not seriously thought about the consequences of a definitive status 
resolution for their own organisations may be taken as evidence of this.  Indeed, 
as the present and previous subsections (4.4.1) demonstrate, the status 
question serves to conceal both the parties' lack of forward thinking and their 
weak ideological foundations beyond status positions.  The status question 
might therefore appear to be a red herring, disguising these two important 
realities and protecting the legitimacy of the parties and its politicians. 
 It may be the case that the political elites genuinely feel more motivated 
to change the system than to dominate the existing one.  After all, two of the 





argue about how this should be addressed.  This said, the motivation of the 
elites to change the system is derived, at least in part, from their personal 
aspirations to occupy powerful positions within the reconfigured state 
apparatus.  The state-centric decolonisation proposed by the parties, Grosfoguel 
(2008: 6) argues, merely validates the aspirations of the existing colonial elites 
to become “a national bourgeoisie, to be presidents and senators of the Republic 
or ambassadors or consuls in foreign countries.”  Indeed, in interview the 
Resident Commissioner inadvertently betrayed his personal desire for 
recognition in US Congress as a fully-fledged Representative or Senator: 
 
I’m in Washington being treated as a territory every day.  My 
name’s not even on the electronic board in the house when I go 
there.  That’s pretty offensive.  I live through this every day.  
(Resident Commissioner, PNP) 
 
 
4.5 Hegemony beyond the centre: the municipalities 
 
The section above provided a short critique of the hegemony of the 
status question using the perspectives of central political elites, gathered as the 
thesis’ pilot work.  This section aims to set up the thesis’ main critique of the 
hegemony of the status question, which focuses on its relationship to the 
everyday politics of the municipalities.  It discusses the features of municipal 
politics and explains its potential to empower local political actors to 
appropriate, modify, resist and even subvert centrally-defined political 
positions – in this case, status positions.  This assumes a relational and 
entangled account of political power.  Power is not fixed and simply possessed 
in a hierarchy of dominant and subordinate institutions, but exercised or 
performed (Allen, 2004; Sharp et al, 2000).  As such, decision-makers in 
institutions ‘beneath’ the central state (as per a hierarchical understanding of 
state power) are in practice able to strategically work around or beyond it, 






4.5.1 Decentralisation and local power 
 
The scope and functions of the Puerto Rican municipalities are 
established in Puerto Rico’s Autonomous Municipalities Act of 1991.  Passed by 
the central government legislature, this law defines a municipality as “a 
geographic demarcation with all its wards, which has a specific name and is 
governed by a local government composed of a legislative power and an 
executive power” (OMB, 2012: 8).12  Municipalities are legally independent from 
the central government but subordinated to the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.  The Autonomous Municipalities Actrecognises 
the economic, political, juridical and administrative autonomy of the 
municipalities from the central state in all matters of a local nature (OMB, 2012: 
10).  As such the Act establishes decentralisation as official public policy in 
Puerto Rico.  Decentralisation is the transfer of powers from a central state to 
other state entities that are not hierarchically subordinated to it – in this case, 
the municipalities (García, 2012: 4).  The chief executive of municipal 
government is the mayor.  The mayor, as the following chapters will show, is the 
cacique, or chief, and wields absolute power over municipal government and 
space (Heine, 1993). 
The Autonomous Municipalities Act was authored by former PDP 
governor Rafael Hernández Colón as a response to Puerto Rico’s highly 
centralized form of government.  A “centralist mentality” had dominated 
governmental thought and practice since the foundation of Commonwealth in 
1952 (López Pumarejo, 1998: 20).  As Hernández Colón (2006a: 29) puts it, in a 
centralised government “power is distant… Decision-making is far away from 
the people and their problems”.  While the Act has done much to reverse this, 
Hernández Colón (2006d: 25) observes that many Puerto Rican politicians are 
still “prisoners of a paternalistic mentality that spells out that government must 
come from the centre no matter how indifferent, slow, or gridlocked that centre 
                                                        
12 In this section I cite from a full English-language translation of the original Spanish-language 
Act, provided by Puerto Rico’s Office of Management and Budget.  The translated text is 





may be”.  Municipal autonomy may be seen as an attempt to counteract the 
prevailing centred view of political power (Allen, 2004: 7) in Puerto Rico.  It also 
responds to Gil’s (1994: 100) call for Puerto Rican politics to “imagine… an 
administrative conception of power in terms of certain “places” that have to be 
covered, because the place of True Power, the national state, has been vacated”.  
In other words, the municipalities open up an understanding of power as it is 
performed in concrete, local political contexts - a move away from the centred 
view of power that is assumed by the status discourse through its 
preoccupation with national state forms. 
The Autonomous Municipalities Act recognises that the municipalities 
have extensive powers.  Politically, the municipal residents vote for the local 
authorities - the mayor and a group of legislators - every four years.  
Administratively, municipalities have legislative and executive powers to 
manage local resources, to plan and regulate municipal territory, and to 
undergo construction.  They can also assume responsibilities for waste disposal, 
local public transport, public housing, and local enforcement.  Legally, the 
municipalities have jurisdiction over municipal territory and municipal affairs.  
As stated in the Act, “[e]ach municipality has legal capacity, independent and 
separate from the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, with 
perpetual succession and legislative, administrative and fiscal capacity in all 
matters of a municipal nature.” (OMB, 2012: 10).  Laws passed by the municipal 
legislature cannot be revoked by central government.  Economically, the 
municipalities enjoy many freedoms, such as collecting taxes, budget 
management, investing on international markets, and entering into contracts 
with any public or private sector entity (OMB, 2012: 189). 
 
4.5.2 Autonomy and degrees of power 
 
  While the Act allows the municipalities to havesignificant autonomy 
from central government, these powers must be claimed.  The first step is to 





Planning Board.  Once approved, the Territorial Plan grants the municipality the 
faculty to organise its urban space (Portillo and Rabell, 1995: 32).  
Municipalities may then claim responsibilities on a five-category scale from 
least to greatest autonomy.  A municipality with Category V autonomy has the 
authority to undergo any construction without intervention from the central 
government (OMB, 2012: 176).  Conversely, Category I autonomy only grants 
permission for small projects, which must be approved centrally.  Municipalities 
that do not have a Territorial Plan are not autonomous and depend on the 
central government to provide most services and functions.   
 In essence, the political power of the mayor increases with the degree of 
autonomy that his or her municipality enjoys.  The more autonomous the 
municipality, the greater the mayor’s capacity to make decisions independently 
of the central government.  This opens up the possibility for mayors to modify, 
resist or even influence central positions and policies, as well as simply reflect 
or reproduce them.  Local powers of autonomy are boosted further in Puerto 
Rico’s cities.  Under federal law a city or municipality with a population greater 
than 50,000 may procure funds directly from federal government agencies, 
bypassing the central government entirely.13  Guaynabo and Caguas are two 
such cities.  Conversely, municipalities with low autonomy, such as Lares, are 
more dependent on central government, and by extrapolation, more likely to be 
subservient to central positions and policies.  In sum, the extensive 
decentralisation of power to the municipalities opens up the possibility that the 
mayors - the local political elites - could exercise power in ways that reflect, 
modify or even resist the positions and policies of the centre, as set by the 
government or party leadership.  The next chapter shows that these exercises of 




                                                        
13 To clarify, this freedom is granted under US federal law and is unrelated to Puerto Rico’s 
Autonomous Municipalities Act.  Regardless, it has the effect of deepening the fiscal autonomy of 







 This chapter was inspired by the concept of hegemony to demonstrate 
the powers of persuasion underlying the discourses of Puerto Rico’s status 
question.  It attempted to reveal that the central political elites in the three main 
parties grant the status question hegemony in order to secure control over 
Puerto Rico’s current political system.  Further, the discourses of status, as 
circulated by the political elites, attempt to protect the legitimacy of the parties 
by concealing their internal ideological contradictions and lack of future 
planning for a definitive status resolution.  Ironically, therefore, the elites use 
their stated wishes to change the system as discursive devices to dominate, and 
thereby reproduce, the existing system - and not necessarily to change it as per 
their status preferences.  Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the political 
elites are not as serious about status as the discourses they circulate would have 
the people believe.   However, they would appear to be persuaded nonetheless 
of the power of their own discourses, making status hegemonic even from an 
elite’s perspective.  This is evident by the inability of politicians to clearly 
identify other political views that unite all members of their party.  The last part 
of the chapter highlighted that the decentralisation of political power to 
municipal governments presents possibilities for a further critique of the 
dominance of the status question, from the local scale.  Namely, the 
performance of local state power contains the potential to reinforce, modify, 
resist or subvert centrally prescribed status positions.  This critique is 







































 Having established that the status question is structurally dominant in 
Puerto Rican politics, the thesis now turns to an examination of the relationship 
between this dominance and everyday politics in Puerto Rico.  To consider 
where and how status positions are manifested in everyday politics, the chapter 
presents three case study sites.  Each demonstrates the material representation 
of status positions in municipal territory.  Specifically, party political discourses 
around the status question are expressed through complementary practices of 
municipal identity construction and public works associated with the built 
environment.  These actions are the result of decisions made by the ruling 
political elites in the municipal governments at each case study site.  As such, 
they represent concrete examples of how positions on status have informed 
political decisions on Puerto Rico.  While the dominant geographical 
frameworks for understanding the status question are the nation, state and 
nation-state, these insights demonstrate that Puerto Rican questions about 
nationalism and state building also have local significance and material effects. 
The first section of the chapter outlines the adopted theoretical approach.  
Specifically, local political elites have implemented material changes to the 
everyday, lived environment of the municipalities in order to bring into being 
and normalise discourses of Puerto Rican identity that are consistent with their 
status positions.  In a performative way, these elites attempt to inscribe 
hegemony through landscape.  The second section presents a background to the 
construction of Puerto Rican identities in place.  The third, fourth and fifth 
sections discuss the case studies of Guaynabo City (representing statehood), 
Caguas, Nuestro Nuevo País (Commonwealth) and Lares, Ciudad del Grito 
(independence).  The chapter draws upon interviews with the local political 
elites and documents collected from each municipal site.  The mayors are the 





power.  Supporting evidence is provided by other local elites: municipal 
legislators from all parties, and directors of the mayor’s executive departments. 
 
5.2 Performing hegemony in landscape 
 
Theoretically, the chapter considers that local political elites have 
implemented material changes to the everyday, lived environment of the 
municipalities in order to bring into being and normalise discourses of Puerto 
Rican identity that are consistent with their status positions.  The inscriptions of 
hegemonic status discourses in material space attempt to performatively 
realign identities, since “the repeated inscription of norms, and the continual 
experience of these norms, permit the emergence of a stable ego” (Thrift and 
Dewsbury, 2000: 412).  These processes deepen an understanding of status as 
not a predetermined aspect of Puerto Rican reality but rather constitutive of 
hegemonic discourses that are routinely performed and brought into being 
through material spaces.  Such inscriptions feed back into the production of the 
landscapes of Guaynabo, Caguas and Lares (Gregson and Rose, 2000).  As 
outlined in section 2.2.1, the thesis considers the municipalities to be 
“peripheral centres of power” capable of producing sub-hegemonic effects (Peet, 
2007: 22).  Peripheral centres of power “translate received discourses, modify 
and add to ideas, and provide evidence of their validity through regional 
practice” (2007: 22).  The case studies presented here demonstrate how local 
political elites exercise their powers over municipal space to appropriate, 
modify and validate centrally prescribed status positions. 
 The chapter contributes to theoretical understandings of the workings of 
hegemony in landscape.  Landscapes, understood as ‘texts’, are “transformations 
of ideologies into concrete form” (Duncan and Duncan, 1988: 117).  The built 
environment in the municipalities of Guaynabo, Caguas and Lares shall be read 
as such, with the ideologies in question relating to status positions.  Landscapes 
are socially constructed by those that wield the “power of definition” (Western, 





as Daniels and Cosgrove (1988: 7) put it, landscapes are “duplicitous” as they 
have the capacity to appear objective and ‘natural’ while concealing their 
ideological foundations.  They should therefore be distrusted as “pernicious 
delusions” and “dazzling tricks” (1988: 7).  This chapter reflects that the actions 
of the mayors in the municipalities regarding landscape do little to conceal their 
ideological intentions; rather, they may be read as performed attempts to 
display and promote them.  Indeed, the mayors aim to give their ideological 
intentions – specifically, their status positions – legitimacy by inscribing them in 
space.  In sum, landscapes “not only reflect and articulate ideologies and social 
relations, they actively institutionalise and legitimise them by reifying them in 
concrete form” (Winchester et al, 2003: 67).   
Place naming is an important aspect of hegemony in landscape, and of 
particular relevance to the case studies.  Tuan (1991: 684) notes that language 
plays an active role in the creation of place: “Words alone… can have the power 
to render objects, formerly invisible because unattended, visible, and impart to 
them a certain character”.  Place naming “plays a key role in the social 
construction of space and the contested processes of attaching meaning to 
places” (Alderman, 2008: 196).  Notably, it has a “capacity for changing and 
challenging lines of identity” (2008: 196).  In this vein, the case studies explore 
how decisions on local place-naming and identity – specifically, municipal 
slogans - both cement and challenge the lines of identity set by status discourses. 
 
5.3 Background: the inscription of Puerto Rican identities in space 
 
On both the island and US mainland, symbols of Puerto Rican identity 
have been materially represented in place.  In Chicago, two huge roadside 
structures in the form of the Puerto Rican flag mark the start and finish of the 
Paseo Boricua (Puerto Rican Pathway), demarcating the boundaries of the city's 
Puerto Rican district and claiming "a recognisable economic, political and 
cultural space for Puerto Ricans" (Flores-González, 2001: 9).  Similarly, the 
casitas of New York – small wooden houses reminiscent of rural Puerto Rico 





"act[s] of reterritorialisation... imparting identity to the urban landscape" 
(Aponte-Parés, 1995: 14).  While there are a number of studies about the 
representations and performances of Puerto Rican space by popular groups in 
the United States, much less has been written about politically motivated 
appropriations of space by elite groups on the island. 
In Puerto Rico, the central government has sanctioned some of the most 
notable monuments to Puerto Rican identity.  It is therefore perhaps 
unsurprising that these works often reflect party political positions on the 
subject – which are in turn related to status positions (Morris, 1995).  For 
example, the famous Monumento al Jíbaro in Salinas commemorates the white 
jíbaro peasant farmer, a symbol of the PDP and its achievements in alleviating 
rural poverty under Commonwealth status.  Unveiled in 1976 by former 
governor Rafael Hernández Colón, the monument proclaims the jíbaro “the 
cultivator of our land, genesis of our race, and authentic Puerto Rican 
expression” (Field notes: 2/15/10).  Since the PDP had constructed the jíbaro as 
an icon of national identity, and claimed to represent its interests, the party "in 
effect claimed to represent the interests of Puerto Rico" (Córdova, 2005: 180).   
In this way the PDP has sought legitimacy for its policies - including the 
foundation of Commonwealth - through the construction and material 
expression of national symbols. 
Similarly, in 2010 the incumbent pro-statehood administration 
constructed the Paseo de los Presidentes (Walkway of the Presidents) at the foot 
of the Capitolio, the central government legislature in San Juan.  Jointly unveiled 
by the leaders of the upper and lower houses, the Walkway presents statues to 
the seven US presidents that have set foot on the island (Figure 5.1).  As the 
commemorative plaque reveals, it serves to foster a sense of closeness between 
Puerto Rico and the United States, with the people of the former subsumed 
within the nation of the latter.  This represents the hegemonic pro-statehood 
discourse: 
 
The statues that represent them were deliberately commissioned 
and made to highlight the figure of each president as a citizen 





[sic], whose human side seems to beckon us to come closer.  
Therefore we see only their figures without pedestals nor 
ornaments, as they seem to walk up to meet us, the people of 






Figure 5.1: Gerald Ford at the Paseo de los Presidentes.  A vacant site for a future statue 
lies in the background.  (Field photo) 
 
 
When I visited the Paseo in early 2011, extra spaces for further statues 
had already been prepared in eager anticipation of future presidential visits.  An 
Obama statue has since been added to mark the president’s visit to the island on 
14 June, 2011 - even though the event itself was regarded as a diplomatic failure 
for the pro-statehood administration.14  Nonetheless, while unveiling the Obama 
statue during President’s Day on 20 February 2012, Resident Commissioner 
Pedro Pierluisi seized the opportunity to perform the statehood argument.  He 
decried the “irony” that “the US president is an important figure for Puerto 
Ricans, despite the fact that we cannot elect him”, and insisted “Puerto Rico and 
its near four million US citizens deserve to enjoy all the benefits and 
responsibilities of our fellow citizens” (Primera Hora, 2012). 
On the municipal level, governments of Puerto Rican towns and cities 
have a strong tradition of using slogans to commemorate multiple aspects of 
local and national Puerto Rican culture.  Many of these find expression in murals 
                                                        
14 Relations between the PNP and President Obama were reportedly sour, with the party failing 





and signage, both within urban centres and along the territorial borders with 
neighbouring municipalities.  Slogans celebrate, for example, a municipality’s 
historic agricultural production (Pueblo del Tomate – ‘Town of the Tomato’), the 
raising of internationally successful beauty pageant contestants (Pueblo de 
Mujeres Hermosas – ‘Town of Beautiful Women’), and even light-hearted 
rivalries with other municipalities (Ponce es Ponce, lo demás es parking – ‘Ponce 
is Ponce, everywhere else is just parking space’) (Field notes: 6/11/10). 
This tendency towards local identification and place-naming has been 
facilitated by the political process of municipalización (municipalisation), which 
has been in effect since the Autonomous Municipalities Act was passed in 1991.  
Municipalización refers to the gradual decentralisation of state powers from 
central to local government (Hernández Colón, 2006a).  As section 4.5.1 
indicated, such political change has enabled municipal actors to exert increased 
control over their public works with minimal interference from the central state.  
In particular, place naming is made possible by the powers of the mayors under 
the Autonomous Municipalities Act to “name the streets, avenues, walks, parks, 
plazas, alleys, pedestrian walks, buildings, facilities and all kinds of municipal 
public highways, works, structures or facilities” (OMB, 2012: 22): 
 
The mayor shall determine the corresponding name, which shall 
be approved through a municipal ordinance to such effects… The 
municipality shall, to the extent possible, choose names related to 
the municipal history, geography, and traditions or of 
distinguished persons of the past identified with the municipality. 
(2012: 22) 
 
The Puerto Rican press often considers the growing presence of 
municipal slogans in signage and monuments to be apolitical marketing 
exercises spearheaded by local political elites in order to promote the town.  As 
Caquías Cruz (2010: 15) writes in El Nuevo Día: “Caguas started to market itself 
a few years back as “Our New Country”.  And suddenly Guaynabo turned into 
Guaynabo City… The mayors distinguish themselves with new slogans”.  
However, it is argued below that the slogans of Guaynabo, Caguas, and Lares 





perspectives on the status question.  Indeed, the material manifestation of 
status at these sites reveals that the question itself has become an important 
aspect of Puerto Rican identity (Laó-Montes, 2008), finding expression through 





Figure 5.2: Location of municipal research sites [recap].  (Source: author) 
 
 
5.4 Guaynabo City 
 
The municipality of Guaynabo is located immediately to the west of San 
Juan (Figure 5.2), with which it shares a municipal border, and has a current 
population of 97,924 (US Census Bureau, 2012a: 30).  Once a rural area, 
Guaynabo has developed over the past 20 years into a predominantly 
residential municipality servicing the entire San Juan Metropolitan Area, of 
which it now forms part.  Its several prestigious gated communities house an 
upper-income population of urban professionals working in commerce, services 
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business” (Duchesne Winter, 2008: 13).  As such Guaynabo currently enjoys the 
highest per-capita income of all municipalities in Puerto Rico (Suárez 
Carrasquillo, 2009: 48) and contains the highest concentration of English 
speakers (Pousada, 2008: 138).  Duchesne Winter (2008: 13) even asserts that 
the “denizens of the Guaynabo City enclave… conscientiously pursue 
miscegenation-assimilation through mixed marriages with Anglo-Americans”.  
Residents of Guaynabo are often called guaynabitos in everyday Puerto Rican 
talk – a pejorative term literally meaning ‘little people from Guaynabo’.  It was 
coined in the 1990s to refer to an identifiable cohort of young professionals who 
worked in the pro-statehood administration of former governor Pedro Rosselló 
and resided in the gated communities of Guaynabo (Interview, PIP legislator, 
Guaynabo). 
Guaynabo is an electoral stronghold of the pro-statehood PNP.  Its 
population has voted for the PNP and statehood in every single gubernatorial 
election, mayoral election and status plebiscite since the foundation of the party 
in 1967 (Álvarez-Rivera, 2013).  Its long-standing mayor, Héctor O’Neill, is 
currently serving a historic sixth consecutive term in office, having assumed the 
position in 1993.  What distinguishes Guaynabo from other pro-statehood 
municipalities is its unmistakable municipal slogan, ‘Guaynabo City’, and its 
complementary display of the English language throughout the built 
environment.  Basic road signage in and around the town square is not in 
Spanish but rather English: ‘DO NOT ENTER’, ‘ONE WAY’, ‘TWO WAY’, ‘YIELD’, 
‘STOP’.  Calle de José de Diego becomes ‘Jose de Diego Street’ through the 
anglicisation of street names (Figure 5.3).  Middle-class residential streets are 
lined with US MAIL postboxes and picket fences.  Main roads and highways 
intersecting the municipal boundary are decorated with large signs that mark 
the ‘Guaynabo CITY LIMIT’.  ‘GUAYNABO CITY POLICE’ cars patrol the 
municipality.  In all of these ways, local affinity with the United States is 








Figure 5.3: Jose de Diego St, Guaynabo City. (Field photo) 
 
 The following discussion argues that Mayor O’Neill’s ‘Guaynabo City’ is a 
sub-hegemonic performance of status discourse.  Guaynabo City is not only a 
material representation of O’Neill’s pro-statehood status position.  More 
specifically, it brings into being a reworked version of the standard statehood 
discourse set centrally by the PNP.  Guaynabo City could therefore be 
considered sub-hegemonic in that it significantly modifies one aspect of that 
central discourse.  Section 4.3.4 of the last chapter discussed that the PNP are 
adamant Puerto Rico’s culture, language and identity would be safeguarded 
under statehood.  However, Guaynabo City would appear to reverse this 
emphasis by actively promoting statehood as the promise of Americanisation 
and cultural assimilation.  Guaynabo, as a ‘peripheral power centre’, therefore 
produces sub-hegemony in that it “basically supports, while modifying, the 
ideological positions taken by central institutions” (Peet, 2007: 22). 
Guaynabo City speaks to one of the most fundamental issues in the status 
debate: namely, the prospect of Puerto Rico’s cultural assimilation into the 
United States if it were to become the 51st state.  In particular, the deployment 
of English in Guaynabo City highlights the complex relationship between the 





puts it, “fostering English is linked in the minds of many Puerto Ricans with 
assimilationism, while defending Spanish is the hallmark of nationalism”.  
Indeed, in Puerto Rico language is intertwined with debates on cultural identity 
and "authentic Puerto Ricanness" (Lazú and Negrón, 2000: 118), such that those 
who speak 'corrupted' Spanglish, or even speak English better than Spanish, are 
considered less Puerto Rican or 'Nuyorican'.  However, since English is also an 
important vessel for connecting Puerto Ricans to the United States and the rest 
of the world, it is understood in ambiguous terms as “both a tool of liberation 
and instrument of oppression” (Pousada, 1999: 33).  At the same time, learning 
English is deemed a challenge for Puerto Ricans, with the language earning the 
nickname el difícil ('the difficult one') "for its reputation as being difficult to 
learn even after years of formal study in school" (Mazak, 2008: 52). 
Pro-independence writers have derided Guaynabo City as a gesture of 
pitiyanquismo – shameless pandering to the United States through attempts to 
show Puerto Rico’s cultural compatibility with that nation.  As Pesquera 
Sevillano (2009: 38) puts it, Guaynabo City is “a sad spectacle of 
transculturation”.  Historically, these groups understand that the use of English 
in Puerto Rico contributes to the "erosion of the language unity of the Puerto 
Rican people" and "can only favour a certain political solution to our status 
question" (Tapia Flores, 1979; in Pousada, 2008: 147).  However, the great 
irony of Guaynabo City, as Noriega (2012: 1) highlights, is that neither the 
mayor nor the majority of his municipal employees speak English:  
 
The mayor of Guaynabo City cannot offer his annual budget 
message in the English language.  If he could, most of his 
municipal legislators wouldn’t understand him.  Neither can the 
principal supervisors of the municipality give orders to their 
subordinates in English.  If the municipal officials are summoned 
to the federal Tribunal as defendants or witnesses, they would 
have to ask for translators.15  (Noriega, 2012: 1)  
 
                                                        
15 One of the curiosities of the Puerto Rican justice system is that the federal District Courts, the 
courts of highest authority on the island, must conduct all proceedings in English.  This is a 





 I asked O’Neill how the concept of Guaynabo City originated.  He 
explained that it was inspired by a trip to the United States in 1997: 
 
<Laughs> That came about as a result of an order I gave.  When I 
arrived here I had one hundred cadets in the municipal police 
force.  I purchased forty patrol vehicles and wanted a distinctive 
design, different from the rest.  And I’m in Chicago, I see Chicago’s 
patrol vehicles, and I start to take photos…  When I returned to 
Guaynabo I called up a graphic designer who had done some work 
in the municipality, I sent him the photos and told him: ‘I want 
you to put the municipal vehicles exactly like that’.  The designer 
got to work, and he put them exactly like that: just as the photo 
said ‘Chicago City’, so he put ‘Guaynabo City’ on all the vehicles.  I 
said, ‘gosh, look what he’s done!’ [Interview, Mayor, Guaynabo] 
 
As US citizens Puerto Ricans circulate freely between two spaces - the colony 
and the metropolis – and in the process overcome traditional barriers 
associated with borders.  Revolving-door migration, argues Aponte-Parés 
(1995: 15), “has provided several generations ongoing contact with ‘fresh’ 
images of the otra patria, the ‘other country or homeland’, providing fluidity in 
exchanging people as well as culture and images”.  In this way Guaynabo City 
was created, O’Neill having returned to Puerto Rico with refreshed cultural and 
linguistic referents in the form of his images of Chicago, soon to find material 
expression in his jurisdiction.  Owing to the instant popularity of the ‘Guaynabo 
City Police’ design within the municipality (Figure 5.4), O’Neill’s Department of 
Public works extended the Guaynabo City slogan to signage, and later oversaw 
the replacement of Spanish-language instructions for traffic with English-
language equivalents around the town centre (Figure 5.3 above).  Indeed, as 
Gomez-Pena (1993; in Aponte-Parés, 1995: 16) notes, travel to the metropolis is 









Figure 5.4: Guaynabo City Police patrol car. (Source: Rexach, 2008) 
 
I asked O’Neill why he implemented these changes.  He responded: 
“Wherever you live in Puerto Rico, people feel pride for being from that place.  
People from Caguas say, ‘I’m from the Creole City’.  Or the Cowboys of Bayamon.  
But here there wasn’t a phrase for the pride of the Guaynabeño.16  That’s why I 
gave them Guaynabo City, to be able to say ‘I’m from Guaynabo City’, to feel 
proud”.  O’Neill notes in his published biography that Guaynabo’s residents have 
indeed embraced the label.  “Now everyone feels a great pride in declaring that 
they are from ‘Guaynabo City’, a pride as profound as that which our friends 
from the Pearl of the South feel when they say ‘Ponce is Ponce’” (Quiñones 
Calderón, 2009: 142).   
Understanding that the source of inspiration for a slogan of local pride is 
the United States, and knowing that Guaynabo is a stronghold of the pro-
statehood party, I asked the mayor about his views on the status question.  His 
responses reflected the PNP’s hegemonic discourses on economic dependency, 
citizenship and nation: 
 
CE: Could you explain to me why statehood represents the 
 best future for Puerto Rico? 
 
                                                        





HON:  Look.  You have to see it, not as a question of the future.  
 It’s a question of how Puerto Rico has developed…  The 
 roads were constructed with federal funds, the 
 maintenance  of roads, the social aspect of cupones 
 [welfare cheques] and health, all that, fifty percent comes 
 from federal funds.  Within that situation, we can 
 continue to receive. 
  
…We have the problem that the moment has arrived, that 
 we don’t have gold, we don’t have agriculture, we don’t 
 have anything.  What do we have?  A powerful American 
 citizenship.  It [statehood] is our destiny… 
 
…We already have ourselves placed in the United States   
with both feet.  So what do we have the responsibility to 




This above dialogue reveals how the hegemonic pro-statehood discourse 
importantly cements an asymmetric economic and political power relationship 
between Puerto Rico and the United States.  However, deviating from the 
hegemonic statehood position, O'Neill believes that this asymmetry also extends 
to the cultural.  He revealed this when I asked him to elaborate on the meaning 
of ‘American nation’: 
 
CE:  Your nation is the United States. 
 
HON:  Correct. 
 
CE:  Do you not feel that your nation is Puerto Rico? 
 
HON:  Well, Puerto Rico is not a nation.  It is a territory.  If it were 
 a nation, it would be a totally independent country… 
 Nation is your ability to face other powers.  What can we 
 face other powers with?… Puerto Rico is such a small 
 country.  Compare it with Costa Rica, with Guatemala, with 
 Panama.  We don’t have the problems they have there.  
 Here there is food! Over there, poverty!  Guatemala isn’t a 
 power because it doesn’t have resources.  It’s a republic.  
 Honduras neither.  These countries lack their own 
 personality.  Why do they [Puerto Rican independence 
 supporters] want to be like them?  Just to be able to say, 
 “I’m from Puerto Rico?” 
 






HON:  OK.  It’s just like the Texan.  Or someone from the  
 Tennessee mountains.  They are all proud of their country.  
 And each one of their state.  I feel Puerto Rican, I was born 
 on this land, and I feel proud of everything that I have.  OK?  
 But, of everything I have, someone has to have given it to 
 me.  It has always been like that.  They [the states of the 
 Union] have it too. 
 
The above dialogue reveals that O’Neill’s positions on status are both 
hegemonic and sub-hegemonic.  His understanding of ‘Puerto Rican’ as a 
cultural identity subsumed within the American nation accurately reproduces 
the hegemonic PNP position on Puerto Rican culture.  However, his specific 
comments about the relationship between Puerto Rican culture and United 
States national culture should be considered sub-hegemonic in that they diverge 
significantly from the party line.  The centre emphasises the resilience and 
uniqueness of Puerto Rican identity and attempts to persuade that it would 
endure and even flourish under statehood (Meléndez, 1991: 136).  However, 
O’Neill places an opposite emphasis on Puerto Ricanness, suggesting above that 
everything that he ‘has’ as a Puerto Rican – in other words, the attributes that 
ascribe him an identity – have been given to him by the United States.  This is 
essentially a cultural assimilationist position. 
It could therefore be argued that Guaynabo City is a performance of local 
state power intended to legitimise the cultural assimilation of Puerto Ricans 
through everyday municipal landscape.  For example, the mayor stated that the 
purpose of the English-language signage is to reproduce the transportation 
infrastructure of the mainland: “more or less, it’s to familiarise you in terms of 
the traffic system in English… When you go to visit a country, to visit a city in 
the United States, it’s so that you are already oriented”.  When I asked O’Neill 
directly if Guaynabo City was related to his pro-statehood views, he strongly 
denied the suggestion: “no, the one has nothing to do with the other”.  However, 
during discussion of the guaynabito, the stereotypical municipal resident, 
O’Neill inadvertently revealed that Guaynabo City is indeed his attempt to 






HON:  The definition of a guaynabito is the following: a citizen 
 that, unfortunately, lives under a status which he says is a 
 colony, and enjoys all the benefits of a state, here in 
 Guaynabo City.  They [pro-independence supporters] say 
 we are a colony, but they live here.  They come from 
 elsewhere!  And they enjoy all the benefits that the United 
 States have.  Clean streets, good services. 
 
CE:  I thought guaynabito referred to someone from one of the 
 prosperous areas. 
 
HON:  Exactly, an individual who very easily could move to the 
 United States, who is rich, but he stays here.  He doesn’t 
 move from Guaynabo.  Why?  Because here are all the 
 benefits, all the facilities for communities, as if it were a 
 state. 
 
Flores (2000: 73) writes that the building of casitas in New York is an “act of 
imaginative transposition” and a “constructed illusion… a performative sense of 
vividly imagined place and time: it is ‘as if’ we were in Puerto Rico or Puerto 
Rico were here”.  Likewise, Guaynabo City may be read as O’Neill’s 
performatively ‘constructed illusion’ of statehood – all the benefits, all the 
facilities, ‘as if’ we were in a state.  Similarly, Aponte-Parés (1995: 17) notes that 
casitas grant Puerto Ricans the “power of place and culture”, creating important 
spaces of belonging “in a city that has yet to offer many of them acceptance”.  In 
the same way Guaynabo City might also create for statehood supporters an 
imagined sense of acceptance by the United States that remains elusive in 
reality, given the numerous failed bids for statehood through formal political 
channels. 
In the above passage O’Neill reveals that Guaynabo City is about 
providing residents with a quality of life and public services that he perceives as 
equivalent to the offerings of any state of the union.  Indeed, he suspects that the 
real guaynabitos are not statehooders but in fact independentistas, who 
hypocritically reside in his municipality while enjoying the advantages of the 
statehood that he has brought into being.  O’Neill therefore appears to suggest 
that his pro-statehood beliefs have influenced not only his municipal slogan but 





for its provision of excellent local services to residents, including bi-weekly 
rubbish collection, mandatory recycling, and high quality social housing 
(Quiñones Calderón, 2009: 103).  It is likely that O’Neill’s proven track record as 
a local political actor gives legitimacy to the Guaynabo City landscape.  However, 
the mayor strongly hints above that his provision of such services is entangled 
with his desire for statehood.  This “entanglement of power” (Sharp et al, 2000: 
12) – the way in which he exercises power in ways that simultaneously connect 
to local concerns and central hegemonic positions – is discussed further in the 
following chapter. 
 O’Neill argues that the primary purpose of the municipal signage is to 
inspire the learning of English.  In the interview he noted he was “educating 
children”, “valuing language”, and “developing Guaynabo as a tourist 
destination”.  Attempting to get beneath this, I politely asked him to again 
consider whether his pro-statehood views might have informed his decision:  
 
CE:  Let’s imagine, if this is possible – if you were not a 
 statehooder, do you think you would have put these signs 
 in English? 
 
HON:  Of course!  I could be an independentista and put them in 
 English.  Rubén Berríos [leader of the PIP], when he goes to 
 [US] Congress, does he speak in Spanish?  No, he speaks in 
 English.  And where do their children study?  The United 
 States!  Why?  To be able to move on up.  But my new 
 assistant, from the Guaynabo countryside, doesn’t have the 
 right to learn because he doesn’t have the economic 
 resources to go where Leader Rubén went…  So, the 
 government has to offer him that alternative.  That’s what 
 we’re talking about. 
 
Here the mayor indicates that his administration attempts to offer Puerto 
Ricans ‘alternative’ everyday exposure to the English language through signage 
– possibly a response to the inadequacies of the domestic public education 
system in teaching it (Barreto, 2000b: 14).  With reference to PIP leader Rubén 
Berríos, he explains that the signs are for Puerto Ricans who lack the elite 
privilege to travel to the United States and learn there.  Further, noting the 





English are also fundamental to enable political dialogue with the United States 
– specifically, to talk about the status question.  Indeed, in the United States 
“Spanish continues to be identified as the language of a disempowered minority 
while English maintains the status as the dominant language that provides 
political, economic and social access” (Lazú and Negrón, 2000: 121). 
The positions of Guaynabo’s minority legislators would support an 
interpretation that Guaynabo City is a sub-hegemonic attempt at cultural 
assimilation.  In their view, the fact that the new signage is monolingual rather 
than bilingual (in English only, not in both English and Spanish) invalidates the 
mayor’s argument that Puerto Ricans can use the signs to learn English.  
Therefore, Guaynabo City can only represent the mayor’s attempt to culturally 
assimilate the town into the United States by mimicking the language and urban 
designs of empire.  Indeed, in recent years the PDP's rival candidates for mayor 
have attempted, unsuccessfully, to contest this by campaigning to remove all 
English-language signs and reinstall Spanish versions (Field notes: 23/4/11).  
The PDP legislator for Guaynabo notes bluntly that English should be learnt 
through “education not street signs”.  The pro-independence legislator believes 
that the mayor’s installation of English-language signs, coupled with his own 
inability to speak the language, represents a “colonial contradiction”: 
 
I don’t know if you know, but independence supporters in Puerto 
Rico, as a group, speak the best English.  And the statehooders are 
those who speak the worst English.  That’s a contradiction – 
because they want to be Americans, American way of life17, and we 
want to separate.  (PIP legislator, Guaynabo) 
 
This statement reflects one of the ironies of Puerto Rican status politics – that 
independence supporters tend to speak better English than statehood 
supporters, possibly due to their higher levels of education as a group (Cámara-
Fuertes and Rosas-Cintrón, 2004: 170).  In sum, for the PIP and PDP legislators 
Guaynabo City stands as a warning of the cultural assimilation that the entire 
island could suffer as a state.  This view is founded on the cultural nationalist 
                                                        
17 'American way of life' was spoken in English and has been italicised to reflect the change of 





assumption that the Spanish language is a deeply rooted aspect of Puerto Rican 
identity (Carroll, 2008: 99).  As such, the prevailing construction of an anglicised 
Guaynabo amounts to a negation of Puerto Ricanness.  Consider, for example, 
the following statements: 
 
[Guaynabo City] appears to be nonsense.  I say ‘appears to be’, 
because for me it isn’t.  It’s totally the opposite of what I’m saying 
Guaynabo is for me.  It’s how to aspire to not be Guaynabo.  
Because this is not Guaynabo City – it’s Guaynabo.  Guaynabo City 
is there in the United States.  So, he wants to be that, despite not 
being it.  It’s like wanting to be what I am not.  (PIP legislator, 
Guaynabo) 
 
The streets all in English.  That’s an ideological concept, that he 
has, to cast aside the things of ours of a population with Spanish 
roots, in order to bring us ideologically closer to the United States.  
But you can’t be what you are not.  You have to be you.  
Understand?  We are a latino country.  Our culture is totally latino.  
The language, the customs, the religion, all the potential we have 
as a people.  (PDP legislator, Guaynabo) 
 
The president of the majority PNP legislators defended the mayor 
against such criticisms by arguing that Guaynabo’s street signs are symbolic of 
the municipality’s local struggle to promote English, often against the wishes of 
central government.  When the PDP are in power, he notes, Spanish is favoured 
over English in both educational policy and lawmaking, to the detriment of 
English.  In advancing this argument, he alludes to the Official Language Act of 
1991, passed by Rafael Hernández Colón’s administration to make Spanish the 
sole official language of Puerto Rico18.  Guaynabo City therefore reflects the 
wider struggles between the PNP and PDP to secure hegemony for their status 
discourses:   
 
If the PDP is governing, then Spanish is taught.  English is taken 
away.  Or they don’t take it away; it’s taught without priority.  The 
official language changes every time the government changes.  If 
the PDP wins, they pass a law saying the official language is 
Spanish.  If the PNP wins, more emphasis is given to English, and 
                                                        
18 The PNP quickly repealed the law upon returning to power two years later, restoring English 





the contracting of English teachers for all public schools.  (PNP 
Legislator, Guaynabo] 
 
If the changes to Guaynabo’s built environment are supposed to teach 
Puerto Ricans English, they would be reminiscent of the United States’ official 
colonial policy of ‘Americanisation’ on the island during the first half of the 
twentieth century (Negrón de Montilla, 1990).  English was enforced as the sole 
language of classroom instruction for five decades, with US policymakers 
considering the Spanish language "one of the things ‘wrong’ with Puerto Ricans", 
and the learning of English a sign of loyalty and patriotism (Barreto, 2000b: 5).  
Indeed, from the American perspective the “Puerto Rican problem” had long 
consisted of assimilating Puerto Ricans as Spanish speakers into the English-
speaking mainstream (López, 2007: 61).  However, the policy was ultimately 
abandoned and regarded a failure once consensus had formed that Puerto 
Ricans were unable to assimilate into the American mainstream due to 
insuperable cultural and linguistic difference (Negrón de Montilla, 1990: 256).  
Guaynabo City is unique in that it represents perhaps the first instance of a self-
imposed Americanisation of Puerto Rican public space, enacted by a local 
political elite rather than the external metropolitan power.  Given that 
performances are always ‘citational’ – that is, embedded historically in past 
discourses and utterances (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 433) – the actions to 
promote English in Guaynabo City could be rooted in past colonial policies with 
similar aims. 
To summarise the section, desire for statehood is performed through the 
landscape of Guaynabo.  Minority legislators believe that Guaynabo City 
represents a failed experiment to Americanise Puerto Rican identity – which, 
according to their take on status, is historically resistant to the United States.  As 
an endorsement of cultural assimilation, Guaynabo City is sub-hegemonic in 
that it significantly reworks the central PNP discourse on the resilience of 
Puerto Ricanness under statehood.   While the centre insists that “our language 
and culture are not negotiable” (Romero-Barceló, 1978: 25), Guaynabo City 





5.5 Caguas, Nuestro Nuevo País (Our New Country) 
 
Caguas, bordering San Juan to the south (Figure 5.2), is a local stronghold 
of the pro-Commonwealth PDP.  The city has only ever had one pro-statehood 
mayor and has voted loyally with the PDP in the status plebiscites of 1968, 1993 
and 1998 (Álvarez Rivera, 2010).  However, Caguas is more changeable in terms 
of voting at the national level, having favoured gubernatorial candidates from 
both main parties over the years – including the PNP’s Luis Fortuño in 2008.  As 
such, the city is often regarded as a “barometer” of national electoral politics 
(Pérez, 2010: 26).  Caguas’ economy is a mixture of commerce, high technology 
manufacture, services, and government.  With a population of 142,893, it is the 
fifth largest city in Puerto Rico (US Census Bureau, 2012a: 30).   
Like Guaynabo, Caguas had a long-standing mayor who oversaw social, 
economic and cultural transformations to the municipality.  William Miranda 
Marín, mayor of Caguas from 1997 until his death in 2010, developed the city 
according to a decision-making model that became known as la gobernanza 
democratica (‘democratic governance’) (Rabell et al, 2007).  This model 
identifies citizen participation in government as an ‘antidote’ to Puerto Rico’s 
colonial dependency culture.  Moreover, it aims to foster in its citizens a strong 
sense of Puerto Rican national identity as a foundation for local participatory 
democracy.19  As such, Puerto Rican national culture has been put to the service 
of a locally realisable ‘spiritual decolonisation’ (Miranda Marín, 2008: 27).  
Miranda Marín’s son, William Miranda Torres, took over as mayor of Caguas 
following a special election event in August 2010.  Winning the election by a 
landslide, Miranda Torres echoes the political views and policies of his father. 
These practices of local government and national culture are evident in 
the slogans of Caguas, which feature prominently in the municipal vision 
statement: Caguas, Nuestro Nuevo País, Centro y Corazón de Puerto Rico (Caguas, 
Our New Country, Centre and Heart of Puerto Rico).  Caguas is also known as La 
Ciudad Criolla, or ‘the Creole City’.  ‘Creole’ references the PDP’s belief that 
                                                        





Puerto Ricans are essentially composed of three ethnic pillars: Spanish, 
indigenous Indian, and African.  As Mayor Miranda Torres explained to me in 
written correspondence, “the most important aspects of Caguas are citizen 
participation and creole pride.  That pride is expressed in our vision of a New 
Country” (Miranda Torres, 2011: 1).  As in ‘Guaynabo City’, the slogans of 
Caguas find material expression across the municipality (Figure 5.5), and reflect 
a number of discourses related to a centrally prescribed status position.  In 
particular, material change in Caguas sub-hegemonically reifies the traditional 
stance of the pro-Commonwealth PDP on Puerto Rican identity: cultural 
nationalism.  This is about promoting Puerto Ricanness as a specifically national 
gesture of resistance to the statehood position, which the party considers to be 
assimilationist (Dávila, 1997: 61; Duchesne Winter, 2007: 92).  Material changes 
to the everyday, lived environment of Caguas therefore bring into being and 
normalise discourses of Puerto Rican identity that are consistent with the status 




Figure 5.5: Caguas, Nuestro Nuevo Pais, as featured on the Caguas ‘trolley’. 
(Field photo)  
 
The changes that Miranda Senior implemented to Caguas’ urban 





discourses which are related to the PDP’s pro-Commonwealth status position, 
and contrast with that of the pro-statehood PNP.  First, Puerto Rican identity is 
composed of three essential ethnic elements, which distinguish it from the 
United States.  Notably, the PDP’s ideology of cultural nationalism implicitly 
excludes the United States and denies the possibility of its influence on Puerto 
Rican culture.  Second, the strength of this identity constitutes Puerto Ricans as 
an inassimilable Caribbean and Latin American nation.  Third, the celebration of 
national culture offers Puerto Ricans a path to decolonisation without formal 
political separation.  These discourses are examined below as they are 
manifested, in Miranda Torres’ (2011: 6) words, in the “tangible works” of 
Caguas: its statues, sculptures, museums, gardens and pathways. 
Caguas has become one of Puerto Rico’s most important destinations for 
cultural tourism by promoting the values of criollismo, or ‘creole identity’.  
Criollismo is based upon the centuries-old myth that Puerto Ricans are the 
product of a harmonious mix of three ethnicities: Spanish colonisers, indigenous 
Taíno Indians and African slaves, usually in this order of importance (Jiménez 
Román, 1996: 8).  The PDP subscribes to this same discourse on identity in their 
central cultural policy, which has traditionally celebrated these three ethnicities 
as the essential “pillars” of Puerto Ricanness (PDP, 2010: 22) and the 
phenotypical ingredients of la Gran Familia Puertorriqueña (the Great Puerto 
Rican Family), bound together by a common language, culture and history 
(Jiménez Román, 1996: 9).  Dávila (1997) notes that the PDP sought to 
perpetuate this myth through the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture - a new 
institution of central government established by the party three years after the 
creation of Commonwealth in 1952.  According to the tourism office, Caguas is 
known as La Ciudad Criolla (‘the Creole City’) because it was “the first island 
community to claim as its own and extol the distinct Puerto Rican (‘creole’) 
identity that emerged from th[is] fusion”: 
 
Caguas symbolizes all that is genuinely creole.  It represents 
everything that we as Puerto Ricans love about our country… that 
which is genuine… That which is autochthonous… That which 





with pride to the whole world, that we are Puerto Ricans.  (Oficina 
de Turismo, 2010:2) 
 
Caguas commemorates “the three ethnicities that bring the Puerto Rican 
heart to life” (2010: 3) with three huge monuments, positioned by the main 
roads that enter the urban centre from the north, south and east.  Los Portales 
de la Ciudad (The Gateways to the City) are comprised of the Monument to 
Taina Heritage at the Northern Gateway, the Monument to African Heritage at 
the Eastern Gateway, and the Monument to European Heritage at the Southern 
Gateway (Figure 5.6).  Further, the Western Gateway is marked by Caguas’ 
Botanical and Cultural Garden, which features the municipality’s official symbol 
– the pitirre (grey kingbird) - in the form of a large sculpture above its entrance 
(top left, Figure 5.6): 
 
The pitirre, in our cultural and literary history, is the metaphorical 
image of the liberty of spirit and national conscience in defense of 
the autochthonous, of our incorruptible Puerto Ricanness… 
 
The combative capacity of this creole bird, its fervour in 
protecting its natural territory, represents the valiant struggle in 
the affirmation of our Puerto Rican personality…  Small but 
extraordinarily brave, it is known for taking on in combat birds 
which are considerably larger and more awesome.  









Figure 5.6: The Portals to the City (top right and below) and entrance of the Botanical 
and Cultural Garden (top left) – which together mark the entrance to the urban centre 
of Caguas via the four main roads from the north, south, east and west.  (Source: 
Departamento de Ornato y Embellecimiento, 2009: 62) 
 
 
The United States is notably excluded from these material 
representations of Puerto Ricanness.  Indeed, it is implicitly constructed as 
Puerto Rico’s cultural Other: a source of corruption, 'considerably larger and 
more awesome', to be combated in a 'valiant struggle' to affirm the 'Puerto 
Rican personality', 'national conscience' and 'natural territory' (2009: 5).  This is 
consistent with the attempt of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture to construct 
a "hispanic civilisation menaced by the 'other', the North American" (González, 
2000: 99).  Such implicit anti-statehood bias contrasts with the views on Puerto 
Rican culture articulated by the mayor of Guaynabo, who believed “the 
population of Puerto Rico has grown culturally through its exchange with 
American culture” (Interview, Mayor, Guaynabo).  Cultural nationalist ideology 
also extends to the three principal museums of the city, which depict a version 
of Puerto Ricanness that predates the United States’ invasion of the island in 





are celebrated as signs of the strength of a nation in spite of continued US 
territorial occupation.  As Caguas’ Director of Culture explained: 
 
DC:  We don’t give them [the United States] much credit here.  
 The main mention they get is as invaders.  We work with 
 the phrase “North American invasion”. 
 
CE: Would that happen in the museums of San Juan? 
 
DC:  No!  Actually, in recent years we’ve stood out by hosting 
 the presentations of books about notable independentistas, 
 about Filiberto Ojeda, which we discuss in a critical way.  
 That would never happen in San Juan.  Never.  Nor in 
 other municipal governments - there’s no space for that. 
 
The implication above is that Caguas’ museums exclude the United States in its 
representations of Puerto Rican identity more so than other museums on the 
island, such as those managed centrally from San Juan.  In the Director’s view, 
when the pro-statehood PNP is in power, partisan administrators in the central 
Department of Culture look to limit expressions of nationalist sentiment and 
play up Puerto Rico’s closeness to the United States.  She also feels that this 
practice of regulating culture takes place in municipalities controlled by the PNP. 
 Second, consistent with hegemonic PDP discourse, the public works of 
Caguas also reflect the conviction of the local administration that Puerto Rico 
constitutes a nation.  As mayor Miranda Torres wrote to me, “our cultural 
histories forge a cultural heritage that we Cagueños treasure, and provoke us to 
be guardians of that criollismo which is representative of the Puerto Rican 
nationality.” (Miranda Torres, 2011: 5).  This statement is consistent with the 
PDP’s official party line that “Puerto Rico is a nation… because nationality is 
directly related to the history and culture of a people”, and not to “its political or 
juridical state” (PDP, 2010: 19).  Further, the exclusion of the United States from 
representations of Puerto Rican culture in Caguas reinforces the PDP’s view that 
Puerto Rico’s “sociological development” makes it a “country distinct from the 
United States” and “the principal factor in understanding why statehood is 





The PDP’s hegemonic position on Puerto Rican nationhood is reinforced 
in Caguas’ landscape through a cultural project in the urban centre known as La 
Ruta del Corazón Criollo (Route of the Creole Heart).  This is a pedestrian route 
between Caguas’ museums, art galleries, cathedrals and plazas that is inscribed, 
stop by stop, into the pavements of the urban centre.  The Ruta is described as a 
“journey through our own essence as a people and as individuals” (Oficina de 
Turismo, 2009: 1).  The Caguas tourism office even produces a pasaporte 
(passport) which visitors and school parties are encouraged to have stamped at 
every stop along the Ruta - a clear gesture of nationhood (Figure 5.7).  Further, 
while discussing nationality, the Director of Culture noted that Guaynabo hosts 
an excellent museum dedicated to Puerto Rico’s international achievements in 
sport, and had plans to construct an ‘Olympic Boulevard’ nearby.  However, she 
believed it was “contradictory” for a vehemently pro-statehood mayor such as 
O’Neill to promote Puerto Rican culture and at the same time deny the existence 
of Puerto Rican nationhood.  Specifically, she noted it was ironic for 
statehooders to celebrate Puerto Rico’s Olympic team given that under 
statehood it would surely cease to exist.  This assessment reveals the prevailing 
sentiment shared between the PDP and PIP that cultural nationalism is the 
privileged terrain of the anti-statehood parties: the PNP is unable to celebrate 










Third, public works in Caguas reinforces the hegemonic PDP discourse 
that celebrating national culture offers Puerto Ricans a path to decolonisation 
without formal political separation.  Just as Commonwealth architect Luis 
Muñoz Marín referred to national culture as an “internal decolonisation” (Soto-
Crespo, 2006: 714) for Puerto Ricans, so mayor Miranda Marin understood that 
criollismo enables a “spiritual decolonisation” that “activates the creative 
individual and collective energy that drives our new generations… to ensure the 
wellbeing and progress of the people” (Miranda Marín, 2007: 35).  In this view, 
Puerto Ricans may fully realise the creative potential of national identity 
without demanding political independence from the United States.  “On visiting 
the eleven stations of the Ruta,” the late mayor Miranda Marín declares, 
 
you will note the historic and civic conscience of Caguas in its 
proud determination to reaffirm the self-esteem, the feeling and 
appreciation of our patriotic symbols which inspire our 
community management…  We invite you to return to Caguas 
whenever your spirit claims that desire for renovation, strength 
and freedom.” (Oficina de Turismo, 2009: 1) 
 
As in Guaynabo, this passage hints that the late mayor's status position is 
entangled with his particular approach to local decision-making.  Specifically, 
his thoughts on the decolonising potential of national culture would appear to 
form a basis for his participatory model of 'community management'. This point 
shall be explored in greater detail in the following chapter.  Generally, however, 
cultural provision in Caguas represents an attempt to combat colonialism locally.  
This takes place by addressing what the municipal administration understands 
as three manifestations of colonialism in the Puerto Rican people: low self-
esteem, a lack of national awareness, and a psychological dependency on the 
United States. 
 
The problem of colonialism is low self-esteem, and lack of 
knowledge as a people.  I mean, that Puerto Rico isn’t good for 
anything, doesn’t have its own resources.  That’s what they teach 
us when we’re small - that we must depend on the United States.  
No, Puerto Rico is a country with a rich culture, a rich history, 





decolonisation of our people, as the Mayor used to say…  That’s 
what the Portales are about, the Ruta, the botanical garden. 
(Former Special Assistant to Mayor, Caguas) 
 
There are many years of colonialism here; we’ve had over 500 
years of colonialism.  Puerto Rico is the oldest colony in the world.  
Before we didn’t even want to accept that, but I believe that there 
is now, yes, an acceptance that it is a colony.  Well, at the least, 
that is what I can tell you in Caguas.  But there’s a long way to go, 
that lack of awareness, that fear coursing through the veins of the 
people - that without the gringos20 we’d be screwed.  (Director of 
Culture, Caguas) 
 
Here it is apparent that spiritual decolonisation is about exorcising the United 
States from Puerto Rican identity.  Though she believes that Caguas’ investment 
in culture has been a great success, the Director of Culture laments that the 
United States continues to regulate Puerto Rican identity, assuming the form of 
the psychological dependency felt by many Puerto Ricans.  Mayor O’Neill of 
Guaynabo exhibited this with his strong sense of gratitude to the United States 
for having developed the island.  Psychological dependency is therefore a 
position that is perhaps most easily associated with statehood. 
  The inscription of hegemonic PDP positions on status in Caguas’ 
landscape becomes particularly clear upon considering the views of PIP and 
PNP legislators about the meaning of Caguas’ slogan.  For example, Guaynabo’s 
PIP legislator reads the municipal slogan Nuestro Nuevo País as a local 
declaration of independence by the late mayor, which he considers “pure 
demagoguery”: 
 
Because Miranda Marín, when the supreme moment of definition 
arrived, never assumed that stance in a public plaza, in a speech… 
I think he knew that the Puerto Rican has a great independentista 
feeling, but that he’s scared to actually take the step.  So they’ve 
[the PDP in Caguas] immersed themselves in that frontier, tapping 
into the feeling of the people, and at the same time saying: ah, I’ll 
maintain your American citizenship, and you can continue 
depending on federal funds.  So the people have the best of both 
worlds, as they would say.  (PIP legislator, Guaynabo) 
 
                                                        
20Gringo is a generally derogatory slang word used throughout Latin America to refer to 





In this view the cultural changes in Caguas reflect the PDP’s traditional 
discourse of the ‘best of both worlds’ (PDP, 2010: 133) – that culture may be 
celebrated as if Puerto Rico were independent, without actually being so.  
Similarly reading the slogan as a pro-independence gesture, Guaynabo’s PNP 
legislator notes: 
 
If Caguas became PNP, they’re going to change the slogan.  It 
won’t be Our New Country, it’s going to be something else.  I bet 
you that.21  (PNP legislator, Guaynabo) 
 
To summarise this section, the decisions made by Caguas’ late mayor on 
landscape accurately reproduce three hegemonic positions on the status 
question as set by the leadership of the PDP: first, that Puerto Rican identity is 
composed of three essential ethnic elements, to the exclusion of the United 
States; second, that Puerto Rico is an inassimilable nation; and third, that 
celebrating national culture offers Puerto Ricans a path to decolonisation 
without political separation from the United States.  By comparison, the 
inscription of status positions in Guaynabo was considered to significantly 
rework official PNP discourse by emphasising Puerto Rico’s cultural 
compatibility with the United States. 
 
5.6 Lares, Ciudad del Grito (City of the Shout) 
 
 The municipality of Lares is located in the mountainous central eastern 
region of the island (Figure 5.1).  Lares' rural geography and economy - 
historically based on coffee and livestock - differentiate it from the urban areas 
of Guaynabo and Caguas.  Today the municipal economy is principally 
characterised by heavy reliance on government employment, with agriculture 
forming a relatively small part of overall economic activity (Municipio Autónomo 
de Lares, 2010).  As this suggests, Lares' economy is highly dependent upon 
public funds from the central and federal governments in San Juan and the 
                                                        
21 The interviewee switched languages and spoke the phrase ‘I bet you that’ in English.  I have 





United States - a situation that is typical of the vast majority of isolated rural 
municipalities in Puerto Rico (Trías Monge, 1997: 120).  As of 2010, Lares had 
30,753 inhabitants (US Census Bureau, 2012a: 30).  For decades it was a 
stronghold of the PDP, whose electoral support has traditionally been greatest 
in Puerto Rico's mountainous interior (Anderson, 1988: 17).  Although Lares' 
population voted with the PDP in the plebiscites of 1967, 1993 and 1998, the 
PNP has made significant electoral inroads in the municipality since 1992, 
having dominating municipal and gubernatorial elections (Álvarez Rivera, 
2010).  Roberto Pagán, the incumbent PNP mayor, took office in 2004 and was 
re-elected by small margins in 2008 and 2012. 
 Lares is the site of Puerto Rico's only declaration of independence.  The 
short-lived uprising, known as the Grito de Lares (The Shout of Lares), took 
place on 23 September, 1868, and was quashed the very next day by the Spanish.  
The Grito was a reaction to the long-term neglect and oppression of Spanish 
colonial rule, triggered by short and medium-term factors.  Politically, Puerto 
Ricans had been denied freedoms of the press, of speech and of assembly.  They 
had also endured a "rigid administrative centralism" (González Ruiz, 2010: 22) 
that required authorisation from Madrid for the most basic matters of public 
administration.  Socially, Puerto Ricans were subjected to the libreta system, 
under which all individuals without land nor employment were forced to work 
for a patron and carry with them a libreta, or notebook, detailing their every 
activity (2010: 23).  Economically, Puerto Rico had suffered heavy taxation, high 
unemployment, currency shortages, and an agricultural crisis. 
 The revolt is remembered through Lares' municipal slogan, La Ciudad del 
Grito (The City of the Shout).  This is displayedthroughout the municipality with 
paintings of the slogan andrevolutionary flag on bridges, walls, benches and bus 
stops (Figure 5.8).  Further, Lares' Plaza de la Revolución - the historic town 
square in which the republic was first declared - features two material tributes 
to the uprising.  The first is a bust of its leader, Ramón Emeterio Betances, which 
faces the cathedral.  The second, at the opposite end of the square, is a tamarind 





symbolic gesture, it was planted by nationalist leader Pedro Albizu Campos 
using soil from the eighteen Spanish-speaking Latin American republics.  Since 
1927 the anniversary of the Gritohas been celebrated with an annual gathering 
in the Plaza de la Revolución.  This event attracts thousands of independentistas 
from all parts of the island, and includes a program of rallies, processions, 




Figure 5.8: Graffiti of the town slogan, Ciudad del Grito, in the centre of Lares (Field 
photo) 
 
As in Guaynabo and Caguas, Lares’ slogan is connected to hegemonic 
discourses on Puerto Rican identity as articulated by a party political status 
position.  Just as performances of Puerto Rican identity in Caguas and Guaynabo 
reproduce and reinterpret the partisan conceptions of the PDP and PNP, so 
Lares’ slogan reproduces the identity discourses of the PIP and other 
independentista factions.  Owing to its revolutionary past, Lares is a symbol of 
their belief in political nationalism - political independence as the fullest 
expression of a separate cultural nationhood (Berríos Martínez, 1997).  As such, 
PIP leader Fernando Martín García describes Lares as "the crucible and womb of 
the Puerto Rican nationality" (Martín García, 2006: 9) and calls Emeterio 





Ruiz (2008: 11) writes in the municipal magazine that "the Grito de Lares fully 
defines our idiosyncrasy as a people" and "symbolises the valiant and patriotic 
defense of our national culture and right to freedom before the ignominious 
contempt of a foreign power".  Moreover, for González Ruiz, celebrating the 
Grito has contemporary relevance as an act of resistance against the "ruthless 
cultural aggression" of the United States: "[a]mbivalence has been promoted at 
the official level - two languages, two flags, two hymns, two loyalties - which has 
created an identity conflict in some sectors... But at the moment of truth, what 
we are comes to the surface: Puerto Ricans" (González Ruiz, 2008: 11). 
The anniversary of the Grito de Lares is celebrated in the municipality 
through an annual activist event that is directed by the pro-independence 
parties.  As such 23 September, the Día del Grito (Day of the Shout), becomes an 
occasion for the performative reproduction of hegemonic independentista 
discourse.  The uprising is remembered by thousands of independence 
supporters who meet in the Plaza de la Revolución, at the "altar of our nation" 
(González Ruiz, 2008: 11).  Pro-independence ideals are performed through 
speeches, processions and theatre.  I attended the 142nd anniversary event.  
Calls were made for unity between independentista factions - a likely reflection 
on the PIP's disastrous performance in the 2008 general elections.22  Speeches 
demanded Puerto Rico's immediate decolonisation, with Mari Pesquera 
declaring there would be "no retreat until we reach the true and absolute 
independence of this nation" (Field notes: 23/9/10).  The recent passing of two 
important independentista figures was honoured, including Juan Marí Bras, who 
had famously renounced his US citizenship in 1994.  Attendees also observed 
the fifth anniversary of the FBI's assassination of pro-independence fugitive 
Filiberto Ojeda Ríos.23  Multiple artisan kiosks sold artefacts adorned with the 
                                                        
22 In 2008 the PIP took just 2.0% of votes for governor - a historic low for the party.  As a result 
it lost its formal recognition as a political party by the State Elections Commission, and had to 
collect signatures on a petition for re-enlistment in 2012. 
23  Ojeda Ríos was the head of the Puerto Rican terrorist group los Macheteros (the Cane Cutters), 
which has claimed responsibility for fatal bombings on the island and mainland.  However, most 
independentistas consider him a martyr to the cause for independence.  They also strongly 
suspect that the FBI deliberately planned his assassination for 23 September as a symbolic 





symbols of independence, such as the Lares revolutionary flag and the machete, 
icon of armed struggle.   
However, during fieldwork in July 2010, mayor Pagán quietly introduced 
a new slogan to Lares that has been interpreted by many - independentistas, 
populares and even members of his own party - as an attempt to displace the 
town's historic identity as the Ciudad del Grito (Caquías Cruz, 2010).  This new 
slogan, declaring that Lares was the Ciudad de los Cielos Abiertos (City of the 
Open Skies), appeared on two new large structures located beside main access 
routes to the town centre (Figure 5.9).  As with the slogans of Guaynabo and 
Caguas, the new slogan of Lares became present throughout the municipal 
landscape on signage and public vehicles, while depictions of the Grito slogan 
were removed.  The series of events relating to the installation of the structures 
in late 2010, and local explanations of the associated controversy, demonstrate 
how Lares has become a site for the articulation and contestation of hegemonic 
status discourses through performances of power in material space.  Two 
versions of state power – statehood and independence – compete for hegemony 
in Lares’ landscape.  First, Pagán’s attempt to displace the Grito slogan may be 
read as a pro-statehood move to cancel out independentista discourse, because 
the PNP is fundamentally anti-independence.  Second, the struggles of local 
activists to reinscribe the Grito slogan across municipal space reflects the 









Figure 5.9: Mural to Lares, City of the Open Skies, by the entrance to the town centre on 
road PR-111.  (Field photo) 
 
 
Roberto Pagán first introduced the slogan Ciudad de los Cielos Abiertos to 
the public in 2007 using the municipal magazine, Surcos Lareños.  A short piece 
entitled Frases a Lares (Expressions for Lares) listed the ten slogans by which 
the town has been previously known, including Ciudad del Grito (see Appendix 
10.7).  However, the piece notes that "the expressions are not traditions, they 
are words to promote [the town] by their habitual use" (Surcos Lareños, 2007: 
12).  It attempts to legitimise the new slogan by asserting that place-naming is 
apolitical.  The article continues: "Lares has been known by different 
expressions - there is not one in particular.  Therefore, 'Ciudad de los Cielos 
Abiertos' has been deemed very wise for receiving our visitors, and will remain 
for our history" (2007: 12).  The phrase first appeared in Lares' urban 
environment towards the end of that year, featuring on redecorated municipal 
vehicles and a small electronic sign in a plaza close to the town centre 
(Interview, PDP Legislator, Lares).  At the same time, Pagán's administration 
gradually went about erasing the historic Grito slogan from several locations in 
the centre in the course of repainting projects and beautification works.24 
                                                        
24 Yamil Guzmán, activist leader opposing the mayor's changes, noted in interview that the 





 Three and a half years later in July 2010, and without prior notice, two 
prominent, floodlit structures welcoming vehicles to the Ciudad de los Cielos 
Abiertos materialised in central Lares (Figure 5.9 above).  Community protest 
erupted within weeks, framing the gesture as an attempt to erase the town's 
independentista history as the site of the Grito.  In a letter to the mayor, Lares' 
PIP municipal legislator objected: "our fellow citizens understand that this 
represents no event, circumstance or characteristic that identifies us as a town" 
(Lucena, 2010: 1).  Rather, he noted, "it is known by all that you have 
communicated publicly that the new slogan arises from a prophecy relayed to 
you by a pastor25, that Lares would be the City of Open Skies" (2010: 1).  
Similarly, Father Dennys Cruz, catholic priest of the historic church San José de 
la Montaña on the Plaza de la Revolución, wrote in an open letter to the 
community that "to go against our history is no less grave than the injustices 
that provoked the uprising of our town's inhabitants over 140 years ago... I must 
protest these recent tendencies to use religious expressions to administer 
political power" (Dennys Cruz, 2010: 1).  Mayor Pagán drew further criticism 
once the story spread to the national press in August.  Even his brother Felix, 
mayor of Lares for the PDP between 1980 and 1988, implored him "to respect 
the indelible pages that history has written" (Pagán Centeno, 2010: 23).  In 
October, Pagán and the Municipality of Lares were sued in Puerto Rico's Federal 
Courts by two Lares citizens who argued his "use of public funds to advance a 
personal religious ideal" violated the principle of the separation of church and 
state established in the US and Puerto Rican constitutions (Tribunal de Primera 
Instancia, 2010: 1). 
Mayor Pagán explained the origins of the slogan to me in interview.  Our 
conversation confirmed that it is indeed a personal one rooted in his religious 
beliefs.  Specifically, it is a tribute to his conviction that God had actively helped 
him to govern the town by performing miracles: 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
centre of Lares.  Purportedly, it was also displayed in municipal car parks and at a location in 
front of the town hall. 
25 Pagán is a member of the Pentecostal movement within the protestant denomination of 





Before I was mayor [2003], I made a campaign promise, and said: 
I'm going to raise the salaries of all the municipal employees here.  
The moment arrived to do it, and there wasn't the money.  I met 
with the finance director and the auditor, and said: prepare 
yourselves, because we're raising everyone's salary.  They said, 
how are you going to do it?  There isn't the money.  I said, it was a 
promise I gave.  I know the people will support me.  We're going 
to do it.  Prepare everything. 
 
A week before the time was up to make the raise, I took a call 
from OCAM26, which for years had been making mistakes with 
Lares.  There was $300,000 designated for us that we hadn't been 
given.  And guess how much money I needed to raise the salaries?  
$300,000...   
 
For me it was a miracle of God.  See?  So in that way, God has been 
helping me in everything we've been doing.  God gave me an 
alternative.  And to thank God for managing me, I said: many are 
the blessings that have arrived here.  This comes from the skies of 
God.  That's why I put Lares, City of the Open Skies. 
 
 Though Pagán justifies the change as a purely religious gesture, it is also 
significantly political.  First, as Lares' PDP legislator explained to me, it relates to 
a local power struggle between the Catholic and Protestant churches.  The 
phrase 'Open Skies' is preached in the Pentecostal church, which has recently 
grown to encompass every neighbourhood in the municipality.  The legislator 
notes that while the Catholic church "doesn't accept politics", the Pentecostal 
church permits affiliated mayors to use religious services "to distribute 
literature and collect votes".  As such, Pagán's structures to the Ciudad de los 
Cielos Abiertos may be read as an attempt to cement the local control of the 
Pentecostal church in Lares.  Second, it is known that the Pentecostal movement 
in Puerto Rico is closely linked to the statehood movement (Martínez-Ramírez, 
2005: 113).  This raises the question of the relationship between Pagán's town 
slogan and his status position. 
 Two leaders of a community activist group fighting the slogan are 
convinced that it is fundamentally connected to the mayor's pro-statehood 
                                                        
26 The Oficina del Comisionado de Asuntos Municipales (Office of the Commissioner of Municipal 
Affairs, or OCAM) is the office of central government responsible for the distribution of federal 
funds to the smaller municipalities, which lack the administrative autonomy to deal with the 





beliefs.  Specifically, it represents Pagán’s attempt, informed by hegemonic pro-
statehood discourse, to neutralise a rival status position.  Local independentista 
historian Alfredo Gonzalez, founder of Lareños en Defensa del Patrimonio 
Histórico (People of Lares in Defense of Historical Heritage), believes that the 
PNP has been "searching for new strategies to make Puerto Rico a state" due to 
their failure to secure victories for statehood in plebiscites: 
 
As part of a change in strategy, local annexationist leaders, which 
is the case with O'Neill in Guaynabo and now here with Pagán... 
understand that it's necessary to take away from the people the 
traits that define us as a people.  Pagán isn't using English, but 
he's using another criterion that he understands could derail our 
identity: hiding history.  You have to take Lares off the panorama 
as the City of the Grito.  It has an explicit and intrinsic meaning 
that here in Puerto Rico, people fought for the freedom of the 
country.  That complicates his hope to see Puerto Rico as a state.  
(Interview, Alfredo González) 
 
Yamil Guzmán, spokesman for the activist group, concurs.  Guzmán is a 
statehood supporter and even worked for Pagán as the head of his re-election 
campaign in 2008.  However, he advocates an estadidad jíbara or 'creole 
statehood' - political integration with the full preservation of symbols of Puerto 
Rican identity.  Despite sharing a desire for statehood, he is therefore critical of 
"pro-statehood mayors... [who] have attempted to undermine the symbols of 
our culture and history": 
 
For example, with the Grito de Lares - there was a mayor in the 
past [1989-1993], Héctor Hernández Arana, the only other PNP 
mayor Lares has ever had.  He tried to cut down the tamarind tree.  
The Grito is a pending issue for them, and the current mayor is 
trying to finish it off.  Why?  To take Lares' personality away, so 
they can present to the United States that we want to be a state.  
(Interview, Yamil Guzmán) 
 
In sum, at the core of the controversy in Lares is the debate on Puerto 
Rican identity and its inscription in landscape.  Ultimately, it is about whether 
the Grito de Lares - Puerto Rico's only declaration of independence - should or 





Pagán has been criticised by members of all political parties - even his own - 
indicates that most politicians would consider it to be important.  However, 
Pagán, like O'Neill of Guaynabo, is a fanatical statehood supporter.  He is 
demonstrably loyal to the symbols of the United States.  Notably, during a break 
in our interview I counted eighteen ornaments of the American Eagle around his 
office - seventeen decorated with the American flag and one with the eagle 
perched above the Puerto Rican flag.  I also noted an ornamental liberty bell and 
a small farm animal on a base that read 'United States of America' (Field notes: 
18/1/11).  If Pagán has not directly and consciously attempted to erase Lares' 
history with statehood in mind - as González accuses - then it is at least clear 
that he holds the slogan Ciudad del Grito in sufficient disregard so as to have no 
qualms about upstaging it.  The way in which O'Neill defends Pagán suggests 
that a fanatical statehood supporter would indeed seek to displace the 
independentista identity of the town: 
 
HON:  You can't maintain the image <slaps fist> of a town of 
 revolution.  Fight the Spanish regime, fight the American 
 regime.  I don't think you can achieve things through 
 violence, revolution...  The tourists, if they said, "right, let's 
 go to the [town of the] revolution", would you go with 
 them? 
 
CE:  Well, perhaps I'd be interested to check it out if it was an 
 important historic event for Puerto Ricans. 
 
HON:  It's an important historic event, but in terms of selling the 
 image of the people, of what the Puerto Rican is - what that 
 says is, fight the American nation who liberated us from 
 the Spaniards...  History can't be erased.  It's a historic 
 event, but you have to remember it, and learn from it. 
 
 
The slogan change in Lares reflects the politically contested nature of place (Jess 
and Massey, 1995).  The controversy is about how competing claims to the 
identity of a place are underscored by different interpretations of its past as 
well as present.  Stakes are high, since the winner of the contest is empowered 
to "produc[e] images and creat[e] identities which then form the bases both of 





towards them" (1995: 3).  Indeed, O’Neill above envisages a future for Lares that 
is sanitised of its image of independentista struggle.  More broadly, local change 
in Lares, alongside Guaynabo and Caguas, highlights the significance of the 
materiality of the status question.  Just as Guaynabo and Caguas have used the 
built environment to cement conceptions of identity that correspond to their 
status preferences, so in Lares an independentista identity has been 
deconstructed through its material displacement by a new slogan.   This 
displays a 'politics of erasure' - a reclamation of space by a political elite seeking 
to overwrite it with new meaning consistent with his hegemonic interests 
(Robinson, 2003: 275).  As Guzmán puts it,  
 
He [Pagán] started little by little, with the public vehicles, and 
carried on with small signs.  A sticker, you can remove it.  A sign, 
you can change it.  But people only really get agitated when you 
make a monument.  A statue, something of cement, of concrete, 
which costs $250,000. (Interview, Yamil Guzmán) 
 
 
González contends that one likely consequence of the new slogan's growing 
material presence in Lares is forgetting: 
 
Visually, with the signs, he's departing from the premise that a 
picture is worth more than a thousand words... So if you see in all 
corners that Lares is the City of the Open Skies - well, the new 




Sánchez and Avilés (2001: 265) argue that Puerto Rican murals in New York 
"represent an affirmation of puertorriqueñidad" and "project a determination 
not to be erased from history" within a hegemonic Anglosaxon culture.  
Conversely, as González acknowledges above, the power of material spaces such 
as murals to celebrate and remember, and to contest, ends upon their physical 
destruction or erasure.  The PNP president of Lares' municipal legislature, who 
is loyal to Pagán, defends the slogan, arguing that it is an apolitical addition and 
not a replacement, because "no-one can erase history": 
 
You can't forget it!  That cannot happen because it's in the books.  





long as we celebrate it every 23 September as an important event, 
that's not going to happen...  I think [the issue is] not that he gave 
Lares another name, it's that 'can this have more impact on the 
people than the Grito de Lares'.  (PNP legislator, Lares) 
 
 
 However, the activists' fear that the Grito slogan could be lost over time 
would appear to be confirmed by Pagán's 2008 campaign phrase, which I saw 
on display at the PNP's Municipal Committee headquarters: 'Roberto Pagán: 
Making History'.  It is likely that Pagán's personal slogan Ciudad de los Cielos 
Abiertos forms a part of this hope to make history in Lares.  Guzmán notes that 
Pagán also has a catchphrase: 
 
He says "no man can change history, but he can make it"... So 
what's he doing?  Making history as he wants it to be!  He's saying, 
I want to erase that history because I can make it all over again.  
That's the situation (Interview, Yamil Guzmán) 
 
Pagán's slogan was resisted by non-elite activists in a number of 
performed ways.  These resistances contested Pagán’s attempt to clear space for 
hegemonic statehood discourse by performatively reinscribing the hegemony of 
the Grito.  On 12 September the activist group Lareños en Defensa del Patrimonio 
Histórico held a march against La Ciudad de los Cielos Abiertos, attended by 
1,500 protesters.  Guzmán used the event to make a final call to Pagán to 
remove the structures before the commencement of legal action against him.  
Eleven days later, during the activism of the Día del Grito, stencilled graffiti 
reaffirming Lares as the 'Ciudad del Grito' and demanding 'Freedom Now' 
appeared around the Plaza de la Revolución.  Particular damage was sustained 
by the town hall - a symbolic gesture against the mayor (Figure 5.10).  On 25 
November, during the Lares' patron saint festival, Guzmán arrived to participate 
in the community parade with a float that mimicked the design of Pagan's Cielos 
Abiertos mural, reinterpreting it with the slogan Ciudad del Grito (Primera Hora, 
2010).  However, Pagán ordered his municipal police force to surround the float 
and prevent its participation.  "It's another abuse by the mayor, another attempt 
to eliminate all that describes our customs... and a violation of our rights to free 





municipality’s historic slogan according to his personal religious ideal, as well as 
his authoritarian moves to clamp down on resistances to it, serve to illustrate 
the ultimate power that Puerto Rican mayors wield as the caciques (chieftains) 




Figure 5.10: Graffiti damage to Lares town hall. (Field photo) 
 
 
 This said, Pagan’s local power exercises are evidently entangled with a 
subservient relationship to central party positions.  Lares enjoys little municipal 
autonomy and is highly dependent upon the central government.  Pagán erected 
his new murals while the PNP were in power centrally.  His erasure of the 
Ciudad del Grito slogan could therefore be interpreted in the context of a wider 
obligation, either perceived or real, to obey all central party positions – not its 
status position alone.  Indeed, Pagán provided evidence of his subservient 
power relationship to the centre by sharing his imminent plans for yet another 
slogan, Lares, Ciudad de Valores (Lares, City of Values): 
 
RP:  There's going to be another place that will say Lares, City of 
Values.  So, every 50 or 75 metres, there's going to be a post that 
we'll put, that contains one of those values.  There are six. 
 






RP:  Let's see, I'll bring them to you now, let's look for them... 
 
<Ten minutes later, he talks to his secretary who has written the 
values down after making a telephone call> 
 
RP: Right, the values are: One, respect.  Two, kindness.  Three, 
civility.  Four, responsibility.  Five, justice.  Six, reliability.  These 
are the six values that will be written in those places.  People can 
read them every day to remember.... until they learn what we 
must be. 
  
Pagán needed to check what the 'values' were because they corresponded to an 
official program of community values being promoted by the incumbent PNP 
central administration.27  It is therefore clear that the mayor was planning to 
inscribe municipal landscape with messages hegemonically set from the centre.   
By early 2011, the activists who had campaigned against the slogan had 
claimed a partial victory.  While Pagán’s murals to the Ciudad de los Cielos 
Abiertos remained in Lares, the original Grito slogan was reinstated on the two 
bridges in the centre that had once displayed it (Figure 5.11).  Alfredo González 
noted that his sources within the municipal administration had confirmed that 
plans for two further murals to the Cielos Abiertos had been withdrawn.  The 
events in Lares therefore illustrate the possibilities for performed resistances to 




                                                        
27 I collected a pamphlet entitled Valores, Llévalos Contigo Siempre (Values - Carry Them With 














 This chapter has explored the ways in which three Puerto Rican mayors 
have exercised their local powers over space to express their status positions in 
landscape.  Decisions on municipal slogans and the built environment are 
bounded in perspectives on Puerto Rican identity, and by extension, political 
status.  Material changes to the everyday, lived environment of the 
municipalities actively reproduce, rework and resist discourses on identity that 
are consistent with particular status positions.  As such, the case studies 
demonstrate that the status question is not a predetermined aspect of Puerto 
Rican reality but rather constitutive of hegemonic discourses that are routinely 
brought into being and negotiated through performances in material space. 
The municipalities, as ‘peripheral centres of power’ (Peet, 2007: 22), 
have produced varied sub-hegemonic effects.  The assimilationist bent of 
change in Guaynabo significantly reworks the official PNP discourse on Puerto 
Rican identity, but is intended to promote statehood nonetheless.  Caguas 
accurately reproduces, and thereby attempts to validate, the central position of 





complicated site where two slogans, bounded in different status positions and 
narratives of Puerto Rican identity, compete for hegemony through contested 
performances in municipal space. 
In sum, the mayors are seen to exercise their local power in ways that 
have resulted in the reinforcement, reinterpretation and resistance of 
hegemonic positions on the status question.  However, each leader has strongly 
indicated that these power exercises – on the surface to do with status - are at 
the same time entangled with local concerns that may not be necessarily related 
to status positions.  In Guaynabo O’Neill has provided residents with first-rate 
municipal services, but it is unclear how - or if - this service provision is related 
to his desire for statehood.  In Caguas, while the promotion of Puerto Rican 
national culture as the ‘New Country’ might reflect the hegemonic positions of 
the PDP, it also appears to form part of a larger model of local participatory 
democracy that has not been explored here.  Finally, in Lares Pagán’s move to 
erase the Grito from municipal landscape may relate to his pro-statehood views, 
but his plans to copy a new central slogan (Valores…) would indicate a local 
priority to obey central positions more generally.  These issues are tackled in 
the next chapter, which examines the relationship between the status question 










The previous chapter explored the performative inscription of status 
positions in Puerto Rican municipal space.  This chapter focuses on the 
relationship between status positions and the structures and everyday practices 
of politics in the municipalities.  It asks how these state visions are reinforced, 
modified, resisted and even overcome through everyday practices of politics in 
concrete settings.  It notes that the Autonomous Municipalities Act ascribes 
considerable powers to mayors who govern the municipalities according to all 
of their political concerns, both central and local.  Conceptually, the chapter is 
based on the theories of everyday politics, performance and power outlined 
more fully in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.   
The first section presents evidence to indicate that local governance 
strategies and status positions become entangled through the routine practices 
of the municipal executives.  These intersections demonstrate that elite 
performances of state power do not straightforwardly reproduce the hegemony 
of status, but rather, create a more complicated and varied terrain of 
contradictory, unintended and subversive effects.  Guaynabo, Caguas and Lares 
are therefore sites of ‘entanglements of power’ (Sharp et al, 2000) where local 
political agendas and centrally prescribed hegemonic status positions are 
intractably knotted together through performances of local state power.   
The second section notes, nonetheless, that the status positions of local 
political actors in these sites exist in parallel with other ideological positions 
and priorities that are not hegemonically set by status positions.  Therefore, if it 
is possible to step outside of the predominance of status discourses, a number 
of alternative political practices come into clearer view that indicate the mayors’ 
multiple goals – what else they look to achieve through exercising local political 
power.  This said, there is not a clean separation between local politics and 





ambiguously interact and entangle, despite the claims of administrators to be 
able to keep them apart.  The third section briefly considers the relationship 
between status positions and the routine practices of the municipal legislatures.  
Specifically, it examines the entanglements of status positions within the 
drafting, debate and passage of municipal ordinances and resolutions. 
 
6.2 Entanglements of status in the municipal executives 
 
 This section suggests that routine practices of politics in the executive 
branches of Guaynabo, Caguas and Lares reflect three different approaches to 
governance that could be related to status positions.  Specifically, it notes that 
the relationship of each administration to the status question is expressed in 
terms of its everyday practices and the connections that it forges with 
governments and institutions beyond the municipality.  As the president of the 
Guaynabo legislature put it: 
 
You're going to see that political tendency [status preference] 
reflected in the everyday life of the municipality... In the names of 
the streets, the names of the schools, at the level of the traffic 
signs, at the level of city slogans, in many other areas.... At the 




6.2.1 Everyday politics in Guaynabo: statehood 
 
 Certain aspects of governance in Guaynabo would appear to reflect 
Mayor O’Neill’s preference for statehood.  O’Neill has harnessed full municipal 
autonomy in ways that emphasise the closeness between Guaynabo and the 
United States.  The former evidently looks towards the latter – not only in terms 
of landscape, as discussed in the previous chapter, but also through its notably 
rigorous compliance with federal laws, emphasised in various offices, and the 
connections forged with US federal government and mainland mayors.  





(Figure 6.1).  Revealingly, when it was unveiled in 2005, O’Neill proclaimed City 
Hall a symbol of political unity between Puerto Rico and the United States by 
finding the occasion “propitious, on this historic moment of our town, to cite the 
words of one of the greatest presidents of our Nation, Abraham Lincoln” 
(O’Neill; in Quiñones Calderón, 2009: 137).  Guaynabo therefore demonstrates 
the salience of mimicry as a mechanism through which Western styles of 




Figure 6.1: Guaynabo City Hall.  (Field photo) 
 
Thrift (2000b: 384) notes that mundane everyday practices bring 
particular worldviews into being: “national identity and an accompanying 
geopolitical stance are inscribed through the smallest of details”.  One such 
‘small detail’ of pro-statehood everyday politics in Guaynabo is the prominent 
message that Puerto Ricans’ possession of US national citizenship corresponds 
to an imperative to obey federal laws.  The mayor circulates this message by 
distributing public information, a responsibility assumed under the 
Autonomous Municipalities Act (OMB, 2012: 42).  Such information underscores 





government offices, contractors of public works, and citizens.  Readers are 
firmly reminded that their routines must conform to the statutes and 
regulations set by federal agencies.  For example, Figure 6.2 below details the 
front page of a public leaflet outlining the US Environmental Protection 
Agency’s drainage regulations: 
 
THE FEDERAL AGENCY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
(EPA – BY ITS INITIALS IN ENGLISH) REQUIRES THAT THE 
MUNICIPALITIES DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT A PROGRAM FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF RAINWATERS. 
 
THE RULES ARE TO BE FOUND IN 40, CFR. 122, PHASE II. 
 
THE MUNICIPALITY MUST PRESENT TO THE AGENCY FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION A PLAN FOR THE 
MANAGEMENT OF RUNOFF WATERS. 
 
IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THIS PLAN MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES 




Figure 6.2: public leaflet about US Environmental Protection Agency regulations 
(translated).  (Source: Oficina de Ordenación Territorial, 2010) 
 
In Puerto Rico the state is a relatively weak and inefficient entity that Puerto 
Ricans successfully resist and defy through their everyday lives and practices 
(Picó, 2007).  Within this context it is revealing that the everyday politics of 
Guaynabo attempt to reinforce the state, at least in appearance.  This might 
indicate that the Guaynabo administration fully understands, and anticipates, 
the strengthening of state institutions that would inevitably occur if Puerto Rico 
ever achieved statehood.  However, the Director of Federal Affairs indicates that 
her everyday work still involves difficult struggles against municipal residents – 
and even municipal employees - who resist her attempts to exact accountability 
for the federal benefits she administers: 
 
We first look for funds for the programs, and second, help the 





the necessary [federal] regulations attached to those funds.  
Sometimes it’s very, very difficult to get people to understand that 
they have to comply with those rules.  (Interview, Director, Office 
of Federal Affairs) 
 
Her job is focused on emphasising the importance of federal compliance 
throughout the executive.  She necessarily reinforces a message that the 
agencies of US federal government are the ultimate authority for citizens and 
the municipal administration.  This is a message that ultimately corresponds to 
statehood.  Indeed, as Caguas’ PNP legislator put it, statehood is the very 
aspiration that “all our institutions of government be regulated by and conform 
to the rules laid down by the American nation… That their behaviour, 
observance, governance, be the same as in the state of Ohio, Wisconsin, 
Nebraska”.  However, as the everyday politics of Guaynabo demonstrate, the 
aspiration to statehood is complicated by the frequency of resistances to its 
rules. 
 O’Neill also exercises local power to forge connections with state 
governments and federal agencies of the United States.  This has occurred on 
the back of several successful municipal programs.  For example, his recycling 
initiative, in which 100% of Guaynabo residents participate, received federal 
recognition from the Environmental Protection Agency (Quiñones Calderón, 
2009: 102).  Further, according to his biography, O’Neill “speaks with evident 
passion” of his New Housing Program, which is described as the first of its kind 
“in a city in the entire American Nation” (Quiñones Calderón, 2009: 110).  
Reportedly, O’Neill inspired the governors of Florida and Louisiana to 
implement similar programs in their states after “the then Secretary of Federal 
Housing, Mel Martínez, today an influential Federal Republican Senator, visited 
the city to observe its development” (2009: 87) (Figure 6.3).  O’Neill reflects, 
“during the course of the program I had meetings with secretary Martínez and 
the governor of Florida and good friend, Jeb Bush, who supported my work 








Figure 6.3: O’Neill in the US Department of Housing.  The caption reads: “The Secretary 
of Federal Housing, Mel Martínez (with his friend O’Neill in the photograph), 
enthusiastically supported and later imitated Guaynabo’s public housing program in 
various cities throughout the Nation.” (Source: Quiñones Calderón, 2009: 86) 
 
 However, these attempts to emphasise closeness between Guaynabo and 
the United States through governance have created unintended effects.  Namely, 
they inadvertently serve to accentuate the continued existence of significant 
linguistic differences between Puerto Rico and the United States.  This 
represents one of the key impediments to the statehooders’ ultimate goal of 
integration (Barreto, 2002).  The mayor is unable to address an inconvenient 
truth - that most Puerto Ricans do not dominate English (Pousada, 2008: 138) – 
by making cosmetic changes to the built environment.  In interview O’Neill 
stated that visitors to the municipality from Orlando once told him, “So you have 
all the streets in English?  Well, it’s logical that you have the traffic signs in 
English too” (Interview, Mayor, Guaynabo).  However, his Director of Culture 
offered an alternative perspective that highlights the logistical difficulties of 
linguistic ambiguity in the municipality: 
 
Soon the municipality is going to host some officials from the 





administration, you'd be surprised how difficult it is to get 
together just a small delegation that's fluent enough in English to 




6.2.2 Everyday politics in Caguas: soberanía (sovereignty) 
 
 It is possible to interpret practices of politics in Caguas as a reflection of 
the status position of its late mayor, William Miranda Marín (Figure 6.4).  
Chapter 4 (section 4.2) mentioned that the PDP is divided internally on status 
between a mainstream position that supports the Commonwealth status quo 
and a minority faction that believes Puerto Rico is still a territory, and therefore 
colony, of the United States under Commonwealth.  Miranda Marín was the de 
facto leader of the minority faction, known as the soberanistas (sovereignists), 
which advocates the development of Commonwealth towards a condition of full 
political sovereignty so as to end Puerto Rico’s subjection to the Territorial 
Clause of the US Constitution (Rivera Ortiz, 2010).  From this position, the 
soberanistas contend, Puerto Rico could then renegotiate a bilateral pact of free 
association with the United States.  Acknowledging Puerto Rico’s political 
sovereignty, the United States would retain only the state powers that Puerto 









Miranda Marín publicly aired his soberanista politics in a controversial 
speech before the PDP leadership in February 2010, six months before losing 
his fight against cancer.  In clear resistance to the hegemonic status position of 
his party, he argued that Puerto Rico was still a colony and required sovereignty 
(but not full independence) in order to enable international political and 
economic relations with other countries.  Further, sovereignty would allow 
Puerto Rico to respond to the “new world economic scenario” of globalisation 
and regional blocs (Miranda Marín, 2010: 4).  As he put it, Puerto Rico must 
have “self-government, capable of relating us to all the countries of the world, 
without asking for permission from anyone… Political sovereignty is, before all, 
a project to recover the country’s economic viability which neither statehood 
nor colony make possible” (2010: 10).  The minority soberanista status position 
within the PDP may therefore be considered an elite expression of counter-
hegemony (Peet, 2007: 22) since it contends against the hegemonic party 
discourse that denies Puerto Rico is a colony, and advocates policy alternatives. 
It is possible to relate three practices of power in Caguas to the 
soberanista status position of Miranda Marín, and his successor, Miranda Torres, 
who inherits his views.  First, Caguas strives to realise the soberanista goal of 
engaging in international economic and political relations “without asking 
anyone for permission” (Miranda Marín, 2010: 9).  Second, it attempts to 
reverse the city’s economic dependency on the United States by fostering 
economic development strategies that harness the opportunities of neoliberal 
globalisation.  Third, Miranda Marín’s strong criticism of other modes of 
governance founded upon dependency relationships may be interpreted as a 
manifestation of his anti-statehood stance. 
First, Caguas appears to pursue, in a local context, the soberanista goal of 
realising international relations.  Economically, Caguas forges connections with 
foreign markets and companies through its annual trade fair EXPO CAGUAS, 
which places a particular emphasis on “business relationships with Latin 
America and the Caribbean” (Caguas la Revista, 2007: 15).  EXPO CAGUAS 





sector representatives, and even heads of state, from these regions.  For 
example, in its debut year in 2007 the fair hosted business visitors from the 
Dominican Republic, Panama, Mexico, Costa Rica, St Vincent and the Grenadines 
(2007: 15), and in 2009, the Prime Minister of St Kitts and Nevis (Miranda 
Torres, 2010: 5).   
Politically, Caguas connects with Latin American and European countries 
through international mayoral organisations.  Notably, Miranda Marín was an 
executive committee member of the Latin American Federation of Cities, 
Municipalities and Local Governments (FLACMA), for which Caguas has hosted 
a number of gatherings (Miranda Torres, 2010: 6).  While O’Neill proudly 
received the recognition of United States agencies for his services to low-income 
families, Miranda Marín received FLACMA’s highest honour, the Medal for Local 
Latin American and Caribbean Merit (Crossroads Order), in recognition of his 
model of ‘democratic governance’ (2010: 6).  In sum, international practices in 
Caguas reflect the significance of ‘para-diplomacy’ – the potential of cities to 
exercise decentralised power in ways that secure their separate, subnational 
representation in a variety of international and regional organisations 
(Baldacchino, 2006: 860).  Whether the achievement of international 
capabilities at the municipal scale complicates the logic for achieving it centrally 
– through the status question – is a crucial discussion that shall take place in the 
following chapter. 
Second, Caguas’ economic development policies appear to reflect the 
soberanista goal of reversing Puerto Rico’s economic dependency on the United 
States through creating a self-sufficient economy based on Puerto Rican 
enterprise.  A key moment towards this goal occurred in 2002 when Miranda 
Marín successfully lobbied the central legislature for an amendment to the 
Autonomous Municipalities Act, granting fully autonomous municipalities the 
power to establish municipal corporations.  The following year Caguas unveiled 





regional28 economic development organisation linking government to the 
private and academic sectors.  INTECO encourages the creation of small and 
medium-sized enterprises in research, information systems, cultural industries, 
renewable energy, food security, and waste management (Miranda Torres, 
2011: 7).  By offering grants, training and mentoring to start-ups, INTECO 
attempts to “displace the handout culture with one of entrepreneurship and 
ventures” (Miranda Torres, 2010: 14).   
It is possible that these measures to promote economic autonomy reflect 
a local acknowledgement of wider shifts in the terrain of the status debate 
towards specifically economic concerns, particularly from the US perspective 
(Gamaliel Ramos and Rivera Ortiz, 2001).  Since Congress has made clear that 
any status change should be ‘revenue neutral’, Puerto Rican decision makers 
have been prompted to implement new measures for economic development so 
as to reverse the metropolitan dependency that currently stagnates debate for 
all positions.  In this way economic change in Caguas could be read as a local 
project linked to Miranda Marín’s broader hope to see Puerto Rico achieve 
national sovereignty as a free associated state. 
Miranda Marín’s landmark speech to the PDP party leadership argued for 
national sovereignty as the only mechanism through which Puerto Rico could 
harness the opportunities of the “new world economic scenario” of neoliberal 
globalisation and regional blocs (Miranda Marín, 2010: 4).  Similarly, the Caguas 
administration has implemented a number of local changes that indicate an 
understanding of the need to adjust to global economic change for the purposes 
of competitiveness and growth.  The municipal corporation INTECO has been 
utilised to prepare citizens for the so-called ‘knowledge economy’ through new 
educational services such as an independent high school specialising in sciences, 
mathematics and technology (CIMATEC), an interactive science and technology 
museum (C3tec; in English, the ‘Creole Centre of Sciences and Technology of the 
Caribbean’), and an IT training scheme for adults who are unemployed or made 
redundant (Miranda Torres, 2011: 13).  Therefore, beyond a simplistically 
                                                        
28While founded as a municipal corporation in Caguas, INTECO has expanded to encompass 





nationalistic reading, Caguas’ slogan Nuestro Nuevo Pais also represents the 
city’s readiness to face the challenges of a new global economic context as a 
“‘New Country’, inserted into the emerging economy of globalisation” (Cantres 
Correa, 2007: 33). 
Third, it is likely that Miranda Marín’s critiques of dependency-based 
forms of governance correspond to his anti-statehood position.  His attack on 
citizens who “complain from the passive position of the victim and wait for a 
saviour to take charge and rescue us from our suffering” (Caguas la Revista, 
2010: 5) is a veiled parody of the statehood discourse, which posits this saviour 
as the United States.  In another instance he lambasts politicians who “nourish 
and exploit the imaginary of lowliness” and “insist upon myopic insularisms… 
drawn to think of themselves only in a relation of dependency with the northern 
metropolis” (Miranda Marín, 2007: 2-3).  This is a clear critique of what Girvan 
(2010: 6) in the Anglophone Caribbean context calls epistemic dependency; a 
colonised mentality.  While Miranda Marín never referred to any party, 
administration or individual by name while airing these views, it is obvious that 
he is referring to the pro-statehood PNP.  It is therefore feasible that he would 
have identified Guaynabo as a site where the ‘imaginary of lowliness’ was 
evident.  His soberanista belief that “the first and principal resource of a country 
or nation is its people” (Miranda Marín, in Cantres Correa, 2007: 18) contrasts 
directly with O’Neill’s pro-statehood argument that Puerto Ricans “don’t have 
gold, we don’t have agriculture, we don’t have anything [but] a powerful 
American citizenship” (Interview, Mayor, Guaynabo). 
 
6.2.3 Everyday politics in Lares: struggling with the status quo 
  
Unlike Guaynabo and Caguas, routine political practices in Lares do not 
directly reflect the status positions of the mayor or his party.  Rather, Lares 
relates to the status issue in that its municipal government is obliged to accept 
the limitations of the current status and work fully within the constraints of the 





fewer autonomous powers than Guaynabo and Caguas - two municipalities that 
have achieved maximum autonomy and exploited it to connect with 
governments and institutions beyond the central state.  By comparison, in Lares 
everyday politics is shaped by two deep layers of dependency.  First, the 
municipality is reliant upon the offices of the central government to provide 
most of its budget.  Second, given that these funds arriving from the centre are 
federally sourced, Lares is ultimately dependent upon the US federal 
government for its daily operation. 
 Lares' dependence on central government is expressed in its relationship 
to OCAM29, the San Juan office responsible for providing financial and 
administrative support to the small municipalities, including the delivery of 
federal funds.  It receives block grants from federal agencies, which are then 
divided up for distribution to individual municipal administrations.  OCAM 
delivers to the small municipalities almost all of the resources they need to run.  
In this respect Lares is typical of most small municipalities.  Indeed, in 2007 
over 70% of the budget in 34 municipalities, including Lares, was formed of 
central subsidies (Asociación de Alcaldes, 2007: 7).  As Pagán explains: 
 
We're very limited because, on not having enough inhabitants - 
which must be 50,000 or over, we don't have the freedom to 
directly negotiate the federal assistance ourselves.  We have to do 
it through the state office.  Over there, they get a block, and then 
it's 'this is for you, this is for you, and this is for you'.  But if we 
were the city I wish we were, we'd be able to go directly [to the 
federal agencies], and the benefits would be much larger.  
(Interview, Mayor, Lares) 
 
 
Here Pagán suggests that his capacity to administrate the town is directly 
affected by the amount of federal funding he is able to claim from the 
central government.  This is also made clear by his response to my 
question about status: 
 
                                                        





CE:   The status issue, do you think it affects the way in which 
 you do your work here?  Could you see a link between 
 status and what you do? 
 
RP:  Well, no.  At the moment, it doesn't affect it.  There's a 
 countryside saying that goes: 'you have to plough with the
 oxen you're given'.30  Let me explain.  In old times, we 
 would whip the animals, the beasts, and they would work 
 the land...And in this case, you have to govern with what 
 you have, right?  So, you have to deal with whatever we 
 lack... and search for a way, as far as you can, to maintain a 
 good environment.  Even if there isn't much to give. 
 
According to mayor Pagán the status issue - the debate itself - does not affect 
local governance because he understands that a formal change in the island's 
status could never be realised from the local scale.  However, he does 
understand that the current status – the island's present juridical and political 
condition as opposed to the debate around it - places significant limits on the 
work he is able to perform as a local political actor.  As a statehood supporter he 
reflects the conviction that this option would result in a bounty of federal funds 
(Romero-Barceló, 1978), especially to poor rural municipalities such as Lares.  
Pending the arrival of statehood, he must get on with everyday politics by 
making best use of the limited resources presently available to him. 
 
Pagán explained the extent of his reliance on federal funds (Figure 6.5) in 
response to my question about the common ground held by all PNP members 
beyond a pro-statehood status position: 
 
Well, we work for the wellbeing of the country.  To work in a way 
that takes funds from the federal agencies, that bureaucracy.  We 
depend greatly on the American nation, through federal funds.  
And I have to tell you that here in Lares, if it weren’t for the 
federal programs, it would be difficult to work.  Because they give 
me money for roads, social housing, money so I can work in the 
office, everything.  (Interview, Mayor, Lares) 
 
                                                        





For this reason, one of mayor Pagán’s key local priorities as head of the 
municipal executive is to secure as much federal funding as possible for the 
town and safeguard the amount that it already receives.  As an example, Pagán 
indicated serious concern with the results of the 2010 US Census31, which had 
shown that Lares’ population decreased by 5,000 since the year 2000: 
 
RP: [Showing me an official census document] It says here, if I 
 have a query, a question, that I get in touch.  We’re going to 
 do it, because I don’t agree with the results.  I understand 
 that something went wrong, or the people didn’t do their 
 work.  Because it’s not possible that we’ve lost 5,000 
 people from 2000 to 2010. 
 
CE:   That’s what the census said. 
 
RP:   Yes…  But how many people didn’t fill it out?  No-one came 
 round to my house to ask me, have you filled it out?  No-
 one checked that all the families had done it.  And this 
 provokes unease because it makes the town smaller, 
 reducing the funds that could arrive to Lares.  Less money.  





Figure 6.5: Notices detailing various programs of federal assistance in Lares’ Office of 
Federal Programs. (Field photo) 
 
                                                        





Lares' dependence on federal funds is further illustrated by Pagán's 
belief that national politics in the United States affects the work he is able to 
perform in the town.  Given that Republican governments tend to be less 
generous than Democratic ones in terms of public spending, the party in power 
stateside can indirectly affect the amount of funds that arrive to municipal 
coffers via OCAM: 
 
Right now, with a change in government in the US, which was 
controlled by the Republicans [before 2009], and is now 
controlled by the Democrats... They're more liberal about 
spending, and the Republicans are more timid.  Well, that ends up 
limiting the work here.  Because they start to make cuts, and if 
there are cuts there's no freedom of employment, the economic 
part doesn't come.  (Interview, Mayor, Lares) 
 
By "freedom of employment" Pagan is referring to the reality that the municipal 
government, the main employer in the town, relies directly on federal funds to 
provide that employment.  Lares’ high rate of government employment is 
therefore yet another symptom of its dependency on federal funds and struggle 
with the status quo. 
 
 
6.3 Other local political concerns in the municipal executives 
 
 The above section suggested that routine political practices in Guaynabo, 
Caguas and Lares appear to be significantly entangled with status positions and 
status issues.  However, this section underlines that much decision-making in 
each site takes place according to executive models of governance that are not 
hegemonically set by status positions or status issues.  Rather, these models are 
based on other ideologies that are partially obscured by the predominance of 
status in the municipalities, where it necessarily defines local political actors 
and finds material expression in landscape.  Nonetheless, these ideologies are at 
moments seen to become entangled with status positions.  The general sense of 







Status?  We’re not going to waste resources talking about 
something we don’t have the power to resolve…  We are just 
focusing on how we are going to get things done.  (Director, Office 
of External Resources, Caguas) 
 
It [status] shouldn’t affect it.  On a daily basis, in fact it doesn’t 
affect it… At the level of administrative decisions and the services 
that the executive gives to the people, it doesn’t affect it at all.  
(Director, Department of Planning, Lares) 
 
I know perfectly well how to separate one from the other.  (Mayor 
of Guaynabo) 
 
However, as this section demonstrates, the fact that status issues and positions 
are rarely discussed directly in the municipalities does not rule out the 
possibility of their influence in the structures and practices of local power. 
 
 
6.3.1 Guaynabo: neoliberalism and paternalism 
 
 Despite the visually striking use of English in Guaynabo, O’Neill’s 
governance in the municipality is principally informed by two ideologies that 
have no necessary relation to his preference for statehood: neoliberalism and 
paternalism.  These ideologies are manifested in two major characteristics of 
governance in Guaynabo - the construction and maintenance of prestige 
communities for the rich, and the provision of extensive welfare programs for 
the poor.   
A key aspect of mayor O’Neill’s governance is heavy investment in the 
construction of gated communities and supporting retail and commercial 
services, such as shopping malls.  Gating may be interpreted as a neoliberal 
urban strategy in that it corresponds to the privatisation of formerly public 
space (Aguirre et al, 2006: 4).  The municipality collects property and business 





municipal budget after the capital, San Juan.32  Guaynabo’s budget returned a 
surplus and experienced steady growth every single fiscal year from 1992-3 to 
2008-9 (Quiñones Calderón, 2009: 96).  O’Neill utilises these funds to provide 
Guaynabo’s residents with high quality public services that he perceives are 
equivalent to the offerings of any city in the United States.  In particular, 
Guaynabo is renowned for the efficiency of its rubbish collection, recycling 
program, and police force (Suárez Carrasquillo, 2011: 5). 
 While O’Neill’s use of English in Guaynabo may indicate his desire for 
statehood, it also relates to a strategy for promoting the high-income residential 
communities.  Indeed, Suárez Carrasquillo (2011: 7) identifies the 
Americanisation, gentrification and gating of residential communities in 
Guaynabo as the results of an active city marketing campaign that has the 
English language as its “cornerstone”.  “Consistent with the increased use of 
English by the municipality”, he notes, “there is also an increased use of English 
in recent gated community developments” (2011: 6).  These have names such as 
Regency Park, Grand View, and Murano Luxury.  This, he argues, is “emblematic 
of the Puerto Rican colonial reality, where it is understood that the use of the 
English language confers a sense of prestige” (2011: 7).  He therefore speculates 
that the municipal slogan ‘Guaynabo City’ and pervasive English-language 
signage form parts of a wider city marketing strategy.  Building upon 
Carrasquillo’s ideas, I was interested to ask the mayor whether the specific 
concept of Guaynabo City may have constituted a formal executive policy: 
 
CE:  Could you explain to me how you implemented your vision 
 of Guaynabo City?  Was there a Guaynabo City ‘action plan’ 
 as such? 
 
HON:   No, but it’s like this.  You’ll note that everyone knows 
 that the services here are unique in Puerto Rico.  Where 
 there’s a recycling system that goes from house to house, it 
 only exists in Guaynabo.  They’re distinct things.  You have 
 to give meaning to what is distinctive, for the people.  
                                                        
32 For the financial year 2010-11, Guaynabo’s total municipal income was $130.4 million, with 
the two main sources - property and business taxes – taking $45.3 million and $48.7 million 





 Understand?  In that respect, Guaynabo City started.  
 Guaynabo City, a five-star city, best quality of life, best 
 healthcare, best roads, best maintenance, best vision, best 
 services in Puerto Rico.  As if it were a state.  That’s what it 
 is. 
 
O’Neill’s response reveals that the Guaynabo City slogan is indeed a marketing 
strategy that attempts to promote his understanding of what constitutes a 
quality of life.  While gentrification, gating and high-end service provision are 
not related to statehood directly, it is significant nonetheless that O’Neill’s 
implementation of these strategies is entangled with (or inspired by) an 
assimilationist imaginary and a perception of the United States as the 
benchmark of quality.  
O’Neill’s governance is also informed by paternalistic ideology (Figure 
6.6).  Paternalism is defined as the belief of an organisation or state that the 
autonomy of some group should be limited for its own good, especially by 
providing for its needs without giving it responsibilities (Dworkin, 2010).  
Guaynabo offers low-income residents a range of municipal welfare initiatives 
that complement the social support received federally from mainland programs.  
After being sworn in for a fourth consecutive term in 2005, O’Neill announced: 
“[a]t this moment it is propitious… to reiterate once more what I have said so 
many times: I will continue to direct work that is sensitive to the needs of those 
who need the assistance of the programs and services of their Municipal 








Figure 6.6: Centrepiece in the ground floor lobby area of Guaynabo City Hall.  The 
statues represent a mother providing for her needy child. (Field photo) 
 
For example, O’Neill’s biography La Satisfacción de Servir (The 
Satisfaction of Service) discusses two particular initiatives for low-income 
families: housing and school uniforms.  One of O’Neill’s first actions upon taking 
office in 1993 was to create the Department of Municipal Housing, making 
Guaynabo the first municipality to take charge of the construction of social 
housing under the Autonomous Municipalities Law.33  This, as O’Neill notes, was 
a response to the needs of his constituents:  “I’m not making it up when I say the 
first person I received in my office as Mayor in 1993 came to speak to me about 
the need of housing for his family.  Actually, the first 20 or 30 people I attended 
to during my first days in office brought to me the problem of not having 
adequate housing or living under conditions that were extremely adverse to 
their safety and health” (in Quiñones Calderón, 2009: 109).  The Department 
therefore created the Guaynabo New Housing Program, under which families 
are provided with a secure, modern residence as well as “ownership, signature 
                                                        
33 Prior to this, all municipal social housing in Puerto Rico had been been planned and 





and all, without any commitment of advance payment nor a monthly mortgage” 
(O’Neill, in Quiñones Calderón, 2009: 88).34  Further, O’Neill’s ‘Vouchers for 
School Clothing Program’ has enabled low-income families to purchase 
uniforms for their children in public schools.  The story of the program is 
recounted by O’Neill’s wife in the biography (Figure 6.7): 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Guaynabo’s Vouchers for School Clothing Program 
 
“One morning I went to represent Hector in an activity in a school of the Amelia 
sector… A little child approached me, who I noticed was watching me, and said: ‘you’re 
all rich’; I said to him ‘no, why do you say that?’, to which he replied: ‘because you have 
everything’.  I noticed the little child’s humble clothing and broken shoes...I looked over 
the group of students and noticed that many were in similar conditions of dress. 
 
That made me very depressed, and as soon as Hector came home that night, I told him 
what I had experienced… He looked at me intently and said: ‘Well, what we’re going to 
do is give the families of scarce economic resources some vouchers so that they can buy 
the clothing their children need; so they can attend classes in the same, equal 
conditions as their classmates from more wealthy families’.  The initiative for the 
Vouchers for School Clothing Program came about that very night.” (In Quiñones 




O’Neill handing out welfare assistance to constituents.  The photo’s caption reads: 
“Thousands of families of scarce resources have received vouchers for school clothing 
for their children, to the value of $4.7 million” (Quiñones Calderón, 2009: 116) 
 
 
                                                        
34 Though a convoluted mechanism detailed in the biography, families participating in the New 
Housing Program can gain full ownership of the property for free so long as they remain there 
for a number of years.  To 2008, 215 Guaynabo families had been housed by the program 





 However, paternalistic governance in Guaynabo foments the dependency 
of the poor – 48% of the municipal population (Interview, Director of Federal 
Affairs, Guaynabo) - on the government through welfare provision.  O’Neill’s 
message for the poor of Guaynabo is that quality of life is to be achieved mainly, 
if not exclusively, through welfare.  In effect, he accurately reproduces one of the 
key messages of hegemonic pro-statehood discourse: that decolonisation is 
largely about guaranteeing the social welfare of the poor according to US 
standards through increased government assistance (Romero-Barceló, 1978).  
Guaynabo’s Director of Federal Affairs reflects on the consequences of this 
message - a dependency cycle that discourages work and is reproduced through 
the generations: 
 
These programs are not bad, they’re certainly sustaining families 
economically.  The thing is, the way in which they’re 
implementing these kinds of funds, they’re not helping the 
families.  They’re creating a great dependence.  And their sons and 
daughters, if they see their fathers don’t work, and yet have 
money to spend, why do you have to work? We probably have 
families with 30, 35 years in these programs… You have to change 
their way of thinking before they can move out of that situation.  
(Interview, Director of Federal Affairs, Guaynabo) 
 
O’Neill denies that his gestures towards the poor are in any way partisan 
or entangled with his status position, declaring that “need and suffering have no 
(political) colour” (in Quiñones Calderón, 2009: 59).  However, his minority 
legislators think otherwise: 
 
The people, as I told you, don’t believe in themselves.  And the 
[PNP] government takes charge of ensuring this.  That’s because it 
lives off maintaining them stupefied like that, so that it can carry 
on being the patron.  So that when the elections come, it offers 
you work, positions, more cupones, more assistance… Well, that’s 
why the people say, ‘that suits me, I’m going for that’.  (PIP 
legislator, Guaynabo) 
 
My vision is that you have to give the people more participation 
[in government].  Make the people here less dependent.  And he 
[the mayor] has made the people very dependent on the 





in communities is vital.  Here, he cuts that off…  If you’re 
dependent, you’re not free.  I don’t want people to bow before the 
mayor every time he passes by.  (PDP legislator, Guaynabo) 
 
The minority legislators contend that O’Neill’s policies ultimately deepen the 
economic and psychological dependency relationships between citizen and 
state.  This effect is emblematic of pro-statehood discourse.  The PIP legislator 
goes further to contend that such dependencies reflect a colonial mentality that 
has prevailed all over the island as a result of its colonial status: 
 
Essentially what influences us most is dependence.  Because we 
have been used to the fact that decisions are taken outside of 
Puerto Rico, the important ones.  That has made the people of our 
town very used to thinking, psychologically, that there is someone 
who is going to solve their problems, that they are going to be 
solved with economic contributions in some cases, with laws in 
others, and that our role is to simply receive and accept it.  So we 
become dependent on those who govern us.  Whether it’s the feds, 
the state, or the municipality.  (PIP legislator, Guaynabo) 
 
By fomenting the dependency of residents on local government, the 
mayor effectively empowers himself, as their elected representative, to make 
decisions on their behalf without actively involving them in the decision-making 
process.  This nurtures an authoritarian style of government in which residents 
are not consulted in the majority of decisions.  An example of this would be the 
significant changes to the municipal built environment in the image of 
‘Guaynabo City’.  Indeed, O’Neill betrays an aggressive governing style in the 
closing pages of his biography, under a section called “The Key to Success”.  In it, 
he reflects: 
 
I am sure that the reason [for my success] lies in the way I never 
let myself be intimidated by the political cost of what I propose to 
do, because if it was like that, I wouldn’t have done anything, out 
of fear or political insecurity.  For me, fear and political insecurity 
are manifestations of the mediocrity of the human being.  (In 








6.3.2 Caguas: participatory democracy 
 
 While it is possible to ascribe certain practices of politics in Caguas to the 
soberanista status position of its late mayor, it is also important to understand 
them as the international and global aspects of a decision-making model that is 
implemented locally, with specifically local goals.  During his thirteen years as 
mayor of Caguas Miranda Marín oversaw the implementation of a new model of 
municipal administration known as ‘democratic governance’ (Rabell et al, 2007).  
Democratic governance is founded upon the principle of participatory 
democracy – the active participation of a citizenry in the decision-making 
processes of government.  This achieves, in Miranda Marín’s (2009: 10) words, a 
“‘government-citizen symbosis’, fostering a culture in which communities 
organise themselves to improve their quality of life with the assistance of the 
Administration”.  Based upon a concept of governance as “a responsibility to be 
shared between the government and the people”, it requires “the active 
participation, not simply representation, of everyone who interacts in the City… 
to take the decisions, provide the services and realise the projects that 
collectively affect us” (Cantres Correa, 2007: 33).  Significantly, Caguas therefore 
effects “a transition from a representative democratic system to a participatory 
democratic system” (Miranda Marín, in Municipio Autonómo de Caguas, 2005: 4). 
Practically, the direct participation of citizens in decision-making is 
formalised through the municipality’s Department of Social Development and 
Self-Management.35  “It is here”, as Miranda Torres (2010: 14) puts it, “that the 
model of democratic governance has its greatest expression”.  This department 
encourages citizens to organise themselves into Residents Associations for the 
identification of specific issues requiring attention in their communities.  These 
Associations then take part in weekly ‘Community Dialogues’ with city 
administrators, in which they can discuss these issues and even present their 
                                                        
35 The stark contrast between governance styles in Caguas and Guaynabo is illustrated by the 
first actions of the respective mayors upon taking office.  While O’Neill created the Department 
of Municipal Housing in Guaynabo in 1993, Miranda Marin founded the Department of Social 






own proposals for resolving them (Miranda Marín, 2009: 11).  In this way, the 
citizens of Caguas become involved both in the identification of local problems 
and the implementation of solutions.  For example, Residents’ Associations 
(Figure 6.8) have participated in signage projects, administered recreational 
facilities, constructed community centres and public toilets for mobility-
impaired residents, and organised schemes for the distribution of drinking 
water during hurricane season (Miranda Torres, 2010: 14).  188 of 216 
communities identified by the Department have organised themselves in this 
way (Miranda Marin, 2009: 10).  Many of the longer-term projects proposed by 
residents are written into the city’s Strategic Plan, an important document that 
details all scheduled municipal developments in a six-year planning cycle.  In 
Miranda Marín’s words, “no other municipal government has reached this level 
of citizen participation” (2009: 11). 
Conceptually, the model places emphasis on reversing the psychological 
and economic dependency of citizens on the government, as manifested by the 
“handout mentality”36 of many Puerto Ricans (Miranda Marín, 2009: 10).  
Caguas understands such dependency to be the direct result of Puerto Rico’s 
colonial relationship with the United States.  As the city’s magazine notes, “our 
creativity to develop collective projects has suffered from a syndrome of 
psychological and emotional impotence for the lack of confidence in ourselves” 
(Caguas la Revista, 2010: 20).  Responding to this, democratic governance 
“precisely and fundamentally attacks dependency in all its forms, [such as] the 
loss of hope and frustration of citizens upon not feeling like the owners of their 
lives” (2010: 20).  It proposes to “displace” the handout mentality “with a 
culture of entrepreneurs and ventures, thereby creating solidarity and a sense 
of belonging between neighbours… because they form part of the change” 
(Miranda Marin, 2009: 10). 
The concepts and practices of participatory democracy might appear to 
be unrelated to the mayor’s soberanista status position (section 6.2.2).  However, 
both policies aim to decolonise Puerto Ricans – the former proposes a non-
                                                        





state-centric version and the latter a state-centric version.  Caguas therefore 
produces effects that have implications for the current terms and significance of 
the status debate.  Governance in the municipality reflects the very approach 
that is currently advocated by progressive intellectuals in English-speaking 
postcolonial Caribbean societies.  Consensus has formed around participatory 
governance as a means of achieving decolonisation beyond the central state 
(Nettleford, 2003; Girvan, 2010; Meeks, 2003).  These intellectuals note the 
potential of this model of decision-making to take concrete steps towards 
reversing the key colonial legacy that has endured, in multiple forms, despite the 
formal resolution of status issues in these islands: metropolitan dependency.  In 
this vein Caguas represents a clear response to Girvan’s (2010) call for an 
‘epistemic sovereignty’ to break colonial ways of thinking, Nettleford’s (2003) 
call for a partnership between government, the private sector and community to 
decolonise local political cultures, and Meek’s (2003) call for the raising of 
national self-esteem as a basis for new local economic projects.  As will be 
discussed further in the next chapter, it is therefore possible that the structures 




Figure 6.8: Caguas’ participatory democracy.  Miranda Marín with a Residents 
Association, during a community-led project to improve storm drainage.  (Source: 





Participatory democracy, as implemented in Caguas, represents a 
significant shift away from dominant practices of local Puerto Rican politics.  
Namely, it attempts to break the subservient power relationship that binds 
citizens to the state in the majority of municipalities.  This relationship is 
captured by the Puerto Rican phrase yo te doy, el otro te quita (‘what I give to 
you, the other would take away’)37 (Caguas la Revista,2010: 5).  Miranda Marín 
famously used the example of a broken door in a community centre to explain 
how democratic governance works (Figure 6.9).  As he put it, “the citizens have 
to ask themselves, and answer, a fundamental question: ‘what are we going to 
do for ourselves to solve our own problems and take charge of our own living 
conditions?’” (Miranda Marín, 2010: 6).  This alternative discourse of 
empowerment and self-sufficiency contrasts directly with dominant approaches 
to local governance rooted in a dependency discourse – as manifested in 
Guaynabo (section 6.4.1 above) and Lares (6.2.3) - according to which “in the 
face of difficulties we complain from the passive position of the victim and wait 
for a saviour to take charge and rescue us from our suffering” (Miranda Marín, 
in Caguas la Revista, 2010: 5).   
 
 
Figure 6.9: The broken door in the Caguas community centre 
 
I remember that during my first election campaign, I visited a community with two 
groups in conflict.  They had invited me to intervene.  We met in the community centre 
and one of the leaders said: ‘What’s the municipality doing!  We’ve spent three years 
asking them to send someone to fix the front door [of the centre], and they still haven’t 
come’.  And I replied with something perplexing: ‘Come on, to repair a door you don’t 
need to wait for the municipality to send out a brigade’.  The leaders looked at me, 
confused.  They were listening to a different discourse.   
 
I didn’t say, ‘OK, I’ll speak to the mayor and have someone sent out as soon as possible’.  
Rather, I asked them: ‘How many welders and construction workers live in this 
community?’‘About forty’, someone said.  ‘You must know two or three of them, right? 
Why don’t you get a few of them together to repair the door one morning?  I’ll give you 
the paint if you like’, I said.  I came back a few weeks later and saw the door had been 
repaired.  ‘Did someone come from the municipality?’  I asked them.  ‘No, we did what 
you suggested, and did it all ourselves’, they said.  They didn’t even give me time to give 
them the paint.  (Miranda Marín, 2008: 6) 
 
                                                        
37 My translation.  The phrase refers to a perception that the electorate compares local political 
candidates in terms of the direct benefits they offer to citizens.  These could include welfare, 





It is clear, therefore, that the practices of politics in Caguas and Guaynabo 
are based on fundamentally opposing principles.  The psychological dependency 
of citizens on government that Miranda Marín attempts to contest is fomented 
by O’Neill in Guaynabo.  While the former mayor believes in governing with the 
people, the latter believes in governing for the people, paternalistically 
providing citizens with financial assistance to alleviate their “need and suffering” 
(O’Neill, in Quiñones Calderón, 2009: 59).  The anecdotes of O’Neill’s wife in 
Guaynabo (Figure 6.7), and Miranda Marín in Caguas (Figure 6.9 above), 
illustrate this difference in emphasis.   
A further key pillar of Caguas’ model of democratic governance, 
alongside citizen participation, is culture (Miranda Torres, 2011: 4).  Caguas’ 
impressive investment in culture, as discussed in the last chapter, not only 
reflects the PDP’s hegemonic position on Puerto Rican identity; it is also 
threaded into municipal governance more profoundly.  Just as citizen 
participation is used as a mechanism to reduce the psychological and material 
dependency of citizens on the government, so culture is deployed to reduce 
these same forms of dependency on the United States.  These two actions are 
interrelated, since the fortification of Puerto Rican national identity in Caguas - 
to the explicit exclusion of the United States – aims to boost Caguas’ 
participatory democracy by raising residents’ senses of individual self-esteem 
and collective belonging.  A central aspect of Miranda Marín’s vision of Puerto 
Rican national identity is its creative and productive potential to overcome 
metropolitan dependency.  As such the Caguas model is founded on his belief 
that “the first and principal resource of a country or nation is its people…  
Without this, there is no country” (Miranda Marín, in Cantres Correa, 2007: 18).  
Indeed, Miranda Torres explained to me that a sense of national solidarity 
therefore forms the foundation for all of Caguas’ projects:  “building upon our 
recognition of the cultural values of criollismo, we formulate our strategic 
visions for democratising technology, human development, multisectoral 





 Ultimately, the mobilisation of culture in Caguas’ administration reflects 
Meeks’ (2003) understanding of cultural decolonisation - a process that draws 
upon culture in ways that inspire new counter-hegemonic economic projects.  
Further, it acknowledges a heightened need to affirm cultural identity at a 
moment where the city looks to respond to globalisation – a process that it 
understands presents economic opportunities and cultural risks at the same 
time.  As Caguas’ Director of Culture explains, Puerto Ricanness is therefore 
strongly promoted to prevent the economic globalisation of the city from also 
effecting its cultural globalisation: “In this global world, creole identity, our 
national identity, is what keeps us together as a people so we’re not… 
everything, right?” (Interview, Director of Culture, Caguas).  Caguas’ slogan 
Nuestro Nuevo País (Figure 6.10) is not, therefore, necessarily a pro-
Commonwealth slogan linked to hegemonic PDP positions.  Rather, it is a way of 
marketing the positive transformations of democratic governance while rooting 
Puerto Rican identity in place, at a moment where global change threatens the 





Figure 6.10: Back cover of Miranda Marin’s 2009 address, featuring the image of the 
Monument to Spanish Heritage.  It reads, “Thirteen years ago in Caguas we envisaged 
the coming of a different world, and that foresight launched us to construct a city 





6.3.3 Lares: clientelism and partisanship 
 
As explained in section 6.2.3, the current status of Puerto Rico influences 
everyday political practice in Lares in that it ultimately sets the municipal 
budget.  Given that it is mostly comprised of federal funds, a change in status - 
either statehood or independence - would have important repercussions for 
municipal finances.  This said, the most significant ideology that presently 
informs the use of these funds is political clientelism.  Political clientelism 
describes the "distribution of selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined 
groups in exchange for political support" (Hopkin, 2006: 2).  As such, political 
practice in Lares manifests the strategies of politicians to hold on to state power 
within the current system rather than change it as per status positions. 
Since government employment in Lares is high, clientelism is 
fundamental to its everyday political practices.  The government is not only the 
largest single employer in Lares but also the largest employment sector 
(Municipio Autónomo de Lares, 2010).  High government employment is typical 
of all Puerto Rican municipalities, but especially so of smaller ones.  In the local 
context, therefore, Lares' government becomes the motor of the local economy 
and a powerful institution that controls a large proportion of its resources.  This 
empowers the municipal chief executive - the mayor - to utilise these resources 
in ways that guarantee him continued electoral support.  Governance in Lares is 
therefore strongly influenced by clientelist ideology - in particular, political 
patronage in government jobs.  As Lares' PIP legislator explains: 
 
The largest company here is the town hall.  Employees in 
everything.  [Referring to the mayor] So, if you don’t keep those 
employees satisfied, you’re going to lose your position.  It’s the 
employees that give you the votes.  It’s always tied to the vote.  If I 
do this, I’m going to lose votes; if that, no.  It’s a constant balance 
between the vote and what I do.  (PIP legislator, Lares) 
 
The legislator suggests that the mayor feels as accountable to his own 
administrative staff as to the electorate, since high government employment 





decision-making is motivated as much by an obligation to protect his own staff 
as to govern according to other priorities.  Such a possibility would certainly be 
consistent with his 2008 election campaign promise to raise the salaries of 
municipal employees – effectively a vote-buying strategy (see section 5.6 of the 
previous chapter).   
 Corruption is a noted trend of Latin American clientelism (Seligson, 
2002).  Indeed, the mayor's strong reliance on government workers for 
continued political support has fomented municipal corruption.  During 
fieldwork a fraud scandal involving 70 municipal employees was exposed in 
Lares.  They were accused of involvement in an organised scheme to defraud 
AFLAC, a US medical insurance provider (Primera Hora, 2011).  The president of 
Lares’ legislature explained to me how it happened: 
 
L: I thought, what is he [mayor Pagán] going to do?  He’s got 
87 employees being accused.  And when I talked to him, he 
said Norma, I think these are good people.  I don’t think 
they did this out of the meanness of their hearts.  I think 
they did this out of ignorance.  AFLAC tells you, if you get 
burnt, you can claim.  If a mosquito bites you, you can 
claim.  So people forgot that you don’t claim when you 
don’t have these issues or accidents.  And you know, 
because we’re going through a difficult situation, I think 
people saw it as a way of getting money.  And they’re 
paying for it, they’re paying for the policy, their insurance.  
And they forgot that you can’t commit fraud… 
 
 So he [Pagán] says, I can’t throw these employees out.  I’m 
 going to wait.  If my governor says I have to, I have to.  He’s 
 a very obedient man...  What did he do?  He took them [the
 accused], and moved them around. 
 
C:   So everyone is still working. 
 
L:   Everyone is still working.  Those who were really close to 
 him, about three or four, he moved to positions that were 
 not to do with money.  And I think that has gained him, just 
 that one action, I think has secured him as mayor for the 







The above dialogue shows that Lares’ high government employment has had 
very negative consequences for governance, fomenting clientelism and 
protecting corruption.  The president makes this abundantly clear with her 
belief that Pagán’s refusal to discipline his employees will have guaranteed him 
victory in the 2012 election.38 
 The importance of clientelism and partisanship to governance in Lares is 
further illustrated by the dynamic between municipal and central governments.  
Owing to partisan favouritism, municipalities that are controlled by the party 
exercising power centrally typically receive much larger amounts of federal 
funds from OCAM, to the loss of municipalities dominated by the opposition.  As 
Lares' PDP legislator notes, Pagán therefore“has a distinct advantage”: 
 
He has senators and representatives that can help him.  And he 
has all the government agencies, right?  That helps you to do more 
works…39  And when the other party wins [centrally], you can do 
less here.  What happens right now is that the PDP mayors 
complain, that Fortuño doesn’t help them.  It depends on who’s in 
power!  (PDP legislator, Lares) 
 
The fact that Lares receives its federal funds from the centre effectively 
maintains the power of decision-making at the centre.  This is because the 
central government establishes how the funds are to be used: 
 
When there are really big budgets to be distributed, for example, 
when Obama brought lots of federal funding for roads and for 
health, the representatives and senators [from the central 
legislature] come, and they tell us how it’s going to benefit Lares.  
(PNP legislator, Lares) 
 
Finally, it may be argued that Pagan’s new town slogan Lares, Ciudad de 
los Cielos Abiertos ultimately represents the municipality’s dependence upon 
federal funds and central government.  As the previous chapter (section 5.6) 
explained, Ciudad de los Cielos Abiertos was Pagan’s personal tribute to God, 
                                                        
38 Roberto Pagán was indeed re-elected as mayor that year. 
39 While I was unable to confirm during fieldwork how Pagán’s Ciudad de los Cielos Abiertos 
structures were paid for, it is very likely that he sourced the funding from an agreeable central 





who had helped him govern the town by performing a miracle.  Namely, God 
had provided exactly the $300,000 he needed to raise the salaries of his 
municipal employees.  This money reached Lares via CRIM, the office of central 
government that is responsible for tax collection in the small municipalities.  
Allegedly, CRIM had made years of accounting errors on the town.  Given that 
Lares’ economy is principally based on federally-funded government 
employment, most of the taxes collected by CRIM would be extracted from 
federally-funded economic activities.  This would make the $300,000 largely, if 
not mostly, federal funds.  So, if Pagan’s version of events is to be believed – that 
Lares, Ciudad de los Cielos Abiertos is a religious tribute to the missing $300,000 
– the slogan ultimately becomes a story of the town’s deep dependence on 
federal funds and central government. 
 
 
6.4 Entanglements of status in the municipal legislatures 
 
 This final section explores the relationship between status positions and 
the routine practices of the municipal legislatures.  Specifically, it examines how 
status relates to the drafting, debate and passage of municipal ordinances and 
resolutions.  This includes a consideration of the three mayors' decisions to 
name municipal space according to their status preferences, as discussed in the 
previous chapter.  Indeed, the Autonomous Municipalities Act states that 
executive decisions on place naming must be approved by the legislature 




 Status positions are occasionally manifested in legislative resolutions.  
Resolutions often channel local political sentiment about political issues or 
events taking place beyond the municipality at the central or federal scales.  In 





question.  As a PNP legislator in Guaynabo explained to me, "it’s there that you'll 
see the political background40 of each person": 
For example, we presented a resolution criticising the expressions 
of ex-governor Rafael Hernández Colón regarding the status issue 
with Pierluisi's project in Congress [HR 2499].41  He tried to 
unwind the project, saying that the Puerto Rican woman gives 
birth in order to receive federal funds, that she is dependent on 
federal funds, and that she wants statehood for the federal funds 
more than anything else.  Well, we understood that he denigrated 
the Puerto Rican woman... and obviously in that moment a debate 
was started.  (PNP legislator, Guaynabo) 
 
 
 Guaynabo's legislative session on 24 February 2011 provides another 
salient example (Gobierno Municipal Autónomo de Guaynabo, 2011; see 
Appendix 10.9).  Here status is seen to filter into and ultimately dominate 
discussion of an issue to which it bears no relation.  Presented by "the 
Administration", Resolution 21 condemns a speech delivered in US Congress by 
Luis Gutiérrez, a Congressman of Puerto Rican descent.  On 16 February 2011 
Gutiérrez, who represents a district of Chicago with a large Puerto Rican 
community, used his time on the House floor to denounce the oppressive 
domestic policies of island governor Luis Fortuño.  His speech brought 
Congressional attention to an unfolding "human rights and civil rights crisis" in 
Puerto Rico (Gutiérrez, 2011: 1).  Specifically, Gutiérrez referred to the PNP's 
use of brutal police force to suppress the largest student strike in the history of 
UPR, and the attempts of a PNP-backed federal judge to weaken Puerto Rico's 
Law Association by imprisoning its president (Gutiérrez, 2011: 1).  Guaynabo's 
Resolution 21 responds: 
 
TO EXPRESS OUR MOST ENERGETIC REJECTION AND 
REPUDIATION OF THE MALICIOUS AND DAMAGING EXPRESSIONS 
OF CONGRESSMAN LUIS GUTIÉRREZ WHO, USING HIS SEAT IN THE 
FEDERAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OFFENDED AND 
                                                        
40 As in the last chapter, I italicise any code-switching into English words by my Spanish-
speaking interviewees. 
41 HR2499 was Resident Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi's 2010 Puerto Rico Democracy Act - an 





HUMILIATED ALL PUERTO RICANS, TRYING TO DENIGRATE OUR 
PEOPLE (Gobierno Municipal Autónomo de Guaynabo, 2011: 7; 
italics in original) 
 
 
This resolution indicates that Guaynabo, despite its full autonomy, remains 
obedient of central positions through expressing solidarity with the governor.  It 
constitutes a local defence of the PNP's central power exercises against 
Gutiérrez, who had criticised them at the federal scale.  Even so, debate on the 
resolution quickly descended into status politics.  This is because Gutiérrez is 
both a US Congressman and a known supporter of Puerto Rican independence.  
Figure 6.11 below details a selection of passages from the debate, dominated by 
the pro-statehood majority legislators: 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Debate in Guaynabo on Resolution 21 
 
PNP legislator #1:  The reason for this project is the negative message of this 
person, who calls himself a Congressman of the United States, elected under 
federal statutes and representing American citizens in Chicago, who says he is 
Puerto Rican, but lives from the benefits and goodness that make him an 
American citizen under statehood.  It is the negative message that the enemies 
of American citizenship, the enemies of permanent union during these recent 
years, have tried to bring to the United States - to prevent the statehood 
movement from bringing their positive message about the goodness of 
statehood. (2011: 9) 
 
PIP legislator:  He lives and is elected in statehood.  And in Puerto Rico, 
hypocritically, as the resolution very well states, he alleges to be an 
independentista... But I still recognise his right as a Representative to make his 
statements. (2011: 9) 
 
PNP #2:  He lobbies more for the rights of [Latino] immigrants than for the right 
of his Puerto Rican brothers to select their political destiny and have the same 
option and opportunity that he had when he made his personal plebiscite and 
decided to reside in Chicago. (2011: 12) 
 
PNP #3:  And the [Puerto Rico] Law Association, the leadership, they’re anti-
Americans that defend socialism and communism - that's what they do, and 
they want to bring independence through the back door.42 (2011: 15) 
 
 
                                                        
42 This is a translation of the Puerto Rican political phrase traer la independencia por la cocina - 
literally, to bring independence through the kitchen.  It refers to the PNP's suspicion that Puerto 
Rican lawyers and intellectuals are constantly looking for ways to achieve Puerto Rican 






Chapter 4 noted that the extreme polarisation of the three main parties 
around the status issue obscures the reality that they do not share coherent 
political views beyond it.  The debate on Resolution 21 in Guaynabo would 
appear to manifest this.  Status has become entangled with governance in a way 
that clearly reflects critiques about the predominance of status over 
understandings of politics and the political in Puerto Rico (Pabón, 2007: 69; 
Meléndez, 1991: 127; Hernandez Colón, 1998: 112).  Figure 6.11 reveals how 
the hegemony of the status question has precluded a coherent, focused 
discussion of the topic at hand: whether Gutiérrez’s specific expressions in 
Congress should be repudiated or were justified.  The actual debate that took 
place did not consider the extent to which Puerto Rico was facing a “human and 
civil rights crisis” – the very accusation that Resolution 21 claimed had 
“offended and humiliated all Puerto Ricans” (2011: 7).  Instead it resulted in a 
one-sided recital of hegemonic pro-statehood discourse. 
It should be noted that municipal resolutions, and the debate around 
them, are ultimately inconsequential.  Merely expressive in nature, they are 
unable to enact change over issues that go beyond the jurisdiction of the 
municipality.  Moreover, resolutions form only a small proportion of all laws 
dealt with in the legislatures.   Therefore, while the example above shows how 
municipal legislatures are known on occasion to become sites for the 
reproduction of status discourse, these moments would appear to be both 
infrequent and insignificant.  This section now turns to consider the influence of 
status positions on ordinances, which constitute the vast majority of laws 




Unlike resolutions, which are temporary and relate to issues, policies or 
events beyond the municipality, ordinances relate exclusively to the jurisdiction 
of the municipality and have “indefinite effectiveness” (OMB, 2012: 8).  





naming must be approved by the legislature through ordinances (OMB, 2012: 
22).   The previous chapter discussed the relationship of place naming in 
Guaynabo, Caguas and Lares to hegemonic status positions.  It is therefore 
appropriate to briefly investigate the relationship between the municipal 
slogans and the municipal legislatures.  The only slogan to have been approved 
in the municipal legislature was that of Caguas, making the slogans of Guaynabo 








Guaynabo City?  No, we never saw that here… But I would have opposed 
it, obviously.  (PDP legislator) 
 
It wasn't something planned where there was a staff meeting where 
Héctor said, 'from now we're calling it Guaynabo City'.  (PNP legislator) 
 
That came about as a result of an order I gave [to the municipal police 
department, redesigning the vehicles].  (Mayor) 
 
Caguas, Nuestro Nuevo País: 
 
Yes, Nuestro Nuevo País was approved, of course.  After all, the slogan is 
in our municipality's mission statement... The Gateways to the City, the 
Botanical Garden, of course we had ordinances for that… They came 
from the mayors’ office.  (PDP legislator) 
 
Lares, Ciudad de los Cielos Abiertos: 
 
No.  That was not brought to us.  No, we had no participation, neither 
the majority nor the minority, in the decision of that name.  It was 
something basically administrative.  (PNP legislator) 
 
The PPD would never have approved this in the legislature, ever.  
Supposedly the money [to build the structures] was donated, but no-
one knows who donated it.  Not even the majority.  (PDP legislator) 
 
It cannot be that whoever gets into power, in this case the mayor, has 
the right to decide how the town shall be known.  If I become mayor, I 
can decide that Lares is going to be the 'City of the Coca Cola Bottles'... 
Or, because I have a divine revelation, I can decide that now everyone 







The slogans of Guaynabo and Lares were never legislated upon.  These two 
cases therefore demonstrate the ultimate power that the mayors wield over 
both the executive and legislative wings of local government.  In particular, the 
Lares case illustrates the practical impossibility that a local politician could ever 
challenge the decisions of a mayor.  One of the minority PDP legislators drafted 
a resolution denouncing Pagán’s slogan, but it was not even considered for 
debate in the legislature.  The president of the legislature explains why: 
 
L: My colleagues in the PDP brought a resolution to me, so I 
 could present it in the session. And they included the 
 mayor aspart of the resolution… One of the statements 
 was, 'we order Roberto Pagan to remove the lettering'…  
 So I said OK, did you consult him?  When you present 
 resolutions, ordinance, you must consult the people you 
 include to check they’re in agreement with what you’re 
 saying…  How can he be opposed to something he  
 approved?  So I told them, you did it wrong.  You need to 
 correct this and bring it back. 
 
CE: Did they bring it back? 
 
L: No, they never brought it back.  (PNP legislator, Lares) 
 
 
The president erroneously claims that the legislator was required to consult 
with the mayor in order to obtain his consent to denounce his slogan in a 
resolution.  In reality she is protecting the mayor from being presented, even 
hypothetically, with a resolution for his signature that contradicts his own 
decision.  All approved actions of the legislature must be signed by the mayor in 
order to gain effectiveness.  This in practice restricts the actions of the 
legislature to approving the mayor’s policies, precluding the possibility of 
challenges to them.  The cases of Lares and Guaynabo therefore illustrate how 
Puerto Rico’s mayors are able to exercise their absolute local political power to 
make decisions informed by individual concerns. 
The majority of ordinances and resolutions dealt with by the municipal 
legislatures are not related to the status question.  Indeed, the examples of its 





that status positions rarely surface in the routine practices of the municipal 
legislatures.  As the presidents of the Lares and Guaynabo legislatures explained 
to me, ordinances are never related to status, while its appearance in 
resolutions is rare: 
 
L: You’re asking if we’ve talked about statehood?  No.  We 
 have not touched that issue… 
 
CE:  Or status in any wider sense. 
 
L: No.  Because what we do is approve laws, they’re called 
 ordenanzas, which have to do with the town and will 
 benefit the people.  They have to be included in the agenda 
 to be discussed in the legislature.  Even if I wanted to talk 
 about something else, like status, I would have to say it off 
 the record.  We can’t talk about anything that’s not in this 
 agenda.  And basically, this agenda up to now, the only 
 thing we’ve done is approve or discuss issues that are 




G:  If our decisions are ever based on our [statehood] ideal?  
 Is that what you’re referring to? 
 
CE:   Yes. 
 
G:   I have to tell you that in the vast majority, no.  I can’t say 
 100%.  What is to do with public politics, ordinances, to do 
 with projects and legislation for the town?  No.  But in our 
 case, distinct from the administration, the executive, we  
 are a political body… So when we present resolutions, then 
 you’ll get to see partisan politics. 
 
 
Here the presidents draw an important distinction between ‘public politics’ and 
‘partisan politics’ in the legislature.  Public politics relates specifically to 
ordinances – proposals for improving the town, solving problems and raising 
quality of life.  By contrast, partisan politics is understood to relate to 
resolutions.  As previously discussed, resolutions connect to partisan issues 
such as status exactly because they are extra-municipal in scope.  This implies 





partisan.  As such, a locally-focused public politics would have the potential to 
overcome partisan political issues, such as status, which only become relevant 
at greater scales.  Because the presidents insist that the vast majority of their 
work deals with public politics over partisan politics, the status question is 
considered to be irrelevant to the municipal legislature: 
 
That [status] is something that isn’t even in our daily 
considerations.  And I can tell you that as a member of a caucus of 
thirteen members of the same party, that before coming to the 
floor, we meet to discuss all the projects.  And never, in the six 
years I’ve been here, has a project of public politics been 
discussed from a point of view of political status.  Absolutely not.  





This chapter has explored the relationship between the structural 
dominance of the status question and everyday politics in three Puerto Rican 
municipalities.  It considered the ways in which positions on the status question 
are entangled with specifically local priorities through exercises of power in the 
two key components of the municipal structure: the executive and the 
legislature.  While the everyday politics of the municipal executives were found 
to be significantly entangled with status issues, the municipal legislatures were 
not, since the vast majority of decisions taken here were not affected by status 
positions.  In the executives the mayors are seen to exercise their local powers 
according to ideologies and logics of decision-making that are not 
hegemonically dictated by status positions.  However, that these practices and 
frameworks may, nonetheless, be traced to status positions indicates that the 
mayors exercise power ambiguously to thread local and central ideological 
positions together.  The entangled performances of local state power create a 
complicated empirical terrain of effects that do not simply reproduce 






For example, in Guaynabo the executive strategies of gating and 
paternalism would appear to manifest pro-statehood discourse.  However, 
attempts to emphasise the closeness of Puerto Rico to the United States bring 
into focus everyday resistances to federal state rules and problematic linguistic 
differences between the island and mainland.  In Caguas, municipal practices 
might appear to reproduce certain aspects of hegemonic PDP discourse, such as 
cultural nationalism.  However, the mayor has exercised decentralised powers 
to advance a soberanista status agenda that contends against the hegemonic 
status position of his own party, which defends the Commonwealth status quo.  
Moreover, Caguas shows that the exercise of fully decentralised political power 
has the potential to seriously complicate the status question itself by subverting 
its logics of central state building, possibly even achieving postcolonial effects 
beyond it.  Lares is perhaps the municipality that is least entangled with status 
positions.  Its everyday practices most clearly reflect the clientelistic strategies 
of administrators to hold on to state power within the current system rather 
than change it as per their status positions.  Nonetheless, the status debate still 
holds some relevance here, since the prospect of any status change would have 
significant implications for public finances in a municipality that is so 
dependent on the central state.  The significance of these findings for 
transforming the terms and significance of the status question is discussed in 










 This final analysis chapter attempts to consider the potential of critique 
developed in Chapters Four, Five and Six – about status positions and their 
relationship to everyday politics – to transform the terms and significance of the 
Puerto Rican status question.  The first two sections contend that practices of 
municipal politics in Puerto Rico mount conceptual and practical challenges to 
the salience of formal political status.  Conceptually, everyday political work 
taking place in certain Puerto Rican municipalities subverts the ontological 
scales that constitute the status question.  Namely, a debate that is (in its 
current framing) about central state building and the nation-state is 
fundamentally challenged by the processes of decentralisation and globalisation 
that are evident at the municipal scale.  Practically, the performance of 
decentralised power in autonomous municipalities has created a series of 
effects that only a status resolution is supposed to make possible, according to 
dominant political discourses in Puerto Rico.  These effects include sovereignty, 
elevated standards of living, and decolonisation.  The chapter therefore suggests 
that practices of politics in the municipalities bring into view not the “question 
of status”, but rather, the “status of the question” (Negrón-Muntaner, 2007: 1). 
 The third section explores how municipal practices demonstrate the 
possibility of alternative paradigms for Puerto Rican politics, with the potential 
to ultimately displace the structural and discursive dominance of status.  
Specifically, municipal politics displays the possibilities of cross-partisan 
cooperation aimed at resolving everyday problems that impede the quality of 
life of Puerto Ricans in concrete local settings.  The work that Puerto Rican 
politicians perform in pursuit of this goal - raising quality of life through local 
exercises of power - has gone ignored by the vast majority of literature on 
Puerto Rican politics, which prefers to focus on the status question.  The fourth 
section discusses the political significance of these findings.  Specifically, the 





agendas that are evident in performances of local state power would suggest 
that status still matters, in spite of attempts to leave it behind.  This said, 
municipal politics is adversely affected by numerous alternative forms of 
partisan political behaviour that do not relate to status directly, but rather, to 
other structural aspects of Puerto Rican political culture.  The chapter therefore 
concludes that it is the resolution of these issues - not status - that represents 
the most immediate opportunity for improving Puerto Rican democracy. 
 
7.2 Conceptual challenges to status: globalisation and 
 decentralisation 
 
The Puerto Rican municipalities are able to challenge the conceptual 
relevance of the status question by undermining the scalar unit upon which it is 
ontologically based: the central state.  This takes place through the dual 
processes of globalisation and decentralisation.  Chapter 4 explained how status 
is, ultimately, a question about nationalism and central state building.  However, 
the possession of decentralised political power gives municipal actors the 
potential - should they choose to exercise it - to overcome the shortcomings of 
the central state by performing kinds of politics that go beyond it.  In so doing 
municipal actors would in effect bypass the ontological scalar unit that is 
encased in all status positions – the central state – and thereby overcome, in 
theory, the status question itself.  Autonomous municipalities possess power 
that asks serious questions of the political scale on which the status question is 
founded.  
Caribbean nation-states presently face a series of 'existential threats' 
(Girvan, 2011) in the form of global economic, social, cultural and 
environmental pressures that undermine their viability and territorial integrity.  
Globalisation is broadly understood as a contemporary process involving a 
notable increase in the geographical scale, volume and velocity of transnational 
interactions (Held et al, 1999).  These interactions undermine the viability and 





it or with the significantly decreased intervention of the central state.  
Government and national state sovereignty – in other words, the power to take 
decisions in a national territory - are therefore being rescaled in response to 
discourses of globalisation and neoliberalism in the region (Sheller, 2009).  In 
this context the “persistent statism” (Newstead, 2009: 158) of Caribbean nation-
states has been overcome, and the predominance of regional and transnational 
institutions over governance in the Caribbean has rendered independence 
“largely shambolic and economic sovereignty an illusion" (Girvan, 2011: 21). 
In Puerto Rico, Pabón (2007) argues that globalisation renders the status 
question a ‘nonsense dilemma’exactly because it challenges the tropes of 
national and state sovereignty that are fundamental to all status positions.  
Assuming a centred view of power (Allen, 2004), all aspire to strengthen the 
central state in one or another form (Picó, 2007).  However, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the Autonomous Municipalities Act assigns to the 
municipalities significant powers which, if exercised, challenge the central state 
by enabling direct policy responses to globalisation.  The most important power 
in this regard is the power to establish municipal corporations, which are run 
with minimal interference from the central state.  Caguas’ model of democratic 
governance was set up to harness these very powers to prepare the city for the 
globalised ‘knowledge economy’ with its municipal corporations INTECO and 
C3TEC.  Indeed, two of the city’s most important executives are well aware that 
globalisation undermines state sovereignty:    
 
In this new world order, cities, companies, non-governmental 
organisations and citizens are called upon to assume roles that 
had been assigned to States from the second decade of the 20th 
century.  The city of Caguas understood this process many years 
ago, and changed the traditional way of doing things in 
government.  (Miranda Marín, in Municipio Autónomo de Caguas, 
2005: 4) 
 
We see how countries configure themselves in economic blocs,  
 delimiting internal aspects inherent to their national sovereignty 
 in the name of new opportunities and the common good. (Jaime 
 Morales, Director of Economic Development; in Caguas la Revista, 





The power of central states in the Caribbean is further brought into 
question by a growing consensus, in both independent and non-independent 
societies, of the pivotal role of decentralisation in governance practices (Benn 
and Hall, 2003).  Decentralisation is considered an effective response to the 
broader, global crisis of the nation-state as a political unit (López Pumarejo, 
1998).  One symptom of this crisis, besides globalisation, is the decreasing 
responsiveness of central states to the “needs of the citizenry at the local level” 
(1998: 4).  If this is the case, it is not clear, conceptually, how a recentralisation 
of the state as per a status resolution would improve the lives of Puerto Ricans 
in concrete settings.  This doubt is seemingly confirmed by the experiences of 
poverty in formally postcolonial Caribbean societies (Grosfoguel, 1997: 70). 
In Puerto Rico, the 1991 Autonomous Muncipalities Act was passed as a 
direct challenge to the central state.  As Chapters 5 and 6 indicated, its mandate 
of decentralisation has minimised the involvement of the central state in local 
affairs and granted mayors extensive powers over municipal space.  For the 
same reason, the Act might also challenge the status question.  Its author, 
former PDP governor Rafael Hernández Colón, notes that “central government 
no longer works efficiently.  If guided by the principle of centralisation, no 
reorganisation of our government will restore effective government” 
(Hernández Colón, 2006a: 29).  This is a veiled way of saying that the status 
question, which proposes a state-centric reorganisation of government, is a 
fundamentally flawed mechanism for solving the problems of Puerto Ricans.  By 
comparison, the logic of decentralisation holds that people’s problems are best 
resolved from the scale at which they are experienced: the local.  Executive 
directors in both Guaynabo and Caguas noted that the key to their achievements 
is the ability to bypass the central government in delivering services and solving 
problems: 
 
With El Nuevo País… he [Miranda Marín] really wanted to 
distinguish Caguas, so that every time you hear that name, you 
know it’s Puerto Rico.  You don’t say Caguas, Puerto Rico; you just 
say Caguas.  In that way, I think he tried to make Caguas an 





That was his intention… but it’s difficult to do it.  (Director, 
External Resources, Caguas) 
 
Both mayors [O’Neill and Miranda Marín] fought the state.  
Because when you're a mayor and believe in what your city can 
do, and the people of your city can do, and you know you can do 
better work than the state, you will fight the state till the final 
drop.  They both believed they could do better than the state.  And 
they proved it.  Because they said, we are here, and you are there. 
You are seeing the whole island as one. And you forget that there 
are some little things in the municipality that you can't deal with 
because you don't see it.  You have to come over.  (Director of 
Federal Affairs, Guaynabo) 
 
Cities are pivotal actors in current discussions about the rescaling of 
sovereignty beyond central states in global and decentralised contexts (Leitner 
et al, 2007).  Through decentralisation, Puerto Rico’s largest cities have become 
new sites of power with international and global scope.  The idea of the ‘city-
state’ has gained currency in Caguas (Caguas la Revista, 2010: 20), where the 
administration envisages a municipality with sovereignty over its territory 
internally and the capacity to engage in international relations externally 
(Hansen, 2000).  As indicated in the last chapter, Caguas participates in a series 
of international organisations of city and local governments, entirely without 
the involvement of the central state.  The PDP Mayors’ Association even has a 
detailed international relations policy43, which includes the following points: 
 
-To promote the Puerto Rican municipality in international, 
intergovernmental and municipal organisations, with the purpose 
of incentivising commercial exchange, attracting investment, 
tourism and international cooperation. 
-To serve as a link between national and municipal foreign 
governments and the Puerto Rican municipality. 
-To combat international isolation in Puerto Rico. 
-To promote the principles of governmental decentralisation and 
municipal autonomy as a way to construct a more democratic 
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participate in international forums of local government.  This is presumably because it is a pro-
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mayors of PNP-controlled cities with populations greater than 50,000 join the US Conference of 





society in Puerto Rico and the world.  ‘A model of State and 
Government: the City State’.  (Asociación de Alcaldes, 2013) 
 
Conceptually, local autonomy presents cities with the power to conduct ‘para-
diplomacy’ (Baldacchino, 2006: 860) involving separate representation in a 
variety of international and regional organisations.  This potential is 
acknowledged by the incumbent president of the Mayors’Association, who 
states: “We look to encourage an international culture in Puerto Rico… It is the 
Puerto Rican municipality, and not the central government, that has assumed 
the role of internationalising the country” (Asociación de Alcaldes, 2011).  
However, it is not clear whether para-diplomacy contradicts, or compliments, 
the stated goals of independentistas and PDP soberanistas to achieve national 
sovereignty at the level of the central state.  As Baldacchino (2006: 860) puts it, 
“in the world of island jurisdictions, para-diplomacy is one of the advantages of 
autonomy without sovereignty”. 
 Cities are becoming increasingly responsible for coordinating policy 
responses to neoliberal globalisation.  Leitner et al (2007: 2) contend that 
globalisation “has emphasised the supra- and subnational scales, ‘hollowing out’ 
the nation-state and making cities increasingly responsible for realising 
international competitiveness”.  The Caguas administration acknowledges this 
in its 2005-8 Strategic Plan, where it sets out a number of principal challenges 
for governance in terms of the failure of the central state to make Puerto Rico 
competitive and responsive to global change: 
 
-The loss of the country’s competitiveness, high electricity costs 
[set by the central state’s public electricity corporation], and a 
costly and inefficient central government. 
-A social culture that promotes dependence on government 
assistance. 
-Uncertainty in the relation between central government and 
municipal government under possible political scenarios. 
-The unpredictable events of globalisation.  (Municipio Autónomo 
de Caguas, 2005: 10) 
 
According to Miranda Torres, the city has displaced the central state as 





issues.  In this view, cities and local governments now assume leading roles in 
international relations because “new global challenges, such as climate change 
and the crises of energy and food production” (Miranda Torres, 2011: 3) occur 
beyond the nation-state scale.  Given that central states and nation-states have 
proven themselves unable to resolve these challenges, cities and local 
governments have risen to assume a “leading role in the coming together of 
nations” (Asociación de Alcaldes, 2013).  The mayors of the PDP therefore 
believe that Puerto Rico’s international relations should leave behind issues of 
state sovereignty in favour of a better focus on strategies for local development 
and quality of life.  Regarding the status question, Miranda Torres thus suggests 
that the city, not the central state, should become the principal unit for new 
discussion of political relations between Puerto Rico and the United States: 
 
I think any change in political relations between the United States 
and Puerto Rico must depart from the recognition of local issues 
and be oriented towards achieving a democracy that is more 
direct and consistent with the people. (Miranda Torres, 2011: 8)  
 
This highlights the importance, and possibility, of a shift in the focus and terms 
of current debate on Puerto Rican status.  In essence, Miranda Torres argues 
that the discussion should move towards a much clearer understanding of the 
opportunities and risks of different ideas about reorganising the central state 
for cities, municipalities, communities and citizens. 
 
7.3  Practical challenges to status: sovereignty effects, quality of life 
 and decolonisation 
 
The section above contended that the autonomous municipalities have 
the potential, through possessing decentralised power, to overcome the status 
question by working beyond the ontological scales that constitute it – the 
central state and nation-state.  This section considers the implications of the 
decisions taken in certain municipalities to put these powers to practice.  It 





ironically created a series of performative effects that only a status resolution is 
supposed to make possible, according to dominant political discourses in Puerto 
Rico.  These effects include national sovereignty, significant improvements to 
quality of life, and decolonisation.  By appropriating and then realising many of 
the goals of the status question, municipal autonomy therefore mounts a serious 
challenge to the practical salience of status. 
Newstead (2005) notes how nation-states of the English-speaking 
Caribbean perform and produce their national sovereignty through 
participation in international and regional agreements.  In a global context of 
practically diminished national sovereignty, “these practices all work to imagine 
a sovereign state into existence and make it appear more real” (2005: 50).  
Likewise, consistent with its ‘city-state’ vision, Caguas has exercised municipal 
power to perform in practice one of the most salient effects of national 
sovereignty: international relations.  Caguas’ mayor Miranda Torres explained 
this to me in emphatic terms, referring to decentralisation as a “key” that “opens 
a door to the world”:  
 
We’ve made various alliances with countries at the international 
level – with Central America, North America, Brazil, Colombia, 
even the West, Spain, Israel, Germany.  And then you realize that 
from your city, you’ve managed to do things that you weren’t able 
to do as a country!  You found a key to open a door to the world, 
and the things that are a little more difficult for you to get as a 
country, well, as a city, we did it.  With rice and willpower!  
(Interview, Mayor, Caguas) 
 
 
Ironically, according to independentista or even PDP soberanista status positions, 
this might problematise the imperative of realising these changes at the central 
scale.  Miranda Marín argued before his party leadership that 
 
[t]he scenario of globalisation and new global and regional 
tendencies point to the reality that the only viable, effective and 
potentially successful way for us to position ourselves as a 
prosperous, vibrant and productive nation, is to change our 
political condition.  And that change corresponds inevitably to 





returning to competitiveness.  Within Commonwealth there is no 
space for that.  (Miranda Marín, 2010: 2) 
 
 
The enormous success of his model of democratic governance in Caguas 
complicates this argument.  Namely, a change in Puerto Rico’s political 
condition would not appear to be absolutely necessary to guarantee its 
prosperity and productivity, nor to respond to global economic challenges.  This 
would especially be the case if the Caguas model were to be successfully 
reproduced in other parts of the island.  The impressive achievements of Caguas 
appear to have been realised beyond, or in spite of, Puerto Rico’s continued 
territorial condition as a Commonwealth of the United States. 
The previous section noted that decentralisation has become a 
fundamental political tool for securing the wellbeing of Puerto Rican citizens.  
The status question might, therefore, be practically complicated by the power 
exercises of autonomous municipalities which have brought about significant 
improvements to quality of life within the framework of the existing 
relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States.  The effects of such 
power challenge the argument made by all advocates of status change that 
Puerto Rican problems can only be addressed effectively through the 
mechanism of the status question (Negrón-Muntaner, 2007: 15).  Work 
performed in Guaynabo and Caguas questions the embedded assumption of 
Puerto Rican political discourse that the island’s current status necessarily or 
absolutely limits the quality of life that its citizens can enjoy.  These cities 
challenge the hegemonic view that a strengthening, or at least modification, of 
the central state is a precondition for improving the wellbeing of Puerto Ricans.  
As Duchesne Winter (2007: 94) puts it, "status change is not a sufficient 
condition for a profound social transformation, and it is not even clear that it 
might be a necessary condition".  Power exercises in fully decentralised cities 
therefore have the potential to question the imperative of formal, state-centric 
decolonisation in Puerto Rico. 
For example, Guaynabo has experienced impressive socioeconomic 





the construction and taxation of high-income housing and supporting 
commercial and retail services, has generated year-on-year trade surpluses and 
the second largest municipal budget in Puerto Rico.  O’Neill proudly notes that 
this has been achieved in the context of an economic crisis at the level of central 
government:  
 
When I offered my Budget Messagein May 2008, I felt a sensation 
of trumph – the triumph of Guaynabo, not my own – upon 
announcing a budget for the fiscal year 2008-9 that had grown to 
$141.8 million.  That this had happened during moments in which 
the general economy of Puerto Rico and the Central Government 
confronted one of its worst economic crises of all time, must be 
considered a feat of public administration…  
 
To have achieved it during moments in which the Central 
Government registered considerable reductions in tax collections, 
and basic services for the people, like education, health and 
housing were being limited, and the prices of products of greatest 
necessity, like water and electricity, suffered constant increases, 
was also a feat of public administration… 
 
Today, looking back over the past, I reiterate something I have 
said before, and I say it now with much pride and humility: ‘I 
always dreamed to see my town walk by its own efforts.  But I 
never thought I’d be a part of that process.’  (O’Neill, In Quiñones 
Calderón, 2009: 99) 
 
 
O’Neill’s evident pride at the achievements of his city in securing 
economic independence from the central government would appear to 
contradict his own self-deprecating assessment that Puerto Rico needs 
statehood centrally because “we don’t have anything”44.  As discussed in the last 
chapter, O’Neill has used decentralised power to provide residents with a 
standard of living and services, in his view, “as if it were a state”.  It is significant 
that he has achieved this while Puerto Rico continues to be a Commonwealth.  
At the scale of Guaynabo, the provision of a quality of life to US standards might 
complicate the case for formally realising statehood at the centre, since certain 
                                                        





statehood effects have already been realised here.  Caguas’ PNP legislator 
provided an excellent summary of the statehood argument: 
 
For us, patria45 and freedom is that our children have rights.  That 
they can vote in the elections every four years.  That they have 
open schools, medicines, doctors in the hospitals, shoes, food, and 
a roof.  The American flag gives us the right to have everything the 
Americans have.  The American Dream.  The true patria is the 
wellbeing of the family, of the people.  (PNP legislator, Caguas) 
 
Evidently, for statehooders decolonisation is largely about guaranteeing the 
social welfare of the poor according to US standards through increased 
government assistance.  Given that the poor of Guaynabo are catered for in 
exactly this way by O’Neill’s existing municipal welfare programs, it is possible 
to argue that they have been decolonised in practice according to one of the key 
criteria of hegemonic statehood discourse. 
Remarkably, the outcomes of decentralised power exercises in Caguas 
are consistent with multiple new theories of decolonisation that have emerged 
from postcolonial experiences in the English-speaking Caribbean.  The “mirage” 
(Ramphal, 2009: i) of formal state sovereignty has prompted searches for 
decolonisation beyond the state.  Specifically, the endurance of multiple colonial 
legacies after formal independence has led to a proliferation of non-state-
centric ideas about reversing the region's continued cultural, economic and 
epistemic dependency on the metropolitan world (Girvan, 2006).  The model of 
democratic governance in Caguas presents a wealth of evidence to support 
these theories.   
First, it responds to Girvan’s (2010) call for an ‘epistemic sovereignty’ or 
mental decolonisation founded on a belief in the power of local ideas and action 
to break colonial systems of thought.  In this regard Miranda Marín spoke of 
“active participation as antidotes to the venom of the welfare mentality, 
conformity and the colonised spirit” (Miranda Marín, 2009: 25-6).  Second, its 
strong emphasis on national culture reflects Meeks’ (2003: 176) and 
                                                        
45Patria means ‘homeland’, ‘motherland’ or ‘fatherland’.  In the context of the status question it 





Nettleford’s (1978: 61) understanding of cultural decolonisation as a means of 
fostering individual self-esteem, and belief in a collective self, as the basis for 
local economic development strategies to counter metropolitan dependency.  
Indeed, Miranda Torres explains that national solidarity forms the foundation 
for all of Caguas’ projects:  “building upon our recognition of the cultural values 
of criollismo, we formulate our strategic visions for democratising technology, 
human development, multisectoral alliances, sustainability and local economic 
development” (2011: 6). 
Third, its emphasis on participation mirrors wider thoughts of Caribbean 
writers on decentralisation and participatory governance as optimal ways to 
decolonise political cultures.  Miranda Marín’s (2009: 10) attempt to “displace 
the handout mentality” of Puerto Ricans resonates with Gonsalves’ (2003: 5) 
assessment that restructured, non-state-centric forms of governance overcome 
a situation where “the lowest common denominator of the people’s instincts or 
inferior passions drive public discourse or public policy”.  Ultimately, Miranda 
Marín understood local participation as a form of freedom: 
 
We do not promote dependence…  On the contrary, we promote 
self-management, which for us is freedom – to give freedom to 
citizens; freedom of conscience because no opportunisitic, corrupt 
politician can deceive a self-sufficient and free citizen.  (Miranda 
Marín, 2010: 7) 
 
The decision-making model in Caguas realises Nettleford’s (2003) vision of a 
‘political culture of partnership’ between government, private sector and 
communities.  This, he contends, is the “way forward” for governance in 
Caribbean nation-states where the “statism” (2003: 589) associated with the 
socialist ideology of postwar decolonisation movements has given way since the 
1990s to the deeper involvement of private and third sector actors in decision-
making and development strategies.  That Caguas has reached this same 
conclusion without first passing through a formal, island-wide status resolution 
might challenge the relevance of asking the status question at all. 
 The implementation of participatory democracy in Caguas appears to 





the Caribbean - notably, Anglophone countries (Pelling, 1998; 1999; Pugh, 
2003; 2006).  These approaches have been criticised for their generic and 
context-neutral implementation, defined by a "narrow and limited discourse... 
[and] a reduced ability to reflect the true cultural diversity of the region" (Pugh 
and Potter, 2003: 17).  By comparison, Caguas evidently places great conceptual 
emphasis on Puerto Rican national culture as the basis for local participatory 
strategies.  While local and national political elites have, in Anglophone contexts, 
appropriated participatory discourses to build up and recentralise their own 
governing powers (Pelling, 1999; Pugh, 2006), a more in-depth study of Caguas' 
model of participatory democracy might investigate the possibility of a similar 
dynamic in Puerto Rico. 
In appearance, however, developments in Caguas also match up with 
recent attempts by Puerto Rican intellectuals to theorise the island’s 
decolonisation beyond traditional status politics.  Caguas directly responds to 
Laó-Montes’ (2008: 15) proposal for a "new politics of decolonisation" in which 
power is fluid and able to "link local, national and global processes”.  The 
exercise of decentralised power in Caguas joins the local in the form of 
participatory democracy, the national in terms of culture, and the global 
through measures geared towards securing neoliberal competitiveness.  The 
city therefore resonates with Grosfoguel’s (2008: 6) call for a move away from 
state-centric forms of decolonisation, which merely validate the aspirations of 
existing colonial elites to dominate positions in the new state apparatus, and 
Flores’ (2000: 38) similar critique of the “obligatory teleology of state power” 
encased in dominant discourses of decolonisation.   
In sum, the work performed in Caguas creates postcolonial effects.  As 
Jacobs (1996: 161) explains, the postcolonial “is not so much about being 
beyond colonialism as about attending to the social and political processes that 
struggle against and work to unsettle the architecture of domination established 
through imperialism”.  Evidently, the model of democratic governance in Caguas 
is strongly geared towards the destabilisation, and reversal, of multiple aspects 





postcolonialism via non-state-centric decolonisation, in the process bypassing 
the status question and the hegemonic discourses that underpin it. 
 
7.4 The parallel politics of Puerto Rico 
 
The previous two sections have indicated that the Puerto Rican status 
question, in its present state-centric framing, is conceptually and practically 
challenged by exercises of power in the municipalities.  This section expands 
upon one of the key conclusions of the previous chapter: that party political 
status positions are, to a degree, overcome in the everyday politics of the 
municipalities.  While status is structurally dominant in Puerto Rican party 
politics, many of the political decisions taken in the municipalities studied do 
not appear to be affected by this structure.  Rather, the everyday practices of 
municipal political decision-making bring into clearer focus the existence of a 
parallel paradigm for Puerto Rican politics – one based on cross-partisan 
cooperative efforts to solve everyday problems impeding the quality of life of 
Puerto Ricans in concrete settings.  Following Negrón-Muntaner (2007: 14), this 
may be theorised as a “politics of small problems”.  While a cause for optimism, 
it has gone ignored or unnoticed by the vast majority of literature on formal 
Puerto Rican politics, which instead focuses on the divisions of status. 
Negrón-Muntaner’s (2007: 15) “politics of small problems” recognises 
the political agency of Puerto Ricans to organise themselves beyond dominant 
discourses in the pursuit of concrete political goals and improvements to daily 
life.  A non-nationalist form of politics, it is about producing "more enabling 
narratives of self and community by seeing through the core assumption that 
political identities are based on national specificity or legal precedent" (2007: 
13).  It reflects Gil’s (1994: 102) earlier attempt to forge a new theory of Puerto 
Rican citizens whose capacity for political action is not limited to status options 
but framed, more crucially, by “recognisable interests in their more or less 
immediate perimeter”.  “In other words”, Gil (1994: 102) explains, “mayors who 





votes than those that promise Liberty and National Sovereignty.  Terms like 
independence, truth, sovereignty, statehood… have very probably lost their 
signifying capacity for our context of messages” (1994: 102). 
A politics of small problems overcomes the status question by rejecting a 
state-centric account of power.  "By invoking smallness", Negrón-Muntaner 
(2007: 15) explains, "I am ultimately parodying the still-dominant idea that only 
when the "big" problems of nation-building, state founding, and/or capitalist 
"development" are solved, will "the people" be liberated... A politics of small 
problems is the opposite of a traumatized politics based on national identity".  
Again this resonates with Gil’s (1994) earlier critique of the status debate, 
which he argues is comprised of empty signifiers that do not connect to the 
material politics of everyday issues.  Taking aim at the independentista 
discourse of national liberation, he argues that it creates a “discursive plug” that 
is “incompatible with the development of microfoundational and discrete 
strategies at a regional level (which must have specific, realisable, reachable 
ends, and offer a greater degree of equity and happiness in microcosmic 
settings)" (1994: 100).  In his view, therefore, decentralisation is fundamental to 
a non-state-centric politics of small problems: "imagine, then, an administrative 
conception of power in terms of certain “places” that have to be covered, 
because the place of True Power, the national state, has been vacated” (1994: 
100).  In sum, there is a strong case for Puerto Rican intellectuals to take local 
politics seriously.  In Gil’s (1994: 102) view the “small problems, the daily, 
micro-foundational conflicts of life” actually present a “more difficult encounter” 
than the status question, exactly because they require a shift away from the 
discursive realm towards “delimited action within well-defined and contained 
parameters” (1994: 102). 
Encouragingly, evidence from Guaynabo and Caguas would suggest that 
such politics is already taking place in the municipalities.  First, there is broad 
acceptance that the status debate, in its present form, is currently stuck 
between partisan disagreements at the central scale and Congressional 






The people of Puerto Rico as a collective have become used to the 
fact that this doesn’t have a solution.  Because we’ve tried 
everything… armed struggle, civil disobedience, the electoral 
struggle, the vote, plebiscites, asking for plebiscites in US 
Congress… Everything has failed.  (PIP legislator, Guaynabo) 
 
The US just isn’t interested.  They say, if it’s not broken don’t fix it.  
(PDP legislator, Lares) 
 
Status here, it doesn’t appear much.  Because each corner is aware 
that it will be resolved only when the leaders of our parties agree, 
and go to Congress together, to present their demands.  (PDP 
legislator, Caguas) 
 
However, accepting the dead-end of status, and the impossibility of resolving it 
from the municipal scale, frees up space for new forms of politics that do not 
exist at the central scale.  Namely, the concrete setting of municipal politics 
provides a foundation for cross-partisan cooperative efforts to solve everyday 
problems impeding the quality of life of Puerto Ricans. 
For example, minority parties often support the local ordinances and 
resolutions presented by the majority party.  As Guaynabo’s PIP legislator put it, 
“I vote in favour of 90% of the PNP’s ordinances and resolutions, because 
they’ve appeared good.  Or if not, then at least they don’t damage the town.”  
This tendency starkly contrasts with decision-making in the central legislature, 
where there is no tradition of bipartisan cooperation between majority and 
minority parties due to authoritarian party discipline and the caucus rule 
(Gándara-Sánchez, 2013: 2).  Further, the primacy of quality of life issues in 
municipal politics is underscored by the phenomenon of mixed voting, whereby 
voters back different parties on their central and municipal ballots (Rivera Ortiz 
et al, 1991: 181).  While the electorate tends to choose candidates on the central 
ballot according to their status preferences (Barreto, 2000a), local voting 
behaviour is driven by specifically local considerations – namely, the 
performance of the mayor: 
 
At the municipal level, there aren’t many issues relating to that 
difference [status preference]… In Guaynabo there’s a lot of 





who want Puerto Rico to remain as it is - or are PIP – who want 
Puerto Rico to be independent – vote for their party’s candidate at 
the state level, but at the municipal level, they vote for our mayor, 
from our party, who’s spent 16 years in the city hall and has really 
served everyone equally well.  (PNP legislator, Guaynabo)  
 
Politics, everybody knows that we’re statehooders.  But Héctor’s 
the mayor that gets the most votos mixtos.  Because the moment 
you come through the front door on the first floor, and into any 
office, we have to give you services.  Doesn’t matter who you are 
or what you wish Puerto Rico was.  You came here because you 
need something – maybe we can help you.  (Director of Federal 
Affairs, Guaynabo) 
 
 There is, therefore, a belief among local executives and legislators that 
municipal politics transcends what is understood as ‘partisan politics’.  Partisan 
politics in Puerto Rico relates to strategic decision-making to secure party 
political gain and control within the existing system of government (Anderson, 
1988).  This should be understood as distinct from status politics, which 
corresponds to political positions about changing this system (Meléndez, 1991).  
Many interviewees in the municipal executives regarded public administration 
as non-partisan and focused on the ‘common good’: 
 
In public politics, the mayor makes no distinction of ‘I’m only 
going to help the people of my party’.  If there’s someone in need, 
or needs a service, it’s provided without asking which party he 
belongs to.  If we fail the streets, we fail all the streets of the 
community.  We don’t say, that street is PDP, let’s leave it.  No.  In 
that sense, public politics at the municipal level has transcended 
the partisan politics that could exist.  (Director of Planning, 
Guaynabo) 
 
In the exercise of my responsibility, I will not take into account 
partisan colours nor ideological convictions, because need and 
pain have no colours.  (O’Neill, in Quiñones Calderón, 2009: 130) 
 
To me the best politics is a good job.  If you do your job, well done, 
you’re going to get the people’s vote.  (Director of Culture, 
Guaynabo) 
 
Moreover, Pérez (2010: 26) notes that in Caguas that “it is no secret that 





bonanza… There the line between PDPs, PNPs, autonomists and statehooders is 
almost imperceptible to issues such as the election of the mayor”.  Evidently, a 
‘politics of small problems’ has the potential to transcend both partisan and 
status politics. 
The potential of decentralised political power to challenge the dominant 
centred view of power in Puerto Rico is further illustrated by the bipartisan 
alliances and even friendships that have existed between mayors, who are 
responsible for administering the politics of small problems in different 
municipal territories.  Notably, the mayors of Guaynabo and Caguas enjoyed a 
great friendship while they transformed their municipalities.  O’Neill and 
Miranda Marín exchanged ideas for local governance, such as a municipal sales 
tax, and shared a strong belief in the principle of decentralisation, lobbying 
together for amendments to the Autonomous Municipalities Act in the central 
legislature.  O’Neill and Miranda Marín were also the presidents of their 
respective partisan mayoral organisations, the Federation of Mayors and 
Association of Mayors.  In a display of the salience of local power, they formed 
an important alliance that was instrumental in holding together a divided 
central government in 2004-08.  This was split between a PNP-controlled 
legislature and a PDP-controlled executive.  As O’Neill explains: 
 
We were key, as much in governmental as legislative decisions, as 
much Willie as myself, in ensuring that this country could be run 
during those four years…  Especially when they decided to shut 
the government down.  We met together frequently, and put 
ourselves on the frontline to resolve the situation, until we got 
them to open again.  We did what was best for the country first, 
before politics.  But when the ideological [status] moment arrives, 




7.5 The endurance of partisan politics in the municipalities 
 
While the status question, status positions and partisanship are 





affect municipal politics in a handful of ways.  While the politics of Caguas and 
Guaynabo demonstrate the possibility of cross-partisan consensus, it might 
therefore be overoptimistic to celebrate all municipalities as “beehives of 
democracy” (Hernández Colón, 2006a: 29).  These problems – clientelism, 
authoritarian party leadership and continued centralism – are not directly 
related to status.  Rather, they are manifestations of structural issues in Puerto 
Rican political culture that could be addressed through modest reforms.  Given 
the continued deadlock of formal political status, the resolution of these issues 
might represent the most immediate opportunity for improving Puerto Rican 
democracy. 
Despite the possibilities for transcending partisanship, the municipality 
remains a site of struggle for local political gain and control.  For example, 
Caguas’ minority PNP legislator clearly indicated that her primary motivation in 
her position was not to serve for the wellbeing of the municipality or legislate in 
a cooperative spirit, but to oust the incumbent PDP administration: 
 
Q:  Could you explain to me, what is your vision for Caguas?  What 
would you like to achieve for the municipality? 
 
A: [Responds instantly] Get a PNP mayor in here, with PNP 
legislators.  (PNP legislator, Caguas) 
 
Similarly, some local decision-makers perceive that incumbent municipal 
administrations strategically manage their local political control by paying less 
attention to neighbourhoods that are identified as supporters of the rival party, 
thereby conserving resources for other projects:  
 
A: I live in a middle-class area in Guaynabo.  He [O’Neill] hasn’t 
done anything for the area where I live – I think they think there 
are lots of people from the PDP there.  We’re trying to close off the 
area and get a gate.  90% of the community is in favour, but they 
won’t do it.  So I have to go and put alarms up.  People say he’s 
going to retire, but… 
 
Q: I think he plans to go four more years. 
 






As indicated in the last chapter, clientelistic practices are commonplace 
in municipal politics.  A change of party in the mayor’s office can result in far-
reaching changes to municipal personnel (Rabell, 1993).  Data collected in Lares 
suggested that local politics is particularly clientelistic in municipalities with 
very high government employment and low municipal autonomy.  
Unfortunately this describes the vast majority of Puerto Rico’s 78 municipalities, 
which are not formally autonomous and highly dependent on central 
government.  Clientelism is also widespread in central government (Rivera Ortiz 
et al, 1991: 180).  Arguably, the status question is therefore not transcended in 
non-autonomous municipalities, where the prospect of a bounty of federal 
funds to central offices under statehood, or their reduction or removal under a 
sovereign political status, would have important consequences for municipal 
budgets. 
Municipal partisanship is further deepened by the implementation of 
strict party discipline.  Municipal legislatures copy the central legislature in 
practicing the political institution of caucus (Cámara-Fuertes, 2009: 121).  The 
municipal caucus is a meeting in which majority legislators join with the mayor 
to fix a blanket voting position on the laws to be presented.  In practice the 
legislators rarely if ever defy the mayor’s wishes.  This stifles local democracy as 
the passage of any law requested or favoured by the mayor is all but 
guaranteeddue to his or her automatic numerical advantage of loyal majority 
legislators.  In this regard Lares’ minority PDP legislator noted that the primary 
responsibility of a majority legislator is to “always defend the public politics of 
the leader above”.  Likewise, party discipline precludes the passage of any law 
that might challenge the mayor’s position.  For example, in February 2011 
Guaynabo’s minority PIP legislator presented a resolution to condemn the 
continued imprisonment of an independentista activist, Oscar Lopez, after 30 
years of incarceration in the United States.  However:  
 
They [the PNP majority legislators] didn’t even consider it.  
Because they know the mayor has to sign it later, and they 
wouldn’t dare to vote in favour of it, for the mayor to say later, 





They know the resolution has merit as a humanitarian gesture.  I 
understand that they didn’t want to consider my resolution 
because they don’t want to see themselves in the sad position of 
voting against something that they know is meritorious and about 
justice, simply because the mayor wouldn’t want it, because the 
person in question is an independentista prisoner.  (PIP legislator, 
Guaynabo) 
 
It may also be argued that partisanship is entrenched in the municipal 
political structure.  Municipal legislators are not elected individually but rather 
in a general slate beneath the party candidate for mayor, who handpicks them 
(Picó, 2007: 27).  In effect, therefore, the head of the executive has the power to 
dominate all municipal affairs, including those of the legislature.  Moreover, by 
law majority legislators outnumber the minority typically by 11 to 3 (OMB, 
2012: 49), making real cross-partisan decision-making only possible in 
situations where minority legislators agree unconditionally with the majority 
position.  As Lares’ minority PDP legislator put it: 
 
As the minority, we can think what we want, but when we meet, 
it’s 11 versus 3.  To date, they haven’t passed a single resolution 
that we’ve presented…  But any project that the mayor of any 
town wants to present, his majority is going to approve it.  Forget 
about it.  There are very, very few municipalities where the 
majority is divided.  We can oppose and argue, but when we vote, 
we lose.  (PDP legislator, Lares) 
 
 Partisanship is crucial to the dynamic between municipal and central 
governments.  This is commonly evident in municipalities where the mayor and 
majority legislators belong to the party that is not in power centrally.  Reflecting 
on the case of Lares, the last chapter noted that this situation has profound 
effects for politics in municipalities with low autonomy and high dependence on 
central government support.  The wrong party in power centrally can severely 
limit budgets municipally.  Central government is also able to hinder projects in 
municipalities with maximum autonomy, such as Guaynabo and Caguas.  This 





independent of central government, in spite of their budget surpluses and city-
state visions. 
For example, efforts in Guaynabo to construct new social housing were 
disrupted by the central PDP administration of 2004-8, since they conflicted 
with a national policy for ‘special communities’ pioneered by the then governor 
Silá Calderón (Interview, PNP legislator, Guaynabo).  Likewise, Caguas’ plan for 
a train line between the municipality and the San Juan metropolitan area was 
blocked by the 2008-12 PNP administration, which favoured a priority bus lane 
for reducing traffic congestion (Miranda Torres, 2010: 7).  In sum, governance 
in Puerto Rico continues to be characterised by what the architect of the 
Autonomous Municipalities Act describes as a “centralist mentality” (Hernández 
Colón, 2006c: 25).  As such, he argues that further powers should be secured for 
the municipalities through the enshrinement of the principle of decentralisation 
in the Puerto Rican Constitution (Hernández Colón, 2006b: 27). 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that the status question is a structural filter 
through which all politics must necessarily pass.  Significantly, therefore, 
confusion sometimes results when two politicians from different parties – who 
occupy fundamentally different status positions – come to agree on the same 
domestic or local issue.  Ultimately, such confusion highlights the reality that the 
parties themselves do not clearly understand how they differ from one another 
in terms of political principles beyond status.  For example, in February 2011 
Guaynabo’s PIP legislator voted in favour of all ordinances to expropriate the 
inhabitants of an informal settlement in the Amelia sector of Guaynabo.  A full 
clearance of this coastal sector had been planned to make way for a waterfront 
development comprised of a mix of high-income and social housing (Gobierno 
Municipal Autonómo de Guaynabo, 2011: 7).  However, the majority legislators 
struggled to understand how the minority legislator, through voting in favour of 
the project, was not abandoning his status position but rather expressing his 
agreement as to its social advantages: 
 
They saw it as a contradiction.  They said to me, ‘hey, you’re 





‘look, there are philosophical differences between us.  But there 
are also philosophical differences between myself and other 
independentistas.  Here I believe in quality of life.  I don’t become 
any less patriotic because I favour a course of action or policy of a 
statehooder.  If it’s right, it’s right.  If it isn’t, it isn’t!  (PIP 
legislator, Guaynabo) 
 
This passage importantly indicates how status positions still hold in routine 
municipal political practices - even in the context of decisions that would appear 
to have nothing to do with them.  The fact that status issues are rarely if ever 
discussed directly in the routine practices of municipal politics (see the previous 
chapter) does not mean that status positions are irrelevant or fully transcended.  
Indeed, the entanglements of centrally prescribed status positions and local 
political agendas above suggests that status continues to matter, even if the 




 This chapter has argued that the Puerto Rican municipalities are sites of 
politics that transform the terms and significance of the Puerto Rican status 
question.  To a degree, the municipalities areable to subvert issues of 
nationalism and central state-building in the pursuit of alternative political 
agendas which forge more direct connections to the material politics of 
everyday settings.  Conceptually, autonomous municipalities challenge the 
relevance of status by problematising its ontological framing around the central 
state - a scale that is undermined by processes of decentralisation and 
globalisation.  Practically, the exercise of decentralised power in autonomous 
municipalities has created a series of performative, unexpected effects that only 
a status resolution is supposed to make possible, according to dominant 
political discourses in Puerto Rico.  By appropriating and then realising some of 
the purported goals of status, municipal power challenges the very salience of 
the question in practice.  These effects - sovereignty, elevated standards of living 
and decolonisation - have been achieved while Puerto Rico continues, formally, 





possible exactly because power is not simply held within a hierarchy of 
dominant and subordinate institutions, as per a centred view of power, but 
rather exercised in ways that enable decisions, and decision-makers, to cut 
across this hierarchy (Allen, 2004).  In reality, therefore, such positive effects 
have been achieved beyond Puerto Rico’s territorial status, and not within it. 
 Moreover, the (partial) overcoming of status presents opportunities for 
less divisive forms of political organisation and practice in local contexts.  
Optimistically, Caguas and Guaynabo demonstrate the possibility of a 'politics of 
small problems’ with a material and everyday focus on quality of life issues.  
Such politics presents the opportunity for a significant shift in the current focus 
and terms of the status debate.  The discussion, which at present is highly state-
centric, would surely benefit from fresh proposals that more clearly articulate 
the opportunities, challenges and risks of different ideas about reorganising the 
central state for cities, municipalities, communities and citizens.  Achieving a 
debate that is not state-centric but rather multiscalar – in other words, a 
dialogue that understands the importance and possibilities of local power - 
might ultimately lead to new forms of consensus to break the current deadlock 
of formal political status. 
While certain municipal political practices appear to leave the status 
question behind, the entanglements of local political priorities and status 
positions that are evident in other moments would suggest that status does still 
matter.  As such, performances of local state power in Puerto Rico have created 
a complicated empirical terrain of contradictory and varied effects vis-à-vis 
status.  Further, while partisan political practices are partially overcome in the 
municipalities, they still take place and cause significant problems.  
Manifestations of partisan politics - clientelism, authoritarian party leadership 
and continued centralism – are not directly related to status positions or the 
status question.  Rather, they reflect the more immediate struggles of political 
elites to dominate political power within the existing system.  Indeed, the 
strength and significance of partisanship in Puerto Rico might lend support to 





resolve the status question than they would claim (Pabón, 2007; Anderson, 
1988).  Partisanship reflects broader structural issues in Puerto Rican political 
culture which could be addressed through reform.  Given the continued 
deadlock of formal political status, and pending a new consensus around fresh 
terms, the resolution of these issues might represent the most immediate 
opportunity for improving Puerto Rican democracy.  Moreover, any attempt to 
counter institutional partisanship could only benefit the climate of status debate 



































This thesis is about the power of Puerto Rican political elites to establish 
the framework of political discourse, and to thereby control political power, in 
Puerto Rico.  Specifically, it has examined the processes through which the 
island’s status question has come to determine this framework, and considered 
the ways in which it is reinforced, modified, resisted and even overcome 
through exercises of power in everyday political settings.  Formal domestic 
politics is structured around three party political desires for an uncertain and 
unknowable postcolonial future, and not around any set of distinctive 
ideological positions for engaging with political issues in the present.  The thesis 
has used the status question as a device to consider the relationship between 
hegemonic political discourses and political practice in Puerto Rico, specifically 
investigating the relationship between status positions and everyday politics.  
Driving this enquiry was an interest to search for new ways to move beyond the 
impasse, or tranque, at which Puerto Rican status politics has arrived.  This 
began, necessarily, with an interrogation of the foundational concepts of the 
debate. 
 Chapter Two explained that the concepts of hegemony, discourse, 
performance and power are useful for understanding the Puerto Rican status 
question.  It noted how most scholars of Puerto Rico have contributed to the 
hegemony of status by rooting it in a dichotomy of two related discourses - 
colonialism and nationalism.  Moreover, it highlighted that the dominance of 
status has skewed understandings of the relationships between politics, scale 
and the state in Puerto Rico.  Indeed, most writings assume a state-centric view 
of power that privileges the scales of nation, state and nation-state as the 
containers of politics.  As such, it has become difficult to write about Puerto 
Rican politics without referencing, and reinforcing, the status question.  
Nonetheless, it was noted that the dominance of status has not, remarkably, 
been matched by empirical research into it.  What does exist does nothing to 
challenge the framework that it sets, nor the power relations that its hegemony 





relationship between status positions and everyday political practice reveals 
the dominant and largely unchallenged position of status in most accounts of 
Puerto Rican politics. 
 This study has attempted to fill a number of research gaps in the existing 
literature.  Progressive scholars of Puerto Rico have started to challenge the 
framework set by status through critiquing state-centric conceptions of political 
power and questioning the motives of the elites that construct and maintain it.  
Given that this exciting new work is mostly theoretical, the present thesis has 
attempted to provide some important empirical grounding.  Further, it has 
aimed to contribute to the small body of comparative literature about politics in 
non-independent Caribbean societies.  While this literature focuses on the 
continued salience of political status issues and state power, this thesis has 
called for new debate about the implications of debates about globalisation, 
decentralisation and the erosion of nation-state integrity for the relevance of 
the political status question itself.  Similarly, it contributes to discussion in 
critical Caribbean geographies about the effects of rescaling state sovereignty 
on political space in the region. 
Chapter Three argued that researching Puerto Rican politics presents 
significant epistemological challenges.  Namely, most existing approaches 
prioritise status, and the related discourses of colonialism and nationalism, as 
the definitive ways of framing the politics and experiences of the Puerto Rican 
people.  However, I attempted to approach Puerto Rico from a different mindset 
that would seek to interrogate, rather than uncritically foreground, the 
dominance of such discourses in order to develop a project that could work 
towards a new understanding of a currently deadlocked issue.  An important 
part of this mindset was my positionality as an ‘outsider’ to Puerto Rico.  A 
researcher from overseas, I favoured no one status option, and approached with 
caution the hegemonic elite and intellectual view that status necessarily eclipses 
all other politics on the island.  More specifically, as a white British scholar I was 
positioned advantageously within a regional Caribbean mindset that facilitated 





research strategy, involving extensive overseas fieldwork, cultural immersion 
and language learning, I arrived at a project to investigate the relationship 
between status positions and everyday politics in three municipalities: 
Guaynabo, Caguas and Lares. 
 To set up this investigation, the thesis first explained in Chapter Four 
that hegemony is evident in the Puerto Rican status question.  The island’s 
central political elites attempt to set status as the framework for political 
discourse by mobilising arguments – about colonialism, nationalism and state – 
with great persuasive power.  Ultimately, the performance and circulation of 
these discourses is intended to protect the legitimacy of the mainstream parties 
by concealing their internal ideological contradictions and lack of future 
planning for any definitive status resolution.  In Puerto Rico the status question 
is so hegemonic it obscures the reality that the parties themselves do not clearly 
understand how they differ from one another in terms of ideological principles 
beyond status.  Moreover, status conceals their vested and immediate interests 
to dominate political power.  Ironically, therefore, the elites use their stated 
wishes to change the system as discursive devices to dominate, and thereby 
reproduce, the existing system - and not necessarily to change it as per their 
status preferences.  The evidence would suggest, in sum, that Puerto Rican 
political elites are substantially less interested to resolve the status question 
than they would publicly claim. 
Having established that the status question was structurally dominant in 
Puerto Rican politics, the thesis then turned to examine the relationship 
between this dominance and everyday politics.  Chapter Five presented three 
case study sites where local political elites had implemented material changes 
to the everyday, lived environment of the municipalities in order to bring into 
being and normalise discourses of Puerto Rican identity that were consistent 
with their status positions.  These case studies demonstrated that the status 
question is not a predetermined aspect of Puerto Rican reality but rather 
constitutive of hegemonic discourses that are routinely brought into being and 





each municipality strongly indicated that their power exercises – on the surface 
to do with status – were at the same time entangled with other local priorities 
not necessarily related to status positions.  
Chapter Six therefore moved on to a deeper examination of the 
relationship between status positions and the structures and everyday practices 
of politics in these municipalities.  This focus confirmed that the mayors in 
Guaynabo, Caguas and Lares exercise their powers according to a range of 
ideologies and local priorities, including neoliberalism, paternalism, 
globalisation, participatory governance and clientelism.  Nonetheless, it noted 
that these strategies for local governance were still entangled with status 
positions through the routine practices of the municipal executives.  Guaynabo, 
Caguas and Lares were therefore considered sites of ‘entanglements of power’ 
(Sharp et al, 2000) where local political agendas and centrally prescribed, 
hegemonic status positions were intractably knotted together through 
performances of local state power.  Moreover, these entanglements were seen 
to create a complicated empirical terrain of effects that did not simply 
reproduce hegemonic status positions, but also contradict and subvert them in 
unexpected ways. 
As such, Chapter Seven argued that the Puerto Rican municipalities are 
sites of politics that transform the terms and significance of the Puerto Rican 
status question.  In both theory and practice, the municipalities have the 
potential to leave behind issues of nationalism and central state building in the 
pursuit of alternative political agendas that forge more direct connections to the 
material politics of everyday settings.  Conceptually, autonomous municipalities 
challenge the relevance of status by problematising its ontological framing 
around the central state - a scale that is cut across by the processes of 
decentralisation and globalisation.  Practically, the exercise of decentralised 
power in autonomous municipalities has created a series of effects that only a 
status resolution is supposed to make possible, according to dominant political 
discourses in Puerto Rico.  These effects - sovereignty, elevated standards of 





formally, to be a territory of the United States beneath Congressional 
sovereignty.  This is possible exactly because power is not simply held within a 
hierarchy of dominant and subordinate institutions, as per a centred view of 
power, but rather exercised in ways that enable individual and group actors to 
cut across this hierarchy (Allen, 2004).  In reality, therefore, such effects have 
been achieved beyond Puerto Rico’s territorial status, and not within it.  Perhaps 
one of the main reasons that Puerto Rico is currently stuck on the status 
question is that it is stuck on a centred view of power.  However, political 
practices in the municipalities clearly demonstrate that it is false to assume 
Puerto Ricans “live in a world of crushing systems that can stamp on all 
expectation” (Thrift, 2000a: 274).  
Remarkably, the outcomes of decentralised power exercises in Caguas 
are consistent with multiple new theories of decolonisation that have emerged 
from postcolonial experiences in the English-speaking Caribbean.  Caguas has 
found novel routes to postcolonialism via non-state-centric decolonisation, in 
the process bypassing the status question and the hegemonic discourses that 
underpin it.  Suggesting that Caguas is ‘postcolonial’ might jar with the views of 
many Puerto Ricans who read this thesis.  Postcolonial ideas have been rejected 
outright as inapplicable to an island that continues, formally, as a colony (see, 
for example, Lugo-Lugo, 2006).  The author is aware that he makes the above 
suggestion in a thesis which does not recommend an immediate and definitive 
solution to the status question according to the familiar mould of options.  As 
such, he is also aware that his thesis risks becoming the latest study to receive 
the condemnation of Puerto Rico’s academic and political establishment as 
politically paralysing work by an Anglosaxon on the island.  According to this 
logic, any work that fails to explicitly advocate the end of US colonialism (as 
hegemonically understood) ultimately reinforces Puerto Rico’s colonial status 
quo and defends colonialism by principle.  However, this project has been 
driven by an aim to investigate whether formal politics in Puerto Rico takes 





essentially colonial, ways of thinking.  The dominance of status in Puerto Rico 
precludes the ability of most elites to see things in a different way. 
This thesis has not, therefore, attempted to solve the status dilemma for 
Puerto Ricans.  The author hopes to have avoided reproducing the dominant 
narrative of Anglo-American researchers who enter Caribbean and Latin 
American fields in order to advise “beleaguered others” (Sletto and Kingsbury, 
2005: 13).  More modestly, the thesis has set out to advance new ideas about 
how the tranque, or dead-end, of Puerto Rican status politics might be overcome.  
In this regard it recommends no status option, nor indeed any immediate status 
change, but rather modest reforms to Puerto Rico’s existing representative 
democracy.  These reforms should aim to undermine the institutional practices 
of partisanship that adversely affect island politics, and stimulate non-
nationalist forms of political action and organisation.  This might involve 
encouraging the establishment of new parties, increasing the accountability of 
decision-makers to citizens, or taking seriously expressions of political agency 
informed by clear ideological principles beyond status.  Structural 
improvements to Puerto Rican democracy in the short and medium term might 
gradually break the monopoly of the mainstream parties over the status 
question and encourage more nonpartisan actors, such as communities, into the 
conversation. 
Two new status-neutral parties were recently founded in Puerto Rico.  
However, the struggles of the Puerto Ricans for Puerto Rico Party (PPR) and 
Working People’s Party (PPT) to find an electoral footing in 2008 and 2012 
demonstrates the difficulty of breaking the entrenched hegemony of status in 
practice.  Pending reforms, the non-nationalist ‘politics of small problems’ 
articulated in the municipalities might suggest the possibility of a useful shift in 
the current terms of the status debate.  The presently state-centric discussion 
would benefit from fresh proposals that more clearly articulate the 
opportunities, challenges and risks of different ideas about reorganising the 





debate that is not state-centric, but rather multiscalar, could ultimately lead to a 
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10.1 Plain language statement for interviewees 
 
 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT 
 
Mr Christopher Ellis (postgraduate researcher) 
PhD candidate 
Department of Geography, School of Geosciences 
University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom 
 
Tel. (PR) 1-787-478-2967 
Email s0897708@sms.ed.ac.uk 
   
Professor Jane Jacobs (supervisor of research) 
Chair in Cultural Geography 
Tel. +44 (0)131-650-2515 
 
Dr Jan Penrose (supervisor of research) 
Senior Lecturer in Human Geography 









I would like to invite you to participate in my doctoral thesis research about the impact of the Puerto 
Rican status debate on municipal politics.  You have been selected to participate as a political figure or 
senior civil servant in one of the three municipalities that are of interest to me.  The research aims to 
assess the real-world importance of the status issue using these municipal case studies.   
 
The research has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of Geosciences, and is 
funded by the UK government-funded Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). Please note 
that I am in Puerto Rico as an independent researcher with no affiliation to any political party or law 
enforcement agency. 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
 
Should you agree to participate, I would like you to interview you.  The exact length of the interview 
shall depend on your availability, but should not be more than 50 minutes.  With your permission, the 
interview shall be recorded with an mp3 voice recorder so that I can have an accurate record of what 
you say.  The conversation shall then be transcribed. 
 
How will my anonymity and confidentiality be protected? 
 
Data collected in the interview is for research purposes.  You shall be asked if you would prefer to 
remain anonymous in the interview transcription; if so, your request shall be honoured.  However, in 





Ethical Practice (2002), please note that as a public figure it may not be possible to disguise your 
identity completely. 
 
I shall provide you upon request with copies of the voice recording and / or transcript at a later date.  
You are then free to request the removal of any part of the conversation.  I guarantee you 
confidentiality in respect of this information. However, I do have an ethical duty as a researcher to 
report evidence of serious crime, such as abuse of individuals under the age of 18, to the police. 
 
How will I receive feedback? 
 
When my thesis has been completed, a brief summary of the findings shall be made available to you 
on request via email.  It is also likely that I shall present the results at academic conferences in Puerto 
Rico and overseas, and write articles in academic journals. 
 
Right to withdrawal 
 
Please note that your participation in this study is completely voluntary.  Should you wish to withdraw 
at any stage, or to withdraw any data you have supplied, you are free to do so without prejudice. 
 
Where can I get further information? 
 
Should you require any further information, or have any concerns, please do not hesitate to contact 
either myself or my supervisor.  Should you have any concerns about the conduct of the project, you 
are welcome to contact the Ethics Committee of the School of Geosciences, University of Edinburgh, at 
ethics@geos.ed.ac.uk. 
 
How do I agree to participate? 
 
You can agree to participate by contacting me via email or telephone, or by simple verbal consent 































10.3 Interview schedules 
 
 
Pilot work with central politicians 
 
Questions around the following key themes: 
 1.  Formal political structure (status discourse) 
 2.  Party political practice (everyday action) 




Briefly about myself – I am a postgraduate research student from the University 
of Edinburgh, Scotland, and am completing a thesis on contemporary status 
politics in Puerto Rico.  Before we begin, I would like to show you this plain 
language statement, which outlines who I am, what I’m doing, and how I hope to 
use the information from our conversation. 
 
-Would you prefer that we talk in Spanish or English? 
-Do I have your consent to proceed? 






-[If interviewee was elected] Congratulations for your electoral success - why do 
you think the public voted for you?  [If not] Could you explain why you think 
Puerto Ricans should vote for your party?  
 (Is a vote for your party a vote for your domestic policies, the 
 personalities of your candidates, your status position?) 
 
-What do you think are the day-to-day concerns of the Puerto Rican people? 
 
-Could you offer me your opinion on Pedro Pierluisi's HR2499 plebiscite 
proposal in Congress? 
  
1.  Formal political structure (status discourse) 
 
-Can you explain why independence / statehood / commonwealth represents 
the best future for Puerto Rico? 
 






-How likely do you think it is that Puerto Rico will become independent / the 
51st state / achieve enhancements to commonwealth?  (What do you perceive 
are the barriers to the achievement of this status?) 
 
-Can you explain how independence / statehood / enhanced commonwealth 
shall improve the quality of life of Puerto Ricans? 
 
-What do all members of your party have in common ideologically other than a 
status preference?  (For example, how are your social or economic policies 
different from those of the other parties?) 
 
 
2.  Party political practice (everyday action) 
 
-Could you tell me about the work you perform as a legislator / party leader? 
 
-How do you divide your time between these activities? 
 
-[Follow-up questions based upon information given to add depth] 
 
 
3.  Relation of political structure to political practice (translation of status 
desire into action) 
 
-What provisions has the party made for the achievement of 
statehood/independence/improvements to the Commonwealth?  (What is the 
party doing at the moment towards the aim of achieving 
statehood/independence/Commonwealth?) 
 
-What happens to your party once independence / statehood / enhanced 
commonwealth is achieved?  Have you thought about this? 
 
-Could you give me an idea of how often the status issue appears in your 
everyday work?  (How does it appear?) 
 
-Do you think your position on status affects the decisions you make as a central 





-Thank you very much for your time.  Is there anything else you would like to 





Main study with municipal elites (political and bureaucratic) 
 
Questions around the following key themes:  
 1.  Formal political structure (status discourse) 
 2.  Local political practice (everyday action) 
 3.  Relation of formal political structure to local political practice 




Briefly about myself – I am a postgraduate research student from the University 
of Edinburgh, Scotland, and am completing a thesis on contemporary status 
politics in Puerto Rico. I am interested in how the status question may influence 
municipal governance and identity.  Before we begin, I would like to show you 
this plain language statement, which outlines who I am, what I’m doing, and 
how I hope to use the information from our conversation. 
 
-Would you prefer that we talk in Spanish or English? 
-Do I have your consent to proceed? 






-[For politicians / Mayor] Congratulations for your local electoral success - why 
do you think the public voted for you? 
 
-[For all] How did you get involved in local politics / the local administration? 
 
1.  Formal political structure (status discourse)  
 
[These questions are for politicians only, as civil service directors are not 
necessarily affiliated to the party in power] 
 
-Can you explain why independence / statehood / commonwealth represents 
the best future for Puerto Rico? 
 
-Why are you in disagreement with the other two status options? 
 
-Aside from your position on status, what political views define and unify your 
party? (For example, how are your social or economic policies different from 






2.  Local political practice (everyday action) 
 
-Could you tell me about your role in local government?  (What does your 
position involve?) 
 
-What are the key political issues in the municipality? 
 
-What do you think are the day-to-day concerns of your constituents?  (Could 
you tell me a little about how you are dealing with them?) 
 
-When disagreements occur between yourself and other decision makers in the 
municipality, what are the disagreements usually about?  (What sorts of issues 
cause disagreement, and why?  Can you think of any examples?) 
 
3.  Relation of central structural politics to local political practice (municipal 
identity) 
 
-[Mayor] What is your vision for the municipality? / [All others] What do you 
understand as the mayors' vision for the municipality? 
 
-What does it mean to be Guaynabeño / Cagueño / Lareño? 
 
-Could you explain to me the meaning of Guaynabo City / El Nuevo País de Caguas / 
Ciudad de los Cielos Abiertos?  What do you understand to be the meaning of the 
other two city slogans? 
 
-Can you tell me anything about how Guaynabo City / El Nuevo País de Caguas / 
Ciudad de los Cielos Abiertos came to be? 
 
-Do you perceive that these slogans are related to the status question?  (If so, how?) 
 
-Can you think of any ways in which the status issue has appeared during your day-
to-day work in the municipality?  (Can you think of any examples where national 
status issues affected local decisions or events in the municipality?  If so, could you 
explain what happened, and how?) 
 
-[Politicians] Do you think your own position on status informs the decisions you 
make in the municipality? 
 
-[Minority legislators and civil servants]  Do you perceive that the status preference 
of the mayor and majority legislators has an effect on the work they perform in the 
municipality?  (I.e., do you see local status biases that the majority party cannot, or 
would deny?) 
 
Warm-down  Thank you very much for your time.  Is there anything else you 





10.4 Sample interview transcript (Spanish) 
 
Andrés Rodriguez Rivera, PIP Guaynabo, 17 February 2011 
 
CE: ¿Me puede explicar un poco sobre su papel en el gobierno municipal, y en el 
proceso de la toma de decisiones? 
 
AR: Pues mira, nuestro papel, como tú sabes somos minoría, en mi caso, somos 
minoría de uno, lo que quiere decir que yo dependo a uno de la oposición, ya sea 
del partido de la mayoria, o del segundo partido, para si quiera presentar una 
moción, porque si presento una moción, y esta moción no la secunda nadie, allí 
muere.  Ni siquiera va a la votación.  
 
Por tal razón, ser minoría de uno, te impone que tú por lo menos tengas que 
consultar por lo menos un legislador de los otros bandos para ver si presentas 
una mocion, pueden apoyar, o por lo menos será considerada.  Pero aún así, 
tenemos un rol importante de fiscalización, porque aunque cierto es que ellos 
pueden aprobar todos sus proyectos sin nuestros votos, porque no hace 
diferencia en términos prácticos reales, lo cierto es que un voto a favor nuestro, 
es una medida yo presiento es, en cierto modo, un endoso de que la oposicion 
acepta y esta de acuerdo con lo que se está presentando. 
 
Por ejemplo, si yo voto en contra, como quiera medida que será aprobada, si es 
que sea el caso, pero, ellos van a tener que convencerme quizás, si voto a favor o 
no a favor.  Tengo la opción de denunciar fuera del hemiciclo, que no pongo el 
proyecto, cuáles son las razones por la que entiendo ese proyecto no debió 
aprobarse, y puedo convocar a una conferencia de prensa, y llevarme el mensaje 
mas allá de las paredes del hemiciclo.  En ese sentido, yo veo la gran 
importancia a que la minoría ... si son muchas o pocas, estén presentes.  Y 
participen del debate, del dialogo, para llevar el mensaje más alla del grupo de 
legisladores.  Cosas que cada vez que ellos vayan a tornar (tomar) una decisión, 
por lo menos tenga una impresion que hay alguien que puede llevar mas alla el 
mensaje, de que se aprobó algo que no debió aprobarse, o que se rechazó algo 
que debió aprobarse. 
 
 En ese sentido yo veo mi función de gran importancia aún cuando sea una 
persona.   
 
CE: ¿Y cuales son los claves issues, o temas politicos en este municipio? 
 
AR: Bueno, es distinto cuando tú estás en en la legislatura estatal, y en la 
legislatura municipal.  Porque en la legislatura estatal, los temas que se tocan 
son temas que cubren toda la isla, inclusive el estatus.  La legislatura municipal 
basicamente lo que hacemos, es uno, fiscalizar al gobierno municipal, y segundo, 
hacer aportaciones para que se forme en parte de la ley en el municipio.  No 
podemos ir mas alla de eso.  Claro tambien que podemos hacer planteamientos, 





10.5 Sample interview transcript (English) 
 
 
Wednesday 19 August 2009, 3.20-4pm.  Department of State, Old San Juan.  
Interviewee: Mr Kenneth McClintock, Puerto Rican Secretary of State.  New 
Progressive Party (pro-statehood). 
 
CE: To tell you a little bit about myself, I’m a postgraduate in human geography, 
and I’m, I’m fascinated by Puerto Rico’s status question, and I’m interested to 





CE: why it keeps getting returned to.  Er… I’m also interested in the way it’s 
portrayed in the public sphere, through political institutions, cultural 
institutions, the radio, newspapers, even education systems as well.  So, that’s 
what I’m interested in, I’m an early stage researcher, but that’s where I’m 
coming from at the moment.  So firstly, I’d like to congratulate you and your 
party’s success in - 
 
KM: Er, one second, one moment.  It’s a reporter, I got to… Bob? Hi.  Yeah, I’m 
here. 
 
[interrupted by ten-minute press call] 
 
CE: Where were we... I was saying before that… Yes, congratulations to your 
party on its recent successes in the gubernatorial elections at the end of last 
year.  Why do you think the NPP won by such a landslide? 
 
KM: Well, I think we won basically because of two issues.  One of them is the 
condition of the economy, and the fact that the past administration really 
contributed to creating the problem rather than being part of the solution.  Er, 
you know, the recession in PR began in March of 2006 long before the national 
recession began. Is the first time in history that a local recession begins before 
the national recession has begun.  Er, They closed down the government for 2 
weeks in May of 2006.  It was done more as a... as a pressure… tactic, it wasn’t 
necessary to do so, it did not save any money to do so, but it had the effect of 
reducing the… the level of... of confidence people that had in our government 
and in the economy as such.  Uh, the second big issue was political status, er, 
although a vote for our party was not necessarily a vote for statehood, but we 
made full use of the fact that the past administration for the past 8 years had 
been trying to separate PR from the rest of the nation, er, had... were using er... 
arguments that PR should… draw farther away from the rest of the nation ... and 
the truth is the immense majority of PR want to maintain or increase the 













































(Source: Gobierno Municipal Autónomo de Guaynabo, 2011) 
